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Introduction
The thesis is structured in two different parts that encompass aspects of two fields
of Economics. The first part focuses on Game Theory and the second part on Social
Choice Theory.
Game Theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interaction among
rational decision-makers. Modern Game Theory began with the publication of the
ground-breaking book “Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour,” by Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1945). All subsequent work in Game Theory is strongly
influenced by this book, which defines the basis of what today is known as “classic
Game Theory". The methods of this discipline are currently applied successfully to
a large number of fields such as economics, biology, sociology and political science.
In Game Theory two different approaches are distinguished: on the one hand,
there are non-cooperative or competitive games, in which each player has strate-
gies and looks for her maximum benefit without making any binding agreement
between players. On the other hand, there are cooperative games in which players
can make binding agreements. The thesis follows the latter approach; i.e., players
can cooperate by forming coalitions in order to obtain benefits. These games focus
on predicting what coalitions will form and how benefits will be distributed among
the players.
Cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games) consist of a set of agents
and a characteristic function that allocates a worth to each possible coalition. A so-
lution is a function that associates each game with a non-empty set of payoff vec-
tors. Based on different notions of fairness, different solution concepts have been
proposed. One of the most important solution concepts is the core (Gillies, 1953),
which assigns payoff vectors to each game such that no coalition can simultaneously
provide a higher payoff to each of its members. The core of a game may be empty
(see Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1965). If the core is non-empty, it does not neces-
sarily contain a unique payoff vector. Two relevant solutions that assign a unique




TU games have been related to rationing problems. O’Neill (1982) provides a sim-
ple mathematical model, which has been extensively analyzed, to explain a wide va-
riety of economic problems such as bankruptcy, partnerships, and taxation, among
others. This model, known as the (conflicting) claims problem, studies situations in
which there are a group of agents with individual claims and a resource (endow-
ment) to be allocated which is insufficient to meet all agents’ claims. In a rationing
problem, the question to be addressed is how the resource should be divided among
the agents. A division rule is a function that associates each rationing problem with
a division proposal so that each agent receives a nonnegative amount that does not
exceed her claim. O’Neill shows that a rationing problem can be rationalized in
terms of transferable utilities as a TU game, in which the worth of each coalition is
calculated as the maximum worth between zero and the difference between the en-
dowment and the sum of the claims of the agents out of that coalition. Thus, in some
cases, a solution for a rationing problem coincides with an explicit solution of TU
games. For instance, the recursive completion method (also known as the random
arrival rule) coincides with the Shapley value and the Contested Garment Division
rule (also known as the Babylonian Talmud rule) coincides with the nucleolus.
A frequent assumption in TU games is that the grand coalition will form. Thus,
many game-theoretic solutions have been defined only with reference to that coali-
tion. However, there are situations in which acting together can be costly or unfea-
sible so the grand coalition fails to form. Hence, a coalition structure or partition
is defined as a collection of pairwise disjoint coalitions whose union is equal to the
set of agents. Aumann and Drèze (1974) introduce cooperative games with coalition
structures to define solutions also with reference to an arbitrary partition.
Later, Dreze and Greenberg (1980) consider cooperative games with coalition
structures as a natural framework for studying of situations in which agents have
preferences over the coalitions to which they may belong. In these games, formally
known as hedonic games or coalition formation problems, each agent only cares
about the identity of the agents in her coalition. Coalition formation problems en-
compass a wide array of models studied in the literature. Depending on which coali-
tions are feasible, matching problems are a well-known subclass of coalition forma-
tion problems. Examples of such problems are the marriage problem, the roommate
problem, and the many-to-one and many-to-many matching problems such as hos-
pitals/doctors or students/schools problems. There are also economic environments
in which coalitions produce outputs to be divided among their members according
to a pre-specified sharing rule. In such situations, the sharing rule naturally induces
a coalition formation game where each agent ranks the coalitions to which she may
belong according to the payoffs obtainable in each of them.
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In some economic environments, the formation of coalitions may lead to a con-
flict to decide what coalition to form. Such conflicts are well described by Demange
(1994), who explains the existence of two opposing fundamental forces: on the one
hand, the increasing returns to scale, which incentivizes agents to cooperate and
therefore to form large groups, and on the other hand, the heterogeneity of agents,
which pushes them towards forming small groups. As a result of these forces, two
main questions arise: (i) What coalitions will be formed? and (ii) how will agents
share the profits resulting from the coalitions formed? Observe that these two ques-
tions are related: agents’ payoffs depend on what coalitions form, while the coali-
tions formed depend on the payoffs available to each agent in each possible coalition.
In answering the question of what partitions will form, the most appealing no-
tion for these games is core stability. A partition is (core) stable if there is no coalition
whose members strictly prefer that coalition to the one to which they belong in the
partition. Since coalition formation problems may have an empty core, many papers
restrict the domain of these games in order to guarantee the existence of stability (for
more details, see Banerjee et al., 2001; Bogomolnaia et al., 2002; Iehlé, 2007). Observe
that, unlike Aumann and Drèze (1974), in coalition formation problems, a stable par-
tition is obtained endogenously as the outcome of the problem.1
Social Choice Theory studies the different ways of aggregating agents’ opinions or
preferences in order to take a collective decision. It concerns the aggregation of indi-
vidual inputs (e.g., votes, preferences, welfare) into collective outputs (e.g., collective
decisions, preferences, welfare). Some of the main questions are: How can a group of
individuals choose a winning outcome (e.g., policy, electoral candidate) from a given
set of alternatives? Which are the properties of different voting mechanisms? How
can a collective (e.g., electorate, legislature, or committee) arrive at collective pref-
erence on the basis of its members’ individual preferences? The influence of Social
Choice Theory extends across economics, political science, philosophy, mathematics,
and recently computer science.
At the heart of Social Choice Theory is the analysis of preference aggregation,
understood as the aggregation of several individuals’ preference rankings of two or
more alternatives into a single, collective preference ranking (or choice) over these
alternatives. Arrow (1963) introduces a general approach to the study of preference
aggregation. He considers a class of possible aggregation methods, which he calls
social welfare functions, and asks which of them satisfy certain axioms or desiderata.
He proves that when there are three or more alternatives, no function can convert the
1Hart and Kurz (1983) also study cooperative games with endogenous coalition structures for the
case of NTU games.
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preference rankings of the agents into a social ranking meeting a specified set of cri-
teria: unrestricted domain (i.e., all rankings across the alternatives are feasible for
each agent), non-dictatorship (i.e., the social ranking need not be always equal to the
ranking of a particular agent), Pareto efficiency (i.e., if all agents agree on a partic-
ular binary comparison, then the social ranking should rank that pair according to
that unanimous opinion), and independence of irrelevant alternatives (i.e., the social
ranking across any two alternatives should depend only on the individual prefer-
ences of that pair). This result, known as Arrow’s impossibility theorem, prompted
much work and many debates in Social Choice Theory and welfare economics.
Some of the work done in Social Choice Theory since then has focused on the
vulnerability of social choice rules to strategic voting. A basic result in this context
is given by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard et al., 1973; Satterthwaite,
1975), which states an impossibility regarding the selection of a winning alternative
as the social outcome (instead of a social ranking). The theorem states that there is no
rule with a range other than two that satisfies the properties of unrestricted domain,
non-dictatorship, and strategy-proofness (i.e., no agent would obtain a better out-
come by lying about her preference ranking). This result is the basis of a growing lit-
erature in strategy-proofness. One main conclusion of that theorem is that in order to
construct non-dictatorial social choice rules that induce truth-telling, it is necessary
either to restrict the range of the rules to two alternatives or to restrict the domain
of admissible preferences of each agent. Since rules with range of two alternatives
are not Pareto efficient on the universal preference domain, much of the research on
strategy-proofness has been focused on the existence of domain restrictions which
allow for non-trivial strategy-proof social choice rules, and the characterization of
such rules, when possible.
Many domain restrictions have been studied for the analysis of strategy-proofness,
e.g., domains where preferences are single-peaked (Black, 1948a,b) or single-dipped
(Barberà et al., 2012). Both these domains arise naturally when alternatives can be
located on the real line such as in the location of public facilities. Single-peaked pref-
erences are commonly used when proximity to the public facility is desirable and
single-dipped preferences when such proximity is not desirable.
A preference is single-peaked if (i) there is a single most preferred alternative (the
peak); and (ii) for each alternative x situated between the peak and another alterna-
tive y, x is preferred to y. The domain of single-peaked preferences was discussed
first by Black (1948a,b), who shows that the median voter rule, which selects the
median of the declared peaks, is strategy-proof and selects the Condorcet winner.
Moulin (1980) and Barberà and Jackson (1994) characterize the set of all strategy-
proof rules on this domain: Generalized median voter rules. In contrast, a preference
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is single-dipped whenever (i) there is a single worst alternative (the dip); and (ii) for
each alternative x located between another alternative y and the dip, y is preferred
to x. Barberà et al. (2012) and Manjunath (2014) show that in this domain all non-
dictatorial strategy-proof rules have a range of two alternatives. They then show that
this domain cannot escape from the classical impossibility. However, these authors
also fortunately prove that there are rules for the single-dipped preference domain
with range two that are strategy-proof, non-dictatorial, and Pareto efficient. They
also provide a characterization of such rules.
This thesis consists of three chapters, where questions raised by previous litera-
ture are analyzed from a theoretical point of view. Specifically, the thesis proposes a
new model for dealing with coalition formation games that emerge under rationing
situations in which stability and the structure of the stable partitions are analyzed
(Chapters 1 and 2) and analyzes the strategy-proof social choice rules for locating
public facilities in a particular preference domain(Chapter 3). Despite the close in-
terconnection in their approaches, especially between the first two chapters, all the
chapters are intended to stand as self-contained papers. The main results are briefly
described below.
Chapter 1: Rationing rules and stable partitions.
Chapter 1 studies the formation of coalitions under rationing situations. In several
economic and political environments such as the provision of public goods and the
formation of clubs or labor unions, agents act by forming coalitions in order to get
a joint output. These outputs are not usually sufficient to meet all the claims and
they are divided according to a pre-specified rule. When several coalitions can be
formed, agents establish a preference ranking over coalitions according to their in-
dividual payoffs obtained by the rule applied. An example used in the chapter is
that of a call for funding research projects. Researchers form teams to submit a
project in order to receive funding to develop the project. The money that each team
may receive depends on the competence of the group and the quality of the project.
Moreover, it usually happens that the money to be assigned is insufficient to meet
all researchers’ claims. Observe that claims here may be related to the CVs of the
researchers or to the amount of money that each researcher considers necessary to
carry out her part of the project. Since each researcher looks for the highest possible
amount of money, the payoffs obtained by the rule applied to distribute the money
among the researchers induces them to rank the teams in which they may partici-
pate. Chapter 1 (Subsection 1.2.1) introduces a generalized claims problem to deal
with coalition formation problems in bankruptcy situations bringing together two
different branches of the literature hitherto analyzed separately: claims problems
and coalition formation problems. We also introduce a new class of coalition forma-
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tion problems, regular coalition formation problems, and show that this class guar-
antees the non-emptiness of the core (Proposition 1.3.1). The main result (Theorem
1.3.8) provides a characterization of all rationing rules that guarantee the existence
of (core) stable partitions. We show that these rules satisfy two appealing properties
(along with continuity): Resource monotonicity and consistency. Finally, we analyze
a well-known class of rules that satisfy the properties required: Parametric rules
(Stovall, 2014; Young, 1987). The main feature of these rules is that the individual
payoff of each agent can be obtained by a function that depends only on her claim
and a parameter, which is common to all agents. Significant parametric rules are
the Proportional Rule, the Constrained Equal Awards (CEA) Rule, the Constrained
Equal Losses (CEL) Rule, and the Talmud Rule. We provide an alternative proof of
the main result of the chapter for the class of parametric rules in Proposition 1.3.9.
Chapter 2: Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims prob-
lems.
Chapter 2 continues the analysis of the model introduced in Chapter 1. The char-
acterization provided in Chapter 1 is an existence result of stability but say nothing
about the structure of the stable partitions. This second chapter focuses on analyzing
how agents organize themselves into coalitions to form stable partitions and seeks
to answer the questions of what size stable partitions have will have and which
agents will sort themselves together. The results in Chapter 1 hold for any vector
of claims and any endowments, which gives full flexibility and makes complex the
study of the structure of stable partitions a complex task. We therefore introduce
a non-singleton proportional generalized claims problem as a generalized claims
problem where endowments are restricted in such a way that singleton coalitions
get a zero endowment and the remaining endowments are a fixed proportion of the
sum of their members’ claims. Note that by giving a zero endowment to singletons,
the model encourages cooperation between agents, which usually happens in many
economic situations such as research team funding. With this model in hand, we
characterize all stable partitions when the rule applied is continuous, strict resource
monotonic, and consistent. More specifically, we find that in each stable partition
there is at most one singleton and coalitions of a size larger than two are feasible
only if each agent in those coalitions receives a proportional payoff (Theorem 2.3.2).
Moreover, when the monotonicity condition is weakened, not all stable partitions
are characterized but the existence of a pairwise stable partition; i.e., a stable parti-
tion formed by coalitions with a size of at most two is guaranteed (Theorem 2.3.3).
Clearly, the way in which agents sort themselves into those pairwise stable parti-
tions may differ depending on the rule applied. To analyze the particular structure
of such pairwise stable partitions, we examine two egalitarian parametric rules: The
CEA and CEL rules. We propose two algorithms, one for each rule, for determining
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a pairwise stable partition. More specifically, the CEA algorithm gives rise to a pair-
wise stable partition by sequentially pairing off either the two highest claim agents
or the highest with the lowest claim agent (Theorem 2.3.4). For CEL, the algorithm
sequentially pairs off the two lowest claim agents (Theorem 2.3.6).
Chapter 3: Strategy-proofness on a mixed domain of single-peaked
and single-dipped preferences.
Chapter 3 analyzes the problem of locating a public facility taking into account indi-
viduals’ preferences. In these real-life situations, a social planner (the government of
a city or a region) must decide where a public good (such as a school or a hospital)
or a public bad (such as a prison or a nuclear power plant) is located. In addition to
technical constraints and monetary limitations, public officials may also be interested
in considering citizens’ preferences when taking the final decision. This could be in-
terpreted as a political strategy or simply a desire to maximize their citizens’ welfare.
When the public facility to be considered is a public good such as a school, a natural
restricted domain is the single-peaked preference domain, while if a public bad has
to be located, then the single-dipped preference domain arises naturally. This chap-
ter considers the location of a public facility that does not cause a unanimous opin-
ion among agents such as a dog park or a dance club. A mixed domain that includes
both single-peaked and single-dipped preferences may seem a natural restricted do-
main for such cases. However, Berga and Serizawa (2000) and Achuthankutty and
Roy (2018) show that when all single-peaked and all single-dipped preferences are
admissible for each agent, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility holds. Therefore,
more restrictions on the domain are needed. Restricted mixed domains have been
studied by Thomson (2008) and Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz (2018), among others. In
Chapter 3, we construct a new domain in which the social planner knows the type
of preference of each agent (single-peaked or single-dipped), but is totally uncertain
as to the structure of those preferences and, in particular, about the location of the
peak or the dip. We characterize all strategy-proof rules on this domain and show
that they are all also group strategy-proof on that domain (Theorem 3.4.8). We also
analyze which rules of the characterized family satisfy Pareto efficiency (Proposition
3.5.1).
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Chapter 1
Rationing rules and stable partitions
Abstract
This chapter introduces a new model of coalition formation. It assumes that agents
have claims over the outputs that they could produce by forming coalitions. Each
output is insufficient to meet the claims of its members and is rationed by a rule
whose proposals of division induce each agent to rank the coalitions to which she
belongs. As a result, a coalition formation problem arises. Assuming continuous
rules, we show that resource monotonic and consistent rules are the only rules that
always induce coalition formation problems that admit stable partitions.
1.1 Introduction
Agents such as individuals, firms and institutions seek to form alliances with the
aim of achieving profits to be divided according to their aspirations,1 which are of-
ten impossible to satisfy. When there are many profitable coalitions and agents have
conflicts over in which coalition take part, the rule used to distribute profits will
specify which coalitions are likely to form.
Consider, for instance, a community of households that has to install a public fa-
cility which provides a certain benefit to each of them. Suppose that each subgroup
of households can equip itself with that facility as long as it is efficient (joint benefit
is greater than the provision cost) to do so. Each coalitional cost is divided by a rule
among its members according to individual benefits. Each household will seek to
minimize its payment and will rank the coalitions in which it takes part accordingly.
Consequently, which coalitions of households build the facility will depend on the
1Aspirations are depicted by a one-dimensional quantifiable factor such as claim, demand, effort,
etc. depending on the context.
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rule used. Examples of such situations arise in the provision of local public goods
and of club goods, the formation of jurisdictions and of research teams and others.
As a second scenario, consider a call for funding research projects. Researchers form
teams to apply for funding knowing that the outcome depends on their composition
and the quality of the project. Typically, the money assigned to a funded project falls
short of meeting the researchers’ aspirations2 and participation in a single team is a
prerequisite of the call. Clearly, each researcher aims for the highest possible share
of the funding so the payoffs proposed by the rule, which takes the agents’ aspira-
tions as input, in the distribution of funding play a key role in how researchers rank
the teams in which they may participate. Regardless of whether agents maximize
payoffs or minimize payments, these two examples are formally identical. In this
chapter we mainly use the second interpretation.
We deal with problems with the following ingredients: (i) a set of agents with
their claims, which are commonly known; (ii) for each subgroup of agents, called
coalition, an endowment which is insufficient to meet the claims of its members and
(iii) a rule that for each coalition induces a payoffs’ vector. Consequently, each agent
establishes a preference relation over coalitions. Each agent’s preference relation is
based on her payoffs in the coalitions to which she belongs but it does not depend
on the identity of the other members of the coalition. The structure of those pref-
erences is decisive in the formation of the coalitions. Whether or not the resulting
preferences generate a stable partition of coalitions is an essential issue. Thus, an-
alyzing which class of rules always induces stable partitions is relevant not only in
providing a better understanding of coalition formation but also from a normative
point of view when choosing division rules.
The formal literature on claims problems began with O’Neill (1982). In a claims
problem the endowment is insufficient to meet all agents’ claims. A rule proposes
a division such that every agent receives a non-negative payoff which does not ex-
ceed her claim. Two appealing properties of rules are resource monotonicity and
consistency. Resource monotonicity is the requirement that when the endowment
increases, each agent should receive at least as much as initially. The idea behind
consistency is the following: Consider a problem and the distribution given by the
rule for it. Imagine that some agents take their payoffs and leave. At that point, re-
assess the situation of the remaining agents, that is, consider the problem of dividing
among them what remains of the endowment. A consistent rule should assign to the
remaining agents the same payoffs as initially.3
2In this example aspirations are linked to expertise and although researchers may tend to overes-
timate their own, objective measures such as CVs bind them.
3Consistency is a property with a fertile history in the literature on social choice and cooperative
game theory. This principle adapted to diverse areas differs in the precise definition of the reduced
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The literature on coalition formation problems, initiated by Dreze and Green-
berg (1980), is based on the idea that each agent’s preference relation over coalitions
depends on the identities of their members. Informally, a partition (of agents into
coalitions) is stable if there is no coalition in which each agent is better off. Coalition
formation problems may not have stable partitions and identifying classes of coali-
tion formation problems that have stable partitions has been a central issue in this
literature.4
Our approach to coalition formation problems bridges these two branches of the
literature. Specifically, the question addressed in this chapter is which rules, given
any list of claims problems, that is, any generalized claims problem, induce coalition
formation problems that have stable partitions. In answering this question we intro-
duce a new class of coalition formation problems, called regular coalition formation
problems. This class includes the problems that satisfy the “common ranking prop-
erty" (Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988) and is contained in the class of stable coalition
formation problems that satisfy the “top coalition property" (Banerjee et al., 2001)
(Proposition 1.3.1).
Then, we characterize the class of rules that always induce coalition formation
problems that have stable partitions. Our main result is that only resource mono-
tonic and consistent rules (among continuous rules) guarantee the existence of coali-
tion formation problems that have stable partitions (Theorem 1.3.8). Thus, non-
consistent rules commonly analyzed in claims problems such as the random arrival
rule (O’Neill, 1982) fail to guarantee stability. However, a host of continuous rules
satisfy resource monotonicity and consistency. The most important ones belong to
the class of (symmetric and asymmetric) parametric rules (see Stovall, 2014; Young,
1987).5 In Proposition 1.3.9, we give a simple proof of the fact that parametric rules
always induce coalition formation problems that have stable partitions. However,
they are not the only rules that generate coalition formation problems that have sta-
ble partitions. There are continuous non-parametric rules that also do so. This is
the grounds for justifying a characterization of rules beyond the class of parametric
rules stated in Theorem 1.3.8.
problems (see, for instance Thomson and Lensberg, 1989). For an extensive review of consistency see
Moulin (2004) and Thomson (2015).
4See for instance Banerjee et al. (2001), Bogomolnaia et al. (2002) and Iehlé (2007).
5Proportional, constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, the Talmud rule (Auman and
Maschler, 1985), the reverse Talmud rule (Schummer et al., 2001) and the dictatorial rule with priority
are parametric rules.
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Related literature
Our work is inspired by Pycia (2012), who deals with a unified coalition formation
model that includes many-to-one matching problems with externalities. He intro-
duces the “pairwise alignment property", which requires that any two agents order
any two coalitions to which they both belong in the same way. Then he shows that
in the setting of bargaining problems this property guarantees stability. By contrast,
we restrict ourselves to coalition formation problems and we weaken the property of
pairwise alignment by requiring only that any two agents who share two coalitions
do not order them in opposite ways. This property is not sufficient to guarantee
stability and other requirements have to be met to achieve stability. We impose ab-
sence of “rings" (cyclicity among coalitions).6 These two conditions define the class
of “regular" coalition formation problems.
As an application, Pycia enriches the coalition formation model by assuming that
coalitions produce outputs to be divided among their members according to their
bargaining power. Then, he characterizes the bargaining rules that induce coalition
formation problems that have stable partitions. Unlike Pycia, we do not specify a
utility function for each agent, but rather a claim; we assume that each coalitional
output is insufficient to accommodate the claims of all its members. Then we im-
pose rules that satisfy continuity, resource monotonicity, and consistency. Pycia has
already established a link between consistency and stability (see footnote 5 in his
paper). Exploiting this idea, we find that consistency together with resource mono-
tonicity and continuity characterize the class of rules guaranteeing the existence of
coalition formation problems that have stable partitions. The intuition why this cou-
pling is fruitful is the following: The exit (or entry) of some agents from (to) a coali-
tion, regardless of whether or not it is accompanied by changes in output, does not
affect the payoffs of the remaining agents in opposite directions. This generates weak
pairwise alignment preferences without rings.
Two other articles bear some relation with the current chapter. Alcalde and Re-
villa (2004) explore the existence of stable research teams, when each agent’s pref-
erence depends on the identity of the members of the team with which she collabo-
rates. The assumption that agents’ preferences satisfy the “tops responsiveness" con-
dition7 guarantees the existence of stable research teams. The formation of research
teams facing a call for funding has been used to motivate our coalition formation
6There are different definitions of cyclicity among coalitions: For instance, Chung (2000) defines
it for roommate problems with weak preferences while Inal (2015) does it for coalition formation
problems with strict preferences. To avoid confusion, as in computer science, we use the word rings
to describe cyclicity among coalitions.
7This assumption is based on the idea of how each researcher thinks different colleagues can com-
plement her abilities.
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problem. However, unlike these authors, we do not impose restrictions on agents’
preferences other than those induced by the rule. Barberà et al. (2015) consider coali-
tions in which individuals are endowed with productivity parameters whose sum
gives an output. Members of each coalition decide by a majority vote between mer-
itocratic and egalitarian divisions of the output so that one coalition may choose
meritocracy while another chooses egalitarianism. Like them, we endow each indi-
vidual with a claim, but we assume that the output is insufficient to satisfy all claims
and that its division among agents is dictated by a single rule. These two articles,
like ours, analyze the stability of coalition formation problems.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 contains the prelimi-
naries on claims problems and on coalition formation problems used to define our
coalition formation problem. It also contains a result on coalition formation prob-
lems. The characterization and other results are presented in Section 1.3. Section 1.4
concludes.
1.2 The model
This section presents the preliminaries of two models that have been extensively
analyzed in the literature: claims problems and coalition formation problems. It also
presents a new model defined by combining some ingredients of the two literatures.
First, we introduce some notation. Let N be the set of potential agents and N the
set of all non-empty finite subsets of N. Given N ∈ N and x, y ∈ RN , we write that
x = y if for each i ∈ C, xi ≥ yi.
1.2.1 Claims problems
Consider a group of agents who have claims on a certain endowment, this endow-
ment being insufficient to satisfy all the claims. A primary example is bankruptcy,
where agents are the creditors of a firm and the endowment is its liquidation value,
but here, we have in mind a more general interpretation of the data (see introduc-
tion).
Formally, let N ∈ N . Let ci be agent i’s claim and c = (ci)i∈N the claims vec-
tor. Let E ∈ R+ be the endowment. A claims problem with agent set S is a pair
(c, E) ∈ RN+ × R+ such that
∑
i∈N ci ≥ E. Let C
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An allocation for (c,E) ∈ CN is a vector x = (xi)i∈N ∈ RN+ that satisfies the non-
negativity and claim boundedness conditions 0 5 x 5 c, and the efficiency condition∑
i∈N xi = E.
A rule is a function F defined on C that associates with each N ∈ N and each
(c, E) ∈ CN an allocation for (c, E). Let F denote the set of rules.
A rule is continuous if small changes in the data of the problem do not lead to
large changes in the chosen allocation.8 Hereafter, we restrict ourselves to continu-
ous rules.
We now introduce our main axioms. Let F ∈ F be a generic rule:
Consider a claims problem and the allocation given by the rule for it. We require
that if the endowment increases, each agent should receive at least as much as ini-
tially.
Resource monotonicity: For each N ∈ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , and each E ′ > E, if∑
i∈N ci ≥ E ′, then F (c, E ′) = F (c, E).
Consider a claims problem and the allocation given by the rule for it. Imagine
that some agents leave with their payoffs. At that point, reassess the situation of
the remaining agents, that is, consider the problem of dividing among them what
remains of the endowment. We require that the rule should assign the same payoffs
to each of them as initially.
Consistency: For each N ∈ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , and each S ⊂ N , and letting x ≡
F (c, E), then xS = F ((ci)i∈S , E −
∑
i∈N\S xi) or equivalently xS = F ((ci)i∈S,
∑
i∈S xi).
Next, we generalize the notion of a claims problem. Consider a set of agents,
each of them with a claim. This time, for each subgroup of agents there is an en-
dowment to distribute among its members. The endowment is insufficient to satisfy
their claims.
Formally, given N ∈ N , a generalized claims problem with agent set N is a pair
(c, E) = ((ci)i∈N , (ES)S⊆N) ∈ RN+ × R2
|N|−1 , such that for each S ⊆ N ,
∑
i∈S ci ≥ ES .
Let GN denote the class of such problems and G ≡
⋃
N∈N GN .
8A rule F is continuous if for each (c, E) ∈ CN and for each sequence of problems {(ck, Ek)} of
elements of CN , if (ck, Ek) converges to (c, E) then the solution F (ck, Ek) converges to F (c, E).
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An allocation configuration for (c,E) ∈ GN is a list (xS)S⊆N such that for each
S ⊆ N , xS is an allocation for the claims problem derived from (c, E) for agent set S,
(cS, ES).9
A generalized rule is a function F defined on G that associates with each N ∈ N
and each (c, E) ∈ GN an allocation configuration for (c, E).
1.2.2 Coalition formation problems
Consider a society where each agent can rank the coalitions that she may belong to.
Some well-known examples of such problems are matching problems, in particular,
marriage and roommate problems.
Formally, let N ∈ N . For each agent i ∈ N , %i is a complete and transitive prefer-
ence relation over the subsets of N containing i. Given S, S ′ ⊆ N such that i ∈ S∩S ′,
S %i S ′ means that agent i finds coalition S at least as desirable as coalition S ′. Let
Ri the set of such preference relations for agent i and RN ≡ Πi∈NRi. A coalition
formation problem with agent set N consists of a list of preference relations, one for




A partition is a set of disjoint coalitions of N whose union is N and whose pair-
wise intersections are empty. Formally, a partition of a finite set of agents N =
{1, . . . , n} is a list π = {S1, . . . , Sm}, (m ≤ n is a positive integer) such that (i) for each
l = 1, . . . ,m, Sl 6= ∅, (ii)
⋃m
l=1 Sl = N, and (iii) for each pair l, l
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with
l 6= l′, Sl ∩ Sl′ = ∅. Let Π(N) denote the set of all partitions of N . For each π ∈ Π(N)
and each i ∈ N , let π(i) denote the unique coalition in π which contains agent i.
The main goal of the literature on coalition formation problems is to identify
the properties of the preferences of individual agents and of preference profiles that
guarantee the existence of a partition from which no agent wants to deviate. For-
mally, let %∈ DN . A partition π ∈ Π(N) is stable for % if there is no coalition T ⊆ N
such that for each i ∈ T, T i π(i). Let St(%) denote the set of all stable partitions of
%.
We introduce some properties of preference profiles that express a commonality
of preferences among the set of agents and that are sufficient for stability.
9The notion of allocation (payoff) configuration was introduced by ? in his characterization of the
Harsanyi NTU solution.
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The first property is “pairwise alignment". A preference profile is “pairwise
aligned" if any two agents rank coalitions that contain both of them in the same
way (Pycia, 2012).10 We introduce a weaker version of this property which says that
if one agent ranks coalitions S and S ′ in one way, the other cannot rank them in the
opposite way. This weaker version will be a necessary property for us: A coalition
formation problem %∈ D satisfies the weak pairwise alignment property if for each
pair S, S ′ and each pair i, j ∈ S ∩ S ′, S i S ′ ⇒ S %j S ′. Note that this definition al-
lows agent i to be indifferent between the two coalitions while agent j prefers one to
the other. Let DWPA denote the class of all coalition formation problems that satisfy
the weak pairwise alignment property.
A second property that is the “top coalition property" (Banerjee et al., 2001). This
says that for each non-empty subset S of agents, there is a coalition S ′ ⊆ S such that
all members of S ′ prefer S ′ to any other coalition that consists of some (or all) mem-
bers of S. Formally, let S ⊆ N . A non-empty subset S ′ ⊆ S is a top coalition of S if
for each i ∈ S ′ and each T ⊆ S with i ∈ T , we have S ′ %i T . A coalition formation
problem satisfies the top coalition property if each non-empty set of agents S ⊆ N
has a top coalition.11
A ring for %∈ D is an ordered list of coalitions (S1, ..., Sm), m > 2, such that for
each l = 1, . . . ,m (subscripts modulo l) and each i ∈ Al = Sl ∩ Sl+1, Sl+1 %i Sl , and
for at least one i ∈ Al, Sl+1 i Sl.
That is, there is at least one agent in the intersection of any two consecutive coali-
tions with a strict preference between both coalitions while his intersection-mates
can be indifferent between them. Thus, an agent is unable to move from one coali-
tion to the next unless her intersection-mates allow her to do so.12
Finally, the lack of rings is also a sufficient condition for stability but it is not a
necessary condition, that is, a coalition formation problem with rings may have sta-
ble partitions (see Example 2). It depends on the “position" of the components of the
ring in the problem under consideration (Bloch and Diamantoudi, 2011).
10A preference profile % is pairwise aligned if for each i, j ∈ S ∩ S′, S %i S′ ⇐⇒ S %j S′. This
definition implies that if agent i is indifferent between two coalitions so is agent j.
11This property is a generalization of the “common ranking property" (Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988),
which requires the existence of a linear ordering over all the coalitions such that each agent ranks the
coalitions she belongs to according to this ordering.
12Inal (2015) defines cyclicity by requiring that only one agent at the intersection of two consecutive
coalitions prefers the former over the latter. Pycia (2012) only requires a weak preference of a single
agent in the intersection of any two consecutive coalitions with at least one strict preference. In both
definitions other members who belong to two consecutive coalitions can oppose the transition from
one coalition to the next.
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Hereafter a coalition formation problem that satisfies the weak pairwise align-
ment property and has no rings is called regular.
The relations among all these properties are illustrated in the following graph.
1.2.3 Coalition formation problems induced by a generalized claims
problem and a rule
Given a generalized claims problem and a rule, each agent, by calculating her pay-
off in each coalition, can form preferences over coalitions giving rise to a coalition
formation problem. Examples of this situation can be the formation of jurisdictions
and research groups. More examples can be found in the introduction.
Formally, given N ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ GN , and F ∈ F , the coalition formation prob-
lem with agent set N induced by ((c,E),F) ∈ GN×F consists of the list of preferences
%((c,E),F )= (%i)
((c,E),F )
i∈N defined as follows: for each i ∈ N , and each pair S, S ′ ⊆ N
such that i ∈ S ∩ S ′, S %((c,E),F )i S ′ if and only if Fi(cS, ES) ≥ Fi(cS′ , ES′).
Our aim is to identify properties of F that guarantee the existence of stable parti-
tions for coalition formation problems induced by pairs ((c, E), F ) ∈ GN ×F .
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1.3 Results
In this section we characterize the rules that, given any generalized claims problem,
induce coalition formation problems that have stable partitions. The characteriza-
tion is based on two properties that a coalition formation problem has to satisfy, the
weak pairwise alignment property and the lack of rings.
The interest of our first proposition stems from the fact that it identifies a specific
class of coalition formation problems. This class includes the class of problems that
satisfy the common ranking property (the proof is straightforward) and is contained
in the class of problems that satisfy the top coalition property.13
Proposition 1.3.1. If a coalition formation problem is regular, then it satisfies the top coali-
tion property.
Proof: Let N ∈ N and %∈ DN be a regular coalition formation problem. Let S ⊆ N
and s ≡ |S|. For each i ∈ N , let Chi(S) be the set of most preferred coalitions for
agent i, that is, Chi(S) ≡ {S ′ ⊆ S : i ∈ S ′ and for each T ⊆ S ′, S ′ %i T}.14 We show
that there is at least one coalition S ′ ⊆ S such that for each i ∈ S ′, S ′ ∈ Chi(S), and
therefore S ′ is a top coalition of S.
Assume by contradiction that there is no such S ′. Then for each i ∈ S, {i} /∈
Chi(S) and, for each i ∈ S and each S ′ ∈ Chi(S), there are j ∈ S ′, j 6= i and
S ′′ ∈ Chj(S) such that S ′′ j S ′. We define an iterative process with at most s−1 steps
to find a contradiction. We show that either the weak pairwise alignment property
is violated or there is a ring at some step. Therefore, a contradiction is reached and
the process stops.
Take any agent of S, let us name her agent 1.
Step 1 : Let S1 ∈ Ch1(S). Then there are an agent, let us name her agent 2, and a
coalition in Ch2(S), let us name it S2, such that S2 2 S1. If 1 ∈ S2 and S1 1 S2
then the weak pairwise alignment property is violated. Otherwise, go to Step
2.
. . .
13There is no inclusive relation between the class of regular coalition formation problems and the
class of coalition formation problems that satisfy the (weak) top-choice property (see supplementary
material, Karakaya, 2011) or with the class of coalition formation problems induced by separable
preferences (Burani and Zwicker, 2003). The notions of k-acyclicity (Inal, 2015) and ordinal balance
(Bogomolnaia et al., 2002) are only defined for strict preferences.
14Note that if a coalition formation problem shows indifference between coalitions any agent may
have several preferred sets.
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Step k ≤ s− 1 : Let Sk ∈ Chk(S). Then there are an agent, let us name her agent
k + 1, and a coalition in Chk+1(S), let us name it Sk+1, such that Sk+1 k+1 Sk.
Two cases are distinguished:
(i) For some i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, Sk+1 = Si, .
• If Sk+1 = Sk−1, then, by Step k − 1, Sk k Sk−1 and the weak pairwise
alignment property is violated.
• If for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2}, Sk+1 = Si, then Si k+1 Sk. By the k − i
previous steps, for each j = i, . . . , k, Sj+1 j+1 Sj . Then {Si, Si+1, . . . , Sk}
is a ring.15
(ii) For each i = 1, . . . , k − 1, Sk+1 6= Si .
• If Sk k Sk+1 then the weak pairwise alignment property is violated.
• If for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k−1}, Si i Sk+1, and given that, by the k− i previ-
ous steps, for each j = i+1, . . . , k+1, Sj+1 j+1 Sj , then {Sk+1, Si, . . . , Sk}
is a ring.
Otherwise, if k < s− 1, go to Step k + 1.
Note that if k = s − 1, given that Ss 6= {s} and there is j ∈ S such that Sj j Ss,
then either for some i ∈ {1, . . . , s− 2}, Ss = Si, and a contradiction is reached in (i),
or for each i = 1, . . . , s− 2, Ss 6= Si, and a contradiction is reached in (ii). 
In contrast to Proposition 1.3.1, a coalition formation problem that satisfies the
top coalition property may not satisfy the weak pairwise alignment property or may
have rings, as the following examples illustrate.
Example 1.3.2. 16 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and %∈ DN be as follows:
%1: {1} 1 {12} 1 {13} 1 {123},
%2: {123} 2 {12} 2 {23} 2 {2},
%3: {123} 3 {23} 3 {13} 3 {3}.
This problem % satisfies the top coalition property but not the weak pairwise alignment
property: Agent 1 prefers {12} to {123} while agent 2 orders these coalitions in the opposite
way.
15Note that any other agent in the intersection of two consecutive coalitions of the ring should order
them in the same way or be indifferent, otherwise the weak pairwise alignment property is violated.
16This is Example 3.5 in Bloch and Diamantoudi (2011).
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Example 1.3.3. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and %∈ DN be as follows:
%1: {123} 1 {12} 1 {13} 1 {1},
%2: {123} 2 {23} 2 {12} 2 {2},
%3: {123} 3 {13} 3 {23} 3 {3}.
This problem % satisfies the top coalition property and has ring {{13}, {12}, {23}}.
The top coalition property guarantees the existence of stable partitions and if
preferences are strict, there is a unique such partition (Banerjee et al., 2001). If indif-
ference is allowed, there may be more than one stable partition.
Let N ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ GN , and F ∈ F . Now, we show that %((c,E),F ) satisfies both
the weak pairwise alignment property (Lemma 1.3.4) and has no rings (Lemma 1.3.7)
only if F is resource monotonic and consistent. These two lemmas and Proposition
1.3.1 prove our characterization (Theorem 1.3.8).
Lemma 1.3.4. Let F ∈ F . For each N ∈ N and each (c, E) ∈ GN ,%((c,E),F )∈ DWPA if and
only if F is resource monotonic and consistent.
Proof: (a) We prove that for each N ∈ N , if F ∈ F violates either resource mono-
tonicity or consistency, there is (c, E) ∈ GN such that %((c,E),F ) /∈ DWPA.
(i) Assume that F is not resource monotonic. Then there are S ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ CS ,
E ′ > E with
∑
i∈S ci ≥ E ′, and i ∈ S, such that Fi(c, E ′) < Fi(c, E). Then there
is j ∈ S such that Fj(c, E ′) > Fj(c, E). Let x ≡ F (c, E) and x′ ≡ F (c, E ′).
Case 1: |S| > 2. Let y ≡ F (c{i,j}, xi + xj). Two cases are distinguished:
Subcase 1.1: (yi, yj) = (xi, xj). Then yi > x′i and yj < x′j . Let (c̄, Ē) ∈ GS be such
that c̄ = c, ĒS = E ′, and Ē{i,j} = xi + xj . Then agents i and j order
coalitions S and {i, j} in opposite ways. Hence, %((c̄,Ē),F ) /∈ DWPA.
Subcase 1.2: (yi, yj) 6= (xi, xj). Then yi > xi and yj < xj . Let (c̄, Ē) ∈ GS be such
c̄ = c, ĒS = E, and Ē{i,j} = xi+xj . Then agents i and j order coalitions
S and {i, j} in opposite ways. Hence, %((c̄,Ē),F ) /∈ DWPA.
Case 2: |S| = 2. W.l.o.g. let S = {i, j}. Let N ⊃ S and (c′, xi + xj) ∈ CN be such
that for each k ∈ S, c′k = ck and each k 6= i, j, c′k = 0. Let y ≡ F (c′, xi + xj).
Note that for each k 6= i, j, yk = 0. Let (c̄, Ē) ∈ GN . Reasoning as in
Subcases 1.1. and 1.2., we obtain that agents i and j order coalitions S and
N in opposite ways. Hence, %((c̄,Ē),F ) /∈ DWPA.
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(ii) Assume that F is not consistent. Let S ∈ N and (c, E) ∈ CS . Let F ∈ F and
x ≡ F (c, E). Since F is not consistent, there are S ′ ⊂ S and (cS′ ,
∑
i∈S′ xi) ∈
CS′ such that there are at least two agents in S ′, say agents i and j, such that
Fi(cS′ ,
∑
k∈S′ xk) > xi and Fj(cS′ ,
∑
k∈S′ xk) < xj . Let (c̄, Ē) ∈ GS be such that
c̄ = c, ĒS = E and ĒS′ =
∑
k∈S′ xk. Then S
′ i S and S j S ′. Hence,
%((c̄,Ē),F ) /∈ DWPA.
(b) Conversely, we prove that if F is resource monotonic and consistent, then for each
N ∈ N and each (c, E) ∈ GN , %((c,E),F )∈ DWPA.
Let N ∈ N and (c, E) ∈ GN . Let S, S ′ ⊆ N and j, k ∈ S ∩ S ′. Let x ≡ F (cS, ES)
and x′ ≡ F (cS′ , ES′). By consistency,





By resource monotonicity, one of the following two cases holds:
Case 1: xj + xk ≥ x′j + x′k.
Then x{j,k} = F (c{j,k}, (xj + xk)) = F (c{j,k}, (x′j + x′k)) = x
′
{j,k}.
Since x{j,k} = F{j,k}(cS, ES) and x′{j,k} = F{j,k}(cS′ , ES′),
F{j,k}(cS, ES) = F{j,k}(cS′ , ES′).
Therefore, agents j, k do not rank S and S ′ in opposite ways.
Case 2: xj + xk ≤ x′j + x′k.
Proceeding as in Case 1, agents j, k do not rank S and S ′ in opposite ways.
Thus, either F{j,k}(cS, ES)) = F{j,k}(cS′ , ES′) or F{j,k}(cS, ES) 5 F{j,k}(cS′ , ES′), i.e.
agents j, k do not rank S and S ′ in opposite ways. As this argument holds for each
pair S, S ′ ⊆ N and each pair j, k ∈ S ∩ S ′, %((c,E),F )∈ DWPA. 
The next example shows that there are coalition formation problems satisfying
the weak pairwise alignment property that do not admit stable partitions.
Example 1.3.5. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and %∈ DN be as follows:
%1: {12} 1 {13} 1 {123} 1 {1},
%2: {23} 2 {12} 2 {123} 2 {2},
%3: {13} 3 {23} 3 {123} 3 {3}.
This problem % satisfies the weak pairwise alignment property. However, due to the
existence of ring {{13}, {12}, {23}}, there is no stable partition.
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The following lemma shows that for each N ∈ N and each ((c, E), F ) ∈ GN , if
F is resource monotonic and consistent, then weak pairwise alignment and rings do
not coexist in %((c,E),F ).
First, we introduce a lemma that says that the payoffs given by a consistent rule
in a claims problem can be obtained in an extended claims problem in which one or
more agents with positive claims are added.
Lemma 1.3.6. Let S ∈ N and (c, E) ∈ CS . Let F ∈ F be a consistent rule and x ≡ F (c, E).
Let S ′ ⊃ S. Then there is Ē such that letting (c′, Ē) ∈ CS′ such that for each i /∈ S, c′i > 0
and for each i ∈ S, c′i = ci, then for each i ∈ S, Fi(c′, Ē) = xi.
Proof: Let S ∈ N and (c, E) ∈ CS . Let F be a consistent rule and x ≡ F (c, E). Let
S ′ ⊃ S. Let (c′, E ′) ∈ CS′ be such that for each i ∈ S, c′i = ci and for each i /∈ S,
ci > 0. Let α(E ′) =
∑
i∈S Fi(c
′, E ′). Since F is continuous, α is a continuous function
defined on [0,
∑




i∈S ci. By continuity of α,
there is Ē ∈ [0,
∑
i∈S′ ci] such that α(Ē) =
∑
i∈S xi. Let y ≡ F (c′, Ē). By construction,∑
i∈S yi =
∑
i∈S xi and by consistency, for each i ∈ S, Fi(c′, Ē) = xi. 
Lemma 1.3.7. Let N ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ GN and F ∈ F . If F is resource monotonic and
consistent, then %((c,E),F ) has no rings.
Proof: LetN ∈ N and (c, E) ∈ GN . LetF ∈ F be a resource monotonic and consistent
rule. Assume by contradiction that %((c,E),F ) has a ring (S1, . . . , Sl), l > 2.
By definition of a ring, for each k = 1, . . . , l (subscripts modulo k), there is at least
one agent, say agent jk+1 ∈ Sk+1 ∩ Sk, such that Sk+1 jk+1 Sk. By transitivity of
preferences, it cannot be that j1 = · · · = jl. Let S∗ ≡
⋃l
k=1 Sk. We claim that S
∗ is not
a component of (S1, . . . , Sl). Assume by contradiction that for some k ∈ {1, . . . , l},
S∗ = Sk, say S∗ = S1. Then S2 j2 S∗ and S∗ j1 Sl. Since S3 j3 S2 and, by
weak pairwise alignment, S2 %j3 S∗, then S3 j3 S∗. Likewise, for each k > 3,
Sk jk S∗. Now, if jl = j1, then S∗ j1 Sl and Sl j1 S∗ and therefore, agent j1’s
preference is not transitive. Hence,%((c,E),F ) is not a well-defined coalition formation
problem. If jl 6= j1, then S∗ j1 Sl and Sl jl S∗. Therefore, the weak pairwise
alignment property is not satisfied and, by Lemma 1, F is not both resource monotonic
and consistent.
Now, let (c′, E ′) ∈ GN be such that for each i ∈ N , c′i = ci, for each S 6= S∗, E ′ = E
and let E ′S∗ be derived from Lemma 2 as follows: let xS1 ≡ F (cS1 , ES1); since S1 ⊂ S∗,
there is E ′S∗ such that for each i ∈ S1, Fi(cS∗ , E ′S∗) = xi.17 Then by construction, the
agents in S1 receive the same payoffs in S1 as in S∗, and therefore they are indifferent
between these two coalitions. Hence, %((c′,E′),F ) has a ring of which S∗ is a compo-
nent, which is impossible from the previous argument. Therefore, if F is resource
monotonic and consistent, %((c,E),F ) has no rings. 
17Note that if for each i ∈ S∗\S1, ci = 0, then E′S∗ = ES1 .
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Finally, Lemmas 1.3.4 and 1.3.7 jointly with Proposition 1.3.1 prove the character-
ization result:
Theorem 1.3.8. Let F ∈ F . For each N ∈ N and each (c, E) ∈ GN , the set of stable
partitions of the coalition formation problem induced by ((c, E), F ) is non-empty if and only
if F is resource monotonic and consistent.
These results are illustrated in the following picture:
1.3.1 Parametric rules induce stability
For claims problems many division rules are resource monotonic and consistent.
The most important ones are the so-called “parametric" rules. For a rule in this class,
there is a function of two variables such that for each problem, there is parameter
λ such that each agent’s payoff is the value given by this function where the first
argument is his claim and the second one is λ, which is the same for all agents. This
parameter is chosen so that the sum of agents’ payoffs is equal to the endowment.
Young (1987) characterizes parametric rules on the basis of symmetry,18 continuity
and bilateral consistency.19 Recently, there has been growing interest in studying
parametric rules (see, for instance, Erlanson and Flores-Szwagrzak, 2015; Kaminski,
2006; Stovall, 2014). Stovall characterizes the family of symmetric and asymmetric
parametric rules on the basis of continuity, resource monotonicity, bilateral consis-
tency and two additional axioms, “N -continuity" and “intrapersonal consistency".
18Two agents with equal claims should receive equal payoffs.
19Bilateral consistency requires consistency only when |M | = 2.
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Therefore, this family of rules always induces coalition formation problems that have
stable partitions. A simple proof of this result is given below.
A parametric rule is defined as follows:
Let f be a collection of functions {fi}i∈N ,20 where each fi : R+ × [a, b] −→ R+ is
continuous and weakly increasing in λ, λ ∈ [a, b], −∞ ≤ a < b ≤ ∞ and for each
i ∈ N and di ∈ R+, fi(ci, a) = 0 and fi(ci, b) = ci. Hence, for each f a rule F for
claims problem (c, E) ∈ CN is defined as follows.
For each i ∈ N
Fi(c, E) = fi(ci, λ) where λ is chosen so that
∑
i∈N
fi(ci, λ) = E.
Thus, f is said to be a parametric representation of F.
The proportional, constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, and the
Talmud and reverse Talmud rules are symmetric parametric rules while the sequen-
tial priority rule associated with ≺ is an asymmetric parametric rule.21
Proposition 1.3.9. A parametric rule induces coalition formation problems that have at least
one stable partition.
Proof: (i) First, we show that, given any generalized claims problem, parametric
rules induce coalition formation problems that satisfy the weak pairwise alignment
property.
Let N ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ GN and F be a parametric rule. Let %((c,E),F ) be such that
the weak pairwise alignment property is violated. Then there are S, S ′ ⊆ N and
i, j ∈ S ∩ S ′ such that S i S ′ and S ′ j S. Let x ≡ F (cS, ES) and y ≡ F (cS′ , ES′). By
definition of F , for each S ⊆ N and each i ∈ S, there exist a collection of functions
f and a parameter λ such that xi = fi(ci, λ). For the sake of convenience, we denote
the value of λ for coalition S by λ(S). Let xi = fi(ci, λ(S)) and yi = fi(ci, λ(S ′)) the
allocations given by F to agent i and similarly for agent j. As S i S ′, then xi > yi
and therefore λ(S) > λ(S ′). On the other hand, as S ′ j S, then yj > xj and therefore
λ(S ′) > λ(S), and a contradiction is reached.
(ii) Second, we show that, given any generalized claims problem, parametric rules
induce coalition formation problems with no rings.
Let N ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ GN , and F be a parametric rule. Let %((c,E),F ) be such that it
contains ring {S1, . . . , Sm},m > 2. Let {A1, . . . , Al} be the sets of agents such that for
each l = 1, . . . ,m (subscripts modulo l), Al = Sl ∩ Sl+1.
20When the rule is symmetric, fi is the same for all agents.
21Moulin (2000) characterizes a class of asymmetric rules using consistency and other properties,
“upper and lower composition".
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Let x(Sl) ≡ F (cSl , ESl). By definition of F , for each l = 1, . . . ,m and each agent
i ∈ Sl there are a collection of functions f and a parameter λ such that xi = fi(ci, λ).
For the sake of convenience, we denote the payoff of agent i in coalition Sl by xi(Sl)
and the value of λ associated to coalition Sl by λ(Sl).
By definition of a ring, for each l = 1, . . . ,m and each i ∈ Al, Sl+1 %i Sl and for at
least one j ∈ Al, Sl+1 j Sl. Observe that no other agent in the intersection opposes
the agent j’s strict preference of Sl+1 over Sl. Therefore,
Sl+1 %Al Sl =⇒ Sl+1 j Sj =⇒ xj(Sl+1) > xj(Sl) =⇒
fj(cj, λ(Sl+1)) > fj(cj, λ(Sl)) =⇒ λ(Sl+1) > λ(Sl)
Since this holds for each Sl, l = 1, . . . ,m (subscripts modulo l), a contradiction is
reached.
Finally, considering (i) and (ii) together with Proposition 1.3.1, it can be stated
that parametric rules induce coalition formation problems that have at least one sta-
ble partition. 
Parametric rules, however, are not the only rules covered by our results. There are
continuous non-parametric rules that induce stability in coalition formation prob-
lems, such as the following example borrowed from Stovall (2014) shows.
Example 1.3.10. For i 6= 1, let fi(ci, λ) = λci be i’s parametric function on [0, 1]. For i = 1,
f1 is not a function, but a correspondence on [0, 1] defined by:
f1(c1, λ) =

0 for λ < c1
1+c1
[0, c1] for λ = c11+c1
c1 for λ > c11+c1
(1.1)
Let N ∈ N and (c, E) ∈ GN . Observe that for each S ⊆ N , there is a unique λ such that
ES ∈
∑
i∈S fi(ci, λ). So define a rule F as follows:
For i 6= 1,
Fi(cS, ES) = fi(ci, λ) = λci
and for i = 1,




where λ is chosen so that ES ∈
∑
i∈S fi(ci, λ).
Stovall (2014) shows that F has no parametric representation but nevertheless
satisfies continuity, consistency, and resource monotonicity. This is a simplified ex-
position of Stovall’s example in our context that justifies the characterization of rules
beyond the class of parametric rules. Such a characterization is given in Theorem
1.3.8.
30 CHAPTER 1. RATIONING RULES AND STABLE PARTITIONS
1.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we introduce a coalition formation problem induced by a general-
ized claims problem and a rule that links the literatures on claims problems and
coalition formation problems. We start with a group of agents with claims such that
each subgroup produces an output that is insufficient to meet agents’ claims. Each
coalitional output is rationed among its members by a rule, which takes the agent’s
claims over the outputs as input. Thus, every agent orders the coalitions that she can
join according to the payoffs proposed by the rule. The orderings define a coalition
formation problem. It turns out that only resource monotonic and consistent rules
(among continuous rules) induce regular coalition formation problems, which are
proven to have stable partitions.
In our approach claims and outputs are assumed to be exogenous and indepen-
dent of each other. Other assumptions about claims and outputs may also be re-
alistic: Each agent’s claim may well depend on the identity of the members of the
coalition she can join, outputs may be a function of the size of the coalition or may
be contingent on how the remaining agents are organized.22 These and related con-
siderations offer potential for future research.
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Chapter 2
Stable partitions for proportional
generalized claims problems
Abstract
We consider a set of agents, e.g., a group of researchers, who have claims on an en-
dowment, e.g., a research budget from a national science foundation. The research
budget is not large enough to cover all claims. Agents can form coalitions and coali-
tional funding is proportional to the sum of the claims of its members, except for
singleton coalitions which do not receive any funding. We analyze the structure of
stable partitions when coalition members use well-behaved rules to allocate coali-
tional endowments, e.g., the well-known constrained equal awards rule (CEA) or
the constrained equal losses rule (CEL).
For continuous, (strictly) resource monotonic, and consistent rules, stable parti-
tions with (mostly) pairwise coalitions emerge. For CEA and CEL we provide al-
gorithms to construct such a pairwise stable partition. While for CEL the resulting
stable pairwise partition is assortative and sequentially matches two lowest claim
agents, for CEA the resulting stable pairwise partition is obtained by either assor-
tatively matching two highest claim agents or by matching a lowest claim with a
highest claim agent.
2.1 Introduction
The formation of coalitions is a pervasive aspect of social, economic, or political en-
vironments. Agents form coalitions in very different situations in order to achieve
some joint benefits. Cooperation between agents is sometimes hampered by the ex-
istence of two opposing fundamental forces: on the one hand, the increasing returns
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to scale, which incentivizes agents to cooperate and, therefore, to form large coali-
tions and, on the other hand, the heterogeneity of agents, which causes instability
and pushes towards the formation of only small coalitions.
Chapter 1 introduces generalized claims problems to deal with coalition formation
in a bankruptcy framework. A generalized claims problem consists of a group of
agents, each of them with a claim and a set of “coalitional endowments”, one for
each possible coalition, which are not sufficient to meet the claims of their mem-
bers. Coalitional endowments are divided among their members according to a pre-
specified rule, which thus is a decisive element of the coalition formation process.
Their main result states that, given a generalized claims problem, only the contin-
uous rules that are resource monotonic, and consistent induce coalition formation
problems with stable partitions. In this chapter, we study the structure of stable
partitions under different rules satisfying those properties to answer two types of
questions: What coalition sizes can emerge? & Who are the coalition partners?
The model proposed in Chapter 1 does not impose any restriction on coalitional
endowments and consequently answering the above questions is not really possible
in their general model. In contrast, we consider non-singleton proportional generalized
claims problems where singleton coalitions have zero endowments and all remaining
coalitional endowments are a fixed proportion of the sum of their members’ claims.
Proportionality is justified in many situations such as the funding of research projects
where the budgets are often divided proportionally to funding needs or according to
other funding criteria such as project quality.1 Moreover, in many situations, institu-
tions are interested to spark cooperation and hence, discourage singleton coalitions.
Non-singleton proportional generalized claims problems are a subclass of the
class of generalized claims problems studied in Chapter 1 and hence its results hold.
Given a non-singleton proportional generalized claims problem, we characterize all
stable partitions when the rule applied satisfies continuity, strict resource monotonic-
ity and consistency. We show that at most one singleton coalition belongs to each
stable partition and that for each coalition in the stable partition with size larger
than two, each agent of the coalition receives a proportional payoff (Theorem 2.3.2).
Furthermore, considering resource monotonicity instead of its strict version, even
though we do not characterize all stable partitions, we show that a stable partition
formed by pairwise coalitions, i.e., coalitions of size two, with the exception of at
most one singleton coalition if the set of agents is odd, exists (Theorem 2.3.3).
With the result of Theorem 2.3.3 as the departure point, we analyze how agents
sort themselves into pairwise coalitions under some parametric rules (see Stovall,
2014; Young, 1987). Parametric rules are well-studied in the literature because the
1Other examples can be found in a bankruptcy situation, where assets have to be allocated among
creditors according to their claims or, in a legislature, where seats are distributed among the parties
according to their vote totals.
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payoff of each agent is given by a function that depends only on the claim of the
agent and a parameter that is common to all agents. We focus on two well-known
parametric rules that represent two egalitarian principles: the constrained equal
awards rule (CEA) and the constrained equal losses rule (CEL). On the one hand,
CEA divides the endowment as equally as possible subject to no agent receiving
more than her claim (e.g., rationing toilet paper when shortage occurs). On the other
hand, CEL divides the losses as equally as possible subject to no agent receiving a
negative amount (e.g., equal sacrifice taxation when utility is measured linearly2).
We propose two algorithms, one for each rule, to find a pairwise stable partition.
The CEA algorithm sequentially pairs off either two highest claim agents or a highest
with a lowest claim agent (Theorem 2.3.4). Examples of the first type of cooperation
are found in social environments where agents tend to join other agents with similar
characteristics. In contrast, the second type of cooperation may be interpreted as a
transfer of knowledge between agents as happens, for instance, between apprentices
and advisors. While the CEA algorithm produces stable partitions that can contain
assortative as well as extremal pairwise coalitions, the CEL algorithm is purely assortative
and sequentially pairs off lowest claim agents (Theorem 2.3.6).
There is a large number of papers that pay attention to the structure of coalition
formation. Becker (1973) and Greenberg and Weber (1986) introduce the notion of
assortative coalitions.3 Observe that in both our algorithms assortative coalitions
(in terms of claims) may form. We discuss some papers in which similar results
concerning assortative stable coalitions are obtained in our conclusion (Section 2.4).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we introduce all
ingredients needed to define the class of generalized claims problems and our sub-
class of non-singleton proportional generalized claims problems. We also introduce
the class of parametric claims rules (including CEA and CEL) and their key proper-
ties (continuity, (strict) resource monotonicity, and consistency). Section 2.3 contains
the results we have discussed above with subsections dedicated to CEA (Subsec-
tion 2.3.1) and CEL (Subsection 2.3.2). We conclude in Section 2.4.
2.2 The model
Consider a coalition of agents, e.g., a group of researchers, who have claims on an
endowment, e.g., a research budget from a national science foundation. The re-
2The idea of the equal sacrifice principle in taxation is that all tax payers end up sacrificing equally,
according to some cardinal utility function. Young (1988) provides a characterization of the family of
equal-sacrifice rules based on a few compelling principles and, more recently, Chambers and Moreno-
Ternero (2017) generalize the previous family.
3Assortativeness is based on an ordering of agents according to a specific variable such as claims,
productivity, or location. Alternative terminology includes that of consecutive coalitions.
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searchers’ claims could be related to the past performance or productivity of re-
searchers or be an estimate of the research costs or the expected research outputs.
The research budget is not large enough to cover all claims. Now assume that the
national science foundation prefers to subsidize research projects or teams instead
of individual researchers and that researchers will later need to allocate the research
funding within the research teams. On the other hand, anticipating this method of
allocating funding, researchers might prefer to be members of certain research teams
over others. This situation was analyzed in Chapter 1. Before fully specifying this
class of problems, we present the preliminaries of the two classical type of problems
it is based on: claims problems and coalition formation problems.
First, we introduce some notation. Let N be the set of potential agents and N the
set of all non-empty finite subsets or coalitions of N. Given N ∈ N and x, y ∈ RN ,
if for each i ∈ N , xi > yi, then x  y and if for each i ∈ N , xi ≥ yi, then x = y.
Furthermore, for each x ∈ RN and each S ⊆ N , xS := (xj)j∈S denotes the restriction
of x to coalition S.
Generalized claims problems
Consider a coalition of agents who have claims on a certain endowment, this endow-
ment being insufficient to satisfy all the claims. A primary example is bankruptcy,
where agents are the creditors of a firm and the endowment is its liquidation value;
however, we have a more general interpretation of the data in mind.
Formally, let N ∈ N . For i ∈ N , let ci be agent i’s claim and c = (cj)j∈N the claims
vector. Let E ∈ R+ be the endowment. A claims problem with coalitionN is a pair
(c, E) ∈ RN++ × R+ such that
∑
j∈N cj ≥ E. Let C




An allocation for (c,E) ∈ CN is a (payoff) vector x = (xi)i∈N ∈ RN+ that satisfies
the non-negativity and claim boundedness conditions 0 5 x 5 c, and the efficiency
condition
∑
j∈N xj = E. A rule is a function F defined on C that associates with each
N ∈ N and each (c, E) ∈ CN an allocation for (c, E). Let F denote the set of rules.
A rule is continuous if small changes in the data of the problem do not lead to
large changes in the chosen allocation.
Continuity. For each N ∈ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , and each sequence of problems
{(ck, Ek)} of elements of CN , if (ck, Ek) converges to (c, E) then F (ck, Ek) converges
to F (c, E).
Consider a claims problem and the allocation given by the rule for it. We require
that if the endowment increases, each agent should receive at least as much as (more
than, respectively) initially.
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Resource monotonicity. For each N ∈ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , and each E ′ > E, if∑
j∈N cj ≥ E ′, then F (c, E ′) = F (c, E).
Strict resource monotonicity. For each N ∈ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , and each E ′ > E, if∑
j∈N cj ≥ E ′, then F (c, E ′) F (c, E).
Consider a claims problem and the allocation given by the rule for it. Imagine
that some agents leave with their payoffs. At that point, reassess the situation of
the remaining agents, that is, consider the problem of dividing what remains of the
endowment among them. We require that the rule should assign the same payoffs
to each of them as initially.
Consistency. For eachN ∈ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , each S  N , and letting x ≡ F (c, E),
we have xS = F (cS, E −
∑
j∈N\S xj) or, equivalently, xS = F (cS,
∑
j∈S xj).
For claims problems many rules are continuous, resource monotonic, and con-
sistent. The most important ones are the so-called “parametric” rules. For a rule
in this class, there is a function of two variables such that for each problem, each
agent’s payoff is the value of this function when the first argument is her claim and
the second one is parameter λ, which is the same for all agents. This parameter is
chosen so that the sum of agents’ payoffs is equal to the endowment. Young (1987)
characterizes parametric rules on the basis of symmetry,4 continuity, and bilateral
consistency.5 Stovall (2014) characterizes the family of possibly asymmetric para-
metric rules on the basis of continuity, resource monotonicity, bilateral consistency,
and two additional axioms, “N -continuity” and “intrapersonal consistency.”
A parametric rule is defined as follows: Let f be a collection of functions {fi}i∈N ,6
where each fi : R+× [a, b] −→ R+ is continuous and weakly increasing in λ, λ ∈ [a, b],
−∞ ≤ a < b ≤ ∞ and for each i ∈ N and ci ∈ R+, fi(ci, a) = 0 and fi(ci, b) = ci.
Hence, for each f a rule F for claims problem (c, E) ∈ CN is defined as follows. For
each i ∈ N ,
Fi(c, E) = fi(ci, λ) where λ is chosen so that
∑
j∈N
fj(cj, λ) = E.
Then, f is said to be a parametric representation of rule F .
The proportional, constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, the Tal-
mud, reverse Talmud, and Piniles rules are symmetric parametric rules while the
sequential priority rule associated with a strict priority  on agents is an asymmet-
ric parametric rule. We define the first three rules and refer to Thomson (2003, 2015,
2019) for the definition of the other rules mentioned above.
4Two agents with equal claims should receive equal payoffs.
5Bilateral consistency requires consistency only when |S| = 2.
6When the parametric rule is symmetric, fi is the same for all agents.
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The most commonly used rule in practice makes awards proportional to claims.
Proportional rule, P . For each (c, E) ∈ CN and each i ∈ N , Pi(c, E) = λci, where λ is
chosen so that
∑
j∈N λcj = E.
Our next rule divides endowment as equally as possible subject to no agent re-
ceiving more than her claim.
Constrained equal awards rule, CEA. For each (c, E) ∈ CN and each i ∈ N ,
CEAi(c, E) = min{ci, λ}, where λ is chosen so that
∑
j∈N min{cj, λ} = E.
An alternative to the constrained equal awards rule is obtained by focusing on
the losses agents incur (what they do not receive), as opposed to what they receive,
and to assign losses to all agents as equally as possible subject to no one receiving a
negative amount.
Constrained equal losses rule,CEL. For each (c, E) ∈ CN and each i ∈ N ,CELi(c, E)
= max{0, ci − λ}, where λ is chosen so that
∑
j∈N max{0, cj − λ} = E.
Next, we generalize the notion of a claims problem. Consider (c, E) ∈ CN . Then,
each coalition of agents S ⊆ N has the reduced claims vector cS = (ci)i∈S . Next,
assume that for each coalition S ⊆ N there is a coalitional endowmentES such that
(cS, ES) ∈ CS and EN = E. Formally, given N ∈ N , a generalized claims problem
with coalition N is a pair (c, (ES)S⊆N) ∈ RN++ × R2
|N|−1
+ , such that for each coalition
S ⊆ N , (cS, ES) ∈ CS . Let GN denote the class of such problems and G ≡
⋃
N∈N GN .
More specifically, we first study the subclass of proportional generalized claims
problems where given N ∈ N , (c, (ES)S⊆N) ∈ GN , and α := EcN ∈ (0, 1), for each
coalition S ⊆ N , the coalitional endowment ES is proportional to the coalitional
claim cS :=
∑
j∈S cj , i.e., ES = αc
S (where α := E
cN
∈ (0, 1)). Let PN denote the class
of such problems and P ≡
⋃
N∈N PN . Since for each coalition S ⊆ N , all coalitional
endowments ES are completely determined by c and E, we will simplify notation
and denote a proportional generalized claims problem (c, (ES)S⊆N) ∈ PN by (c, E).
An allocation configuration for (c,E) ∈ PN is a list (xS)S⊆N such that for each
S ⊆ N , xS is an allocation for the claims problem derived from (c, E) for coalition
S, (cS, ES).7 Any rule F ∈ F can be extended to a generalized rule defined on P
by associating with each N ∈ N and each (c, E) ∈ PN an allocation configuration
F (c, E) = (F (cS, ES))S⊆N . Since it should not lead to any confusion we useF to also
denote the set of generalized rules.
7The notion of allocation (payoff) configuration was introduced by Hart (1985) in his characteriza-
tion of the Harsanyi NTU solution.
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Coalition formation problems
Consider a society where each agent can rank the coalitions that she may belong to.
Some well-known examples of such problems are matching problems, in particular,
marriage and roommate problems.
Formally, let N ∈ N . For each agent i ∈ N , %i is a complete and transitive
preference relation over the coalitions of N containing i. Given S, S ′ ⊆ N such that
i ∈ S∩S ′, S %i S ′ means that agent i finds coalition S at least as desirable as coalition
S ′. Let Ri be the set of such preference relations for agent i and RN ≡ Πi∈NRi.
A coalition formation problem with agent set N consists of a list of preference




A partition of a set of agents N ∈ N is a set of disjoint coalitions of N whose
union is N and whose pairwise intersections are empty. Formally, a partition of
N is a list π = {S1, . . . , Sm}, (m ≤ |N | is a positive integer) such that (i) for each
l = 1, . . . ,m, Sl 6= ∅, (ii)
⋃m
l=1 Sl = N , and (iii) for each pair l, l
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with
l 6= l′, Sl ∩ Sl′ = ∅. Let Π(N) denote the set of all partitions of N . For each π ∈ Π(N)
and each i ∈ N , let π(i) denote the unique coalition in π which contains agent i. We
refer to the partition π0 at which each agent forms a singleton coalition, i.e., for each
i ∈ N , π0(i) = {i}, as the singleton partition.
An important question for coalition formation problems is the existence of par-
titions from which no agent wants to deviate. Let %∈ DN and consider a partition
π ∈ Π(N). Then, coalition T ⊆ N blocks π if for each agent i ∈ T , T i π(i). A
partition π ∈ Π(N) is stable for % if it is not blocked by any coalition T ⊆ N . Let
St(%) denote the set of all stable partitions of %. We refer to the coalitions that are
part of a stable partition as stable coalitions.
Coalition formation problems induced by a generalized claims prob-
lem and a rule
Given a generalized claims problem and a rule, each agent, by calculating her pay-
off in each coalition, can form preferences over coalitions, giving rise to a coalition
formation problem. Examples of this situation can be the formation of jurisdictions
and research groups (for further examples, see Chapter 1).
Formally, given N ∈ N , (c, (ES)S⊆N) ∈ GN , and F ∈ F , the coalition formation
problem induced by ((c, (ES)S⊆N), F ) consists of the list of preferences %((c,E),F )=
(%j)
((c,E),F )
j∈N defined as follows: for each i ∈ N , and each pair S, S
′ ⊆ N such that
i ∈ S ∩ S ′, S %((c,E),F )i S ′ if and only if Fi(cS, ES) ≥ Fi(cS′ , ES′).
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Proposition 1.3.9 in Chapter 1 shows that, given any generalized claims problem,
parametric rules always induce coalition formation problems that have stable parti-
tions. More generally, they show that a coalition formation problem induced by any
generalized claims problem and any rule has a stable partition if and only if the rule
F is continuous, resource monotonic, and consistent (Theorem 1.3.8 in Chapter 1).
2.3 Stable partitions for (non-singleton) proportional gen-
eralized claims problems
We restrict attention to the class of proportional generalized claims problems P .
Thus, consider N ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ PN , and F ∈ F . Even without any further assump-
tions on rule F , the coalition formation problem induced by ((c, E), F ) has a stable
partition. Due to the assumption that the generalized claims problems we consider
are proportional, the singleton-partition is always stable and all stable partitions are
payoff equivalent to the singleton partition.
Proposition 2.3.1. Let N ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ PN , and F ∈ F . Then, for the coalition formation
problem with agent setN induced by ((c, E), F ), the singleton-partition π0 is stable and each
stable partition π induces the proportional allocation configuration where each agent i ∈ N
receives αci.
Proof: Let N ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ PN , and F ∈ F . Consider the coalition formation
problem with agent set N induced by ((c, E), F ).
First, assume by contradiction that there exists a stable partition π that does not
induce the proportional allocation configuration. Hence, there exists some agent
i ∈ N who receives an under-proportional payoff Fi(cπ(i), Eπ(i)) < αci. However,
since (c, E) ∈ PN , agent i by forming the singleton coalition {i} obtains αci >
Fi(cπ(i), Eπ(i)) and blocks π; contradicting the stability of π. Thus, each stable par-
tition π induces the proportional allocation configuration.
Second, consider the singleton partition π0 at which each agent i ∈ N obtains αci.
Since (c, E) ∈ PN , for each S ⊆ N , ES = αcS . Thus, no coalition S ⊆ N can achieve
payoffs larger than αci for its members i ∈ S and block π0. Hence, π0 is stable. 
Proposition 2.3.1 illustrates that for proportional generalized claims problems es-
sentially only the “trivial” singleton partition is stable. Going back to our motivat-
ing example, the allocation of research funding to research teams, Proposition 2.3.1
suggests that if the main principle of research funding allocation from the funding
agency to teams is proportionality, then, since essentially only individual propor-
tional funding is stable, the formation of larger research collaborations is unlikely.
However, many scientific funding schemes are aimed at the promotion of coopera-
tion of researchers from different countries or disciplines and require research teams
of at least size two; see, for instance the international programs of the Swiss National
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Sciences Foundation (http://www.snf.ch/en/funding/directaccess/international/),
and the European Union funded COST (European Cooperation in Science and Tech-
nology) actions that focus on research and innovation networks (https://www.cost.eu/).
We take this as the departure point to modify the class of proportional gener-
alized claims problems in order to disincentivizing singleton coalitions by assum-
ing that singleton coalitions are not funded. Hence, the second subclass of gener-
alized claims problems that we consider is the following adjustment of the class of
proportional generalized claims problems where, given N ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ CN , and
α := E
cN
∈ (0, 1)), for each S ⊆ N such that |S| ≥ 2, ES = αcS and for each S ⊆ N
such that |S| = 1, ES = 0. Let P̃
N
be the class of such problems. We refer to this
subclass of generalized claims problems as non-singleton proportional generalized
claims problems and denote it by P̃ ≡
⋃
N∈N P̃N . We again simplify notation and
denote a non-singleton proportional generalized claims problem (c, (ES)S⊆N) ∈ P̃N
by (c, E).
Next, we analyze the structure of coalition formation problems that are induced
by non-singleton proportional generalized claims problems and describe the struc-
ture of stable partitions if the underlying rule is continuous, strictly resource mono-
tonic, and consistent. By Chapter 1 the set of stable partitions is nonempty. Fur-
thermore, for each stable partition, there is at most one singleton coalition and each
other coalition either allocates proportional payoffs or is of size at most two. Hence,
in comparison to the benchmark result of proportional stable sharing that is equiv-
alent to the singleton-partition, non-proportional cooperation can be sustained in a
stable way in pairwise research teams.
Theorem 2.3.2. Let N ∈ N and (c, E) ∈ P̃N . Consider F ∈ F satisfying continuity, strict
resource monotonicity, and consistency. Then, for the coalition formation problem with agent
setN induced by ((c, E), F ), the set of stable partitions is nonempty and each stable partition
π is such that
(i) there is at most one singleton coalition and
ii) if S ∈ π such that |S| > 2, then for all i ∈ S, Fi(cS, ES) = αci.
Proof: Let N , (c, E), and F as specified in the theorem. First, by Chapter 1, each
coalition formation problem with agent set N induced by ((c, E), F ) has at least one
stable partition.
(i) Let π ∈ St(%((c,E),F )) and assume, by contradiction, that there exist i, j ∈ N , i 6= j,
such that π(i) = {i} and π(j) = {j}. For the trivial claims problem (c{i,j}, 0) ∈ C{i,j},
we have Fi(c{i,j}, 0) = Fj(c{i,j}, 0) = 0. Then, since E{i,j} > 0, by strict resource
monotonicity, Fi(c{i,j}, E{i,j}), Fj(c{i,j}, E{i,j}) > 0. Given that (c, E) ∈ P̃N , we have
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E{i} = E{j} = 0. Then, Fi(c{i}, 0) = Fj(c{j}, 0) = 0. Thus, coalition {i, j} blocks π,
which is a contradiction.
(ii) Assume that π ∈ St(%((c,E),F )) is such that S ∈ π, |S| > 2, and for some i ∈ S =
π(i), Fi(cS, ES) 6= αci. Without loss of generality, assume that agent i receives an









Furthermore,ES\{i} = αcS\{i} >
∑
k∈S\{i} Fk(cS, ES) and the agents in coalition S\{i}
have a larger endowment to share among themselves if they get rid of agent i. Then,



















and coalition S \ {i} blocks π, which is a contradiction. 
We now weaken strict resource monotonicity to resource monotonicity and show
that among all possible stable partitions that can exist in a coalition formation prob-
lem induced by a non-singleton proportional generalized claims problem, there is
always one stable partition that is composed of pairwise research teams (with at
most one singleton coalition if the number of agents is odd).
Theorem 2.3.3. Let N ∈ N and (c, E) ∈ P̃N . Consider F ∈ F satisfying continuity,
resource monotonicity, and consistency. Then, for the coalition formation problem with agent
set N induced by ((c, E), F ), there exists a stable partition π such that
(i) if |N | is even, then for each i ∈ N , |π(i)| = 2 and
(ii) if |N | is odd, then there exists an agent j ∈ N , such that p(j) = {j} and for each
i ∈ N \ {j}, |π(i)| = 2.
We prove Theorem 2.3.3 in Appendix 2.4.
Given the result of Theorem 2.3.3, from now on we focus on coalitions of size two.
Note that Theorem 2.3.3 does not give information about how agents sort themselves
into those stable pairwise coalitions. In fact, the stable partitions may differ depend-
ing on how endowments are divided among agents. Next, we will study the specific
structure of stable partitions under two egalitarian parametric rules: the constrained
equal awards (CEA) and the constrained equal losses (CEL) rule. Egalitarianism is a
natural principle applied in many economic environments and hence, studying CEA
and CEL in our context seems a natural first step to understand stable partitions.
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2.3.1 Stable coalitions under the constrained equal awards rule
We first analyze how agents organize themselves into stable pairwise coalitions when
endowments are distributed under the constrained equal awards rule, CEA. Recall
that this rule divides endowments as equally as possible subject to no agent receiv-
ing more than her claim. Hence, given a claims vector, under CEA, those agents
with lower claims receive over-proportional payoffs (more so the lower the claims
are) while agents with higher claims receive under-proportional payoffs (more so
the higher the claims are). Furthermore, the higher an agent’s claim, the higher her
contribution towards the endowment of any coalition she is part of. So intuitively, in
order to form a stable pairwise coalition, one could suspect that an agent with a high
claim will pair up with another high claim agent. Indeed, high claim agents play a
special role in our construction of stable pairwise coalitions.
Let N = {1, . . . n} and assume that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn. First, consider a highest
claim agent, say agent n. As explained above, agent n in a coalition with agent n− 1
would be a contender to be part of a stable partition with the following possible
justification: agent n needs to team up with some agent to obtain a positive payoff
and agent n − 1 provides the highest possible contribution to coalition {n − 1, n}
while requiring a smaller transfer from the proportional payoff compared to other
agents. This reasoning is correct, unless a smallest claim agent, say agent 1, has such
a small claim that conceding this small claim to agent 1 is a smaller loss from the
proportional payoff for agent n than the transfer from the proportional payoff of
n to agent n − 1. We capture this intuition in an algorithm that determines a stable
partition by sequentially pairing off either two highest claim agents or a highest with
a lowest claim agent.
CEA Algorithm.
Input: N ∈ N and (c, E) ∈ P̃N .
Step 1. Let N1 := N , |N1| > 2, and
δ1 :=
2c1
2c1 − cn−1 + cn
.
We distinguish two cases:
(i) If α ≤ δ1, then set S1 := {n− 1, n}.
(ii) If α > δ1, then set S1 := {1, n}.
Set N2 := N \ S1. If |N2| ≤ 2, then set S2 := N2, define π := {S1, S2}, and stop.
Otherwise, go to Step 2.
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and |Nk| > 2. We
relabel the agents in Nk such that Nk = {1′, . . . , n′} and c1′ ≤ . . . ≤ cn′ . Let
δk :=
2c1′
2c1′ − c(n−1)′ + cn′
.
We distinguish two cases:
(i) If α ≤ δk, then set Sk := {(n− 1)′, n′}.
(ii) If α > δk, then set Sk := {1′, n′}.
SetNk+1 := N\∪kj=1Sj . If |Nk+1| ≤ 2, then set Sk+1 := Nk+1, define π := {S1, . . . , Sk+1},
and stop. Otherwise, go to Step k + 1.
Output: A partition π = {S1, . . . , Sl} for the coalition formation problem with agent
set N induced by ((c, E), CEA). If |N | is even, then partition π is constructed in n−2
2
steps. If |N | is odd, then partition π is constructed in n−1
2
steps.
The following result states that the partition obtained by the CEA algorithm is
stable.
Theorem 2.3.4. Let N ∈ N and (c, E) ∈ P̃N . Consider the coalition formation prob-
lem with agent set N induced by ((c, E), CEA). Then, the partition obtained by the CEA
algorithm is stable.
We prove Theorem 2.3.4 in Appendix 2.4 but we explain the key intuition of the
proof here. Observe that in each step of the CEA algorithm either two agents with
the highest claims are matched or an agent with the highest claim is matched with an
agent with the lowest claim. We first show (Lemma 2.4.3) that each agent will always
prefer to be matched to an agent with a higher claim, the higher the better. That
means that a highest claim agent, say agent n is a most desirable pairwise coalition
partner for all other agents. Hence, by matching agent n with her most desirable
pairwise coalition partner, a stable pairwise coalition is formed (in fact, a pairwise
top coalition is formed, see Appendix 2.4).
Second (Lemma 2.4.4), we show that when agent n is in a pairwise coalition
where the endowment is split equally, she prefers a pairwise coalition with a higher-
claim agent. This happens when parameter α is lower than 2c1
c1+cn
. Third (Lemma 2.4.6),
we show that when agent n is in a pairwise coalition where the other agent receives
his claim, she prefers a pairwise coalition with a lower-claim agent. This happens
when parameter α higher than 2cn−1
cn−1+cn
.
Lemmas 2.4.4 and 2.4.6 now imply that agents 1 and n − 1 are potential “stable
partners” for agent n. We need to determine the value for parameter α that makes
agent n’s partner be n − 1 or 1. We show that 2c1
2c1−cn−1+cn is the value for α that
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makes agent n form coalition with agent n − 1 or agent 1 (Lemma 2.4.8). Note that
that value coincides with the one specified in Step 1 of the CEA algorithm to trigger
either Case (i) with stable coalition {n− 1, n} or Case (ii) with stable coalition {1, n}.
Finally, Lemmas 2.4.4, 2.4.6, and 2.4.8 are used to show that in each step of the
CEA algorithm a stable pairwise coalition is chosen. In particular, it follows that
for values of α low enough to trigger Case (i) in each step of the CEA algorithm, a
stable partition is formed by assortative pairwise coalitions (we call this an assortative
stable partition) starting from an agent with the highest claim. This implies that if n is
odd, then the singleton coalition will be formed by an agent with the lowest claim.
Similarly, for values of α high enough to trigger case (ii) in each step of the CEA
algorithm, a stable partition is formed by pairwise coalitions in which a highest and
a lowest claim agent are matched in each step (we call this an extremal stable partition).
So, depending on α, the CEA algorithm constructs a stable partition that is either
assortative, extremal, or a mix of both type of pairwise coalitions.
Assortative matching of high types has been observed in other contexts, for in-
stance, the neoclassical marriage model by Becker (1973). In our example of research
team formations, assortative matching of high types can indeed be observed in prac-
tice but it can also be observed in other situations such as the formation of pairs of
students for class projects or other social environments. However, we also observe
extremal research team formations, for example in mentor-mentee relationships such
as between a PhD student and her advisor.
Finally, the stable partitions obtained by the CEA algorithm are not unique (even
beyond tie-breaking between cases (i) and (ii) in the algorithm). The following ex-
ample demonstrates that stable partitions with larger coalition sizes are possible.
Example 2.3.5. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, c = (1, 2, 3), E = 5.4, and (c, E) ∈ P̃N (hence,
α = 9
10
). Let F = CEA. Hence,
Coalition {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
Endowment 0 0 0 2.7 3.6 4.5 5.4
Allocation (0) (0) (0) (1, 1.7) (1, 2.6) (2, 2.5) (1, 2, 2.4)
The coalition formation problem induced, %((c,E),CEA), is
%((c,E),CEA)1 : {12} ∼1 {13} ∼1 {123} 1 {1},
%((c,E),CEA)2 : {23} ∼2 {123} 2 {12} 2 {2},
%((c,E),CEA)3 : {13} 3 {23} 3 {123} 3 {3}.
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The stable partition obtained by our algorithm in Theorem 2.3.4 is {{13}, {2}}.
However, it can be easily verified that partitions {{1}, {23}} and {{123}} are also
stable.
2.3.2 Stable coalitions under the constrained equal losses rule
We next analyze how agents organize themselves into pairwise coalitions in a sta-
ble partition when endowments are distributed according to the constrained equal
losses rule, CEL. Recall that this rule allocates losses as equally as possible subject
to no agent receiving a negative amount. Hence, given a claims vector, under CEL,
agents with lower claims receive under-proportional payoffs (more so the lower the
claims are) while agents with higher claims receive over-proportional payoffs (more
so the higher the claims are). Furthermore, the lower an agent’s claim, the lower his
contribution towards the loss of any coalition she is part of is. So intuitively, in order
to form a stable pairwise coalition, one could suspect that an agent with a low claim
will pair up with another low claim agent. So in contrast to the CEA, when the CEL
is used, low claim agents play a special role in our construction of stable pairwise
coalitions.
Let N = {1, . . . n} and assume that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn. First, consider a lowest
claim agent, say agent 1. As explained above, agent 1 in a coalition with agent 2
would be a contender to be part of a stable partition with the following possible jus-
tification: agent 1 needs to team up with some agent to obtain a positive payoff and
agent 2 provides the lowest possible loss to coalition {1, 2}while requiring a smaller
transfer from the proportional payoff compared to other agents. We capture this in-
tuition in an algorithm that determines a stable partition by sequentially pairing off
lowest claim agents.
CEL Algorithm.
Input: N ∈ N and (c, E) ∈ P̃N .
Step 1. Let N1 := N , |N1| > 2. Set S1 := {1, 2} and N2 := N \ S1. If |N2| ≤ 2, then set
S2 := N2, define π := {S1, S2}, and stop. Otherwise, go to Step 2.




and |Nk| > 2. Set
Sk := {2k−1, 2k} and Nk+1 := N \∪kj=1Sj . If |Nk+1| ≤ 2, then set Sk+1 := Nk+1, define
π := {S1, . . . , Sk+1}, and stop. Otherwise, go to Step k + 1.
Output: A partition π = {S1, . . . , Sl} for the coalition formation problem with agent
set N induced by ((c, E), CEL). If |N | is even, then partition π is constructed in n−2
2
steps. If |N | is odd, then partition π is constructed in n−1
2
steps.
The following result states that the partition obtained by the CEA algorithm is
stable.
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Theorem 2.3.6. Let N ∈ N and (c, E) ∈ P̃N . Consider the coalition formation prob-
lem with agent set N induced by ((c, E), CEL). Then, the partition obtained by the CEL
algorithm is stable.
We prove Theorem 2.3.6 in Appendix 2.4 but we explain the key intuition of the
proof here. Consider i, j ∈ N such that ci < cj . Then, for coalition {i, j}, E{i,j} =
α(ci + cj) and the associated loss equals (1 − α)(ci + cj). Hence, the loss decreases
if either agent i or j switches to a pairwise coalition with a lower-claim agent, and
it increases if they switch to a higher-claim agent. Since losses are split as equally
as possible (taking zero as lower bound), sequentially matching the pairs of lowest
claim agents will lead to a stable partition.
Observe that in each step of the CEL algorithm two agents with the lowest claims
are paired and we obtain an assortative stable partition starting from the agent with
a lowest claim. In particular, this implies that if n is odd, then the singleton coalition
will be formed by an agent with the highest claim (this contrasts the assortative case
of the CEA algorithm where an agent with the lowest claim would form the singleton
coalition).
Finally, the partition obtained by the CEL algorithm is not unique. The following
example demonstrates that stable partitions with larger coalition sizes are possible.
Example 2.3.7. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, c = (1, 3, 11), E = 7.5, and (c, E) ∈ P̃N (hence,
α = 1
2
). Let F = CEL. Hence,
Coalition {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
Endowment 0 0 0 2 6 7 7.5
Allocation (0) (0) (0) (0, 2) (0, 6) (0, 7) (0, 0, 7.5)
The coalition formation problem induced, %((c,E),CEL) is
%((c,E),CEL)1 : {12} ∼1 {13} ∼1 {123} 1 {1},
%((c,E),CEL)2 : {12} 2 {123} 2 {23} 2 {2},
%((c,E),CEL)3 : {123} 3 {23} 3 {13} 3 {3}.
It can be checked that any partition of N is stable.
2.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we continue the analysis of the model introduced in Chapter 1. Chap-
ter 1 focuses on the existence of stable partitions but it does not analyze their exact
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structure. To make more precise predictions about the possible size and composition
of stable partitions, we restrict attention to what we call non-singleton proportional
generalized claims problem where singleton coalitions receive no endowments and
all remaining coalitional endowments are a fixed proportion of the sum of the claims
of coalition members. Let us briefly summarize our results.
We first characterize all stable partitions when the rule applied to allocate coali-
tional endowments satisfies continuity, strict resource monotonicity, and consistency.
For the weaker notion of resource monotonicity, we demonstrate the existence of a
pairwise stable partition with at most one singleton coalition if the set of agents is
odd. Furthermore, we provide two algorithms to construct stable pairwise coalitions
for CEA and CEL, respectively. For CEA, the obtained stable partition assortatively
pairs off either highest claim agents (assortative coalition) or a highest and a lowest
claim agent (extremal coalition). For CEL, an assortative stable partition is obtained
by sequentially pairing off lowest claim agents.
Observe that our results are based on the assumption of proportional coalitional
endowments. Future research could consider another principle of assigning coali-
tional endowments than proportionality. More generally, a two-step model in which
first the total endowment is split between coalitions (by one claims rule) and second,
within each coalition the coalitional endowment is split between its members (by
another rule, possibly the same than the first one) could be considered ((for a related
two-step model in a bankruptcy framework see, for instance, Izquierdo and Timo-
ner, 2019).8 Therefore, coalition formation will depend both on the rule that divides
the total endowment among the different coalitions and on the rule that is used to
distribute the coalitional endowments among its members. Observe that our model
can be straightforwardly extended to a two-step procedure in which the rule used
in the first step is the proportional rule for any coalition of size larger than one and
the constant zero rule for singleton coalitions, and the rule applied in then second
step satisfies continuity, (strict) resource monotonicity, and consistency (or, for some
of our results, equals CEA or CEL).
Finally, as already mentioned in the introduction, there are many papers dealing
with assortative stable coalitions. We briefly discuss three of them.
Barberà et al. (2015) consider a model in which each agent is endowed with a
productivity level and agents can cooperate to perform certain tasks. Each coali-
tion generates an output equal to the sum of its members’ productivities. The au-
thors then analyze the formation of coalitions when all agents in a society vote be-
tween meritocracy and egalitarianism. They find societies where assortative and
non-assortative partitions (in terms of productivity) arise.
8Two-step procedures have been also analyzed, among others, by Lorenzo-Freire et al. (2010) and
Bergantiños et al. (2010) for multi-issue allocation problems. Moreno-Ternero (2011) studies a coali-
tion procedure (two or more steps) for bankruptcy situations.
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In a bargaining framework, Pycia (2012) presents a model in which each agent
has a utility function and, for each possible coalition of agents, there is an output to
be distributed among its members. He analyzes coalition formation games induced
by different bargaining rules and shows that when agents are endowed with pro-
ductivity levels and “when shares are divided by a stability-inducing sharing rule,
agents sort themselves into coalitions in a predictably assortative way”. Pycia (2012)
deals with many-to-one problems and his notion of assortativeness implies that the
most productive agents join the most productive firms.
Finally, Bogomolnaia et al. (2008) study societies where agents are located in an
interval and form jurisdictions to consume public projects, which are located in the
same interval. Agents share their costs equally and they divide transportation costs
to the location of the public project based its distance to each agent. They analyze
both core and Nash stable partitions with a focus on assortative and non-assortative
(in terms of location) stable jurisdiction structures.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2.3.3
We first introduce some lemmas that will be used to prove Theorem 2.3.3. By the first
lemma we show that, given a non-singleton proportional generalized claims prob-
lem and a consistent rule, if in a coalition all agents receive proportional payoffs,
then all agents in any subcoalition (except singleton subcoalitions) receive propor-
tional payoffs as well.
Lemma 2.4.1. Let N ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ P̃N , and F ∈ F satisfying consistency. If S ⊆ N is
such that for each i ∈ S, Fi(cS, ES) = αci, then for each S ′ ( S with |S ′| > 1 and each
j ∈ S ′, Fj(cS′ , ES′) = αcj .
Proof: Let N , (c, E), and F as specified in the lemma. Consider S ⊆ N such that
for each i ∈ S, Fi(cS, ES) = αci and consider S ′ ( S with |S ′| > 1 and prob-
lem (cS′ , ES′) ∈ CS

















k∈S′ Fk(cS, ES). Thus, for each j ∈ S ′, Fj (cS′ , ES′) = αcj . 
We next show that, given a non-singleton proportional generalized claims prob-
lem and a resource monotonic and consistent rule, if some agent in a coalition of size
larger than two does not receive a proportional payoff, then there exists a subcoali-
tion that is strictly preferred by at least one member of the subcoalition.
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Lemma 2.4.2. Let N ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ P̃N , and F ∈ F satisfying resource monotonicity and
consistency. If S ⊆ N , |S| > 2, is such that for some i ∈ S, Fi(cS, ES) 6= αci, then there
exists a subcoalition S ′ ( S such that for some agent l ∈ S ′, S ′ ((c,E),F )l S.
Proof: Let N , (c, E), and F as specified in the lemma. Consider S ⊆ N , |S| > 2, such





 = Fj(cS, ES). (2.1)
Since ES = αcS and Fi(cS, ES) 6= αci, without loss of generality we can assume
that agent i receives an over-proportional share, i.e., Fi(cS, ES) > αci. Therefore,
subcoalition S \ {i} can achieve a larger joint endowment without agent i compared













and by resource monotonicity, for each agent
j ∈ S \ {i},




 (2.1)= Fj(cS, ES),
and, by strict inequality (2.2), for some agent l ∈ S \ {i},




 (2.1)= Fl(cS, ES).
Hence, for subcoalition S ′ = S \ {i}, there exists an agent l ∈ S ′ such that S ′ ((c,E),F )l
S. 
Now we introduce a property for coalition formation problems that plays an im-
portant role in the proof of Theorem 2.3.3. Let % be a coalition formation problem
with agent set N . Then, for each coalition S of agents, there exists a coalition S ′ ⊆ S
such that all members of S ′ are at least as well off at S ′ than at any subcoalition of S.
Formally, let S ⊆ N . Then, a coalition S ′ ⊆ S is a top coalition of S if for each i ∈ S ′
and each T ⊆ S with i ∈ T , we have S ′ %i T . A coalition formation problem satisfies
the top coalition property if each non-empty set of agents S ⊆ N has a top coalition.
This property (Banerjee et al. (2001)) is sufficient to guarantee stability.
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We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.3.3.
Proof: Let N ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ P̃N , and F ∈ F satisfying continuity, resource mono-
tonicity, and consistency. By Theorem 1.3.8 of Chapter 1, the coalition formation
problem with coalition N induced by ((c, E), F ) has a nonempty stable set and by
Lemmas 1.3.4, 1.3.7 and Proposition 1.3.1 in Chapter 1, %((c,E),F ) satisfies the top
coalition property. If |N | ≤ 2, we have nothing further to prove. Hence, assume that
|N | > 2.
First, we iteratively construct a stable partition π ∈ St(%((c,E),F )) with coalition sizes
of at most two.
Step 1. Let N1 := N , |N1| > 2. There exists a top coalition S1 ⊆ N1 of N1. Without
loss of generality, assume that S1 is a top coalition of minimal size. We prove that
|S1| ≤ 2. Assume, by contradiction, that |S1| > 2. We distinguish two cases:
(i) For each i ∈ S1, Fi(cS1 , ES1) = αci. Then, by Lemma 2.4.1, for each S ( S1 with
|S| > 1 and each j ∈ S, Fj(cS, ES) = αcj . Hence, any subcoalition S ( S1 such
that |S| = 2 is a top coalition of N1 as well, contradicting our assumption that
top coalition S1 was of minimal size.
(ii) For some i ∈ S1, Fi(cS1 , ES1) 6= αci. Then, by Lemma 2.4.2, there exists a sub-
coalition S ( S1 and an agent j ∈ S such that S ((c,E),F )j S1, which contradicts
that S1 is a top coalition of N1.
Note that agents in S1 can never be strictly better off in any other coalition S ⊆ N1 =
N . Hence, if S1 is part of a stable partition, no agent in S1 can block it.
Set N2 := N \ S1. If |N2| ≤ 2, then set S2 := N2, define π := {S1, S2}, and stop.
Otherwise, go to Step 2.




and |Nk| > 2. There
exists a top coalition Sk ⊆ Nk of Nk. Without loss of generality, assume that Sk is a
top coalition of minimal size. We prove that |Sk| ≤ 2. Assume, by contradiction, that
|Sk| > 2. We distinguish two cases:
(i) For each i ∈ Sk, Fi(cSk , ESk) = αci. Then, by Lemma 2.4.1, for each S ( Sk with
|S| > 1 and each j ∈ S, Fj(cS, ES) = αcj . Hence, any subcoalition S ( Sk such
that |S| = 2 is a top coalition of Nk as well, contradicting our assumption that
top coalition Sk was of minimal size.
(ii) For some i ∈ Sk, Fi(cSk , ESk) 6= αci. Then, by Lemma 2.4.2, there exists a sub-
coalition S ( Sk and an agent j ∈ S such that S ((c,E),F )j Sk, which contradicts
that Sk is a top coalition of Nk.
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Note that agents in Sk can never be strictly better off in any other coalition S ⊆ Nk.
In addition, it follows from previous steps that for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, agents in Sj
can never be strictly better off in any other coalition S ⊆ Nj . Hence, if S1, . . . , Sk are
part of a stable partition, no agent in ∪ki=1Si can block it.




. If |Nk+1| ≤ 2, then set Sk+1 := Nk+1, define π :=
{S1, . . . , Sk+1}, and stop. Otherwise, go to Step k + 1.
After at most |N |−2 steps, we have constructed a stable partition π = {S1, . . . , Sl}
of coalitions with size at most two.
Finally, we prove that by merging any two singleton coalitions of π, we obtain
another stable partition. Assume that for two distinct agents i, j ∈ N , {i}, {j} ∈ π
and denote the partition obtained from π by replacing sets {i} and {j}with {i, j} by
π̃. Note, that since Fi(c{i}, E{i}) = Fj(c{j}, E{j}) = 0, we have that Fi(c{i,j}, E{i,j}) ≥
Fi(c{i}, E{i}) and Fj(c{i,j}, E{i,j}) ≥ Fj(c{j}, E{j}). Hence, since at partition π̃ pay-
offs only changed for agents i and j, any blocking coalition for partition π̃ would
also be a blocking coalition for π (contradicting π ∈ St(%((c,E),F ))) and thus, π̃ ∈
St(%((c,E),F )). 
Proof of Theorem 2.3.4
Recall that N = {1, . . . n} and c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn. For each S ⊆ N , we denote the
CEA parameter associated with (cS, ES) by λS , i.e., for each i ∈ S, CEAi(cS, ES) =
min{ci, λS}, where λS is chosen so that
∑
j∈S min{cj, λS} = ES .
We first introduce some lemmas that will be used to prove Theorem 2.3.4. By the
first lemma, each agent i ∈ N \ {n} weakly prefers to form a pairwise coalition with
a highest claim agent, say agent n, instead of with any other agent.
Lemma 2.4.3. LetN ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ P̃N , and%((c,E),CEA) be the coalition formation problem
with agent set N induced by ((c, E), CEA). Then, for each i ∈ N \ {n} and each j ∈
N \ {i, n},
{i, n} %((c,E),CEA)i {i, j}.
Proof: Let N , (c, E), and %((c,E),CEA) as specified in the lemma and let i ∈ N \ {n}
and j ∈ N \ {i, n}. Given that (c, E) ∈ P̃N , we have E{i,n} = α(ci + cn) and E{j,n} =
α(cj + cn). We prove {i, n} %((c,E),CEA)i {i, j} by showing that
CEAi(c{i,n}, E{i,n}) ≥ CEAi(c{i,j}, E{i,j}).
If CEAi(c{i,n}, E{i,n}) = ci, then the above inequality holds automatically. Hence,
assume that CEAi(c{i,n}, E{i,n}) = λ{i,n} < ci. Since ci ≤ cn, this implies CEAn(c{i,n},
E{i,n}) = λ{i,n} ≤ cn. Thus, CEAi(c{i,n}, E{i,n}) = α(ci+cn)2 . We distinguish two cases:
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Case 1. CEAj(c{i,j}, E{i,j}) = cj . Hence, CEAi(c{i,j}, E{i,j}) = α(ci + cj)− cj . Then,
CEAi(c{i,n}, E{i,n}) ≥ CEAi(c{i,j}, E{i,j})
⇔ α(ci + cn)
2
≥ α(ci + cj)− cj
⇔ αci + αcn ≥ 2αci + 2(α− 1)cj
⇔ α︸︷︷︸
>0
(cn − ci︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
















We will now focus on agent n and discover with which agents she wants to form
a pairwise coalition.
Consider i, j ∈ N \ {n} such that i < j < n (ci ≤ cj ≤ cn). By our next lemma, if
at coalition {i, n} both agents receive the same payoff, then agent n weakly prefers
coalition {j, n}.
Lemma 2.4.4. LetN ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ P̃N , and%((c,E),CEA) be the coalition formation problem
with agent set N induced by ((c, E), CEA). Let i ∈ N \ {n} such that




and for each j ∈ N \ {i, n} such that i < j < n,
CEAn(c{j,n}, E{j,n}) ≥ CEAn(c{i,n}, E{i,n}).
Proof: Let N , (c, E), %((c,E),CEA), and i, j ∈ N \ {n} as specified in the lemma.
Given that (c, E) ∈ P̃N , we have E{i,n} = α(ci + cn) and E{j,n} = α(cj + cn). Since
CEAi(c{i,n}, E{i,n}) = λ{i,n} ≤ ci, ci ≤ cn implies CEAn(c{i,n}, E{i,n}) = λ{i,n} ≤ cn.






and αcn ≤ (2− α)ci.
Since (2− α) > 0 and ci ≤ cj , this implies
αcn ≤ (2− α)cj
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⇔ αcn + αcj ≤ 2cj











CEAn(c{j,n}, E{j,n}) ≥ CEAn(c{i,n}, E{i,n}).

Lemma 2.4.4 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 2.4.5. Let N ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ P̃N , and %((c,E),CEA) be the coalition formation
problem with agent set N induced by ((c, E), CEA). If α ≤ 2c1
(c1+cn)
≡ β1, then for each
i ∈ N \ {n− 1, n}, CEAn(c{n−1,n}, E{n−1,n}) ≥ CEAn(c{i,n}, E{i,n}).
Consider again i, j ∈ N \ {n} such that i < j < n (ci ≤ cj ≤ cn). By our next
lemma, if at coalition {j, n} agent j receives her claim, then agent n weakly prefers
coalition {i, n}.
Lemma 2.4.6. LetN ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ P̃N , and%((c,E),CEA) be the coalition formation problem
with agent set N induced by ((c, E), CEA). Let j ∈ N \ {n} such that





and for each i ∈ N \ {i, n} such that i < j < n,
CEAn(c{i,n}, E{i,n}) ≥ CEAn(c{j,n}, E{j,n}). (2.4)
Proof: Let N , (c, E), %((c,E),CEA), and i, j ∈ N \ {n} as specified in the lemma.
Given that (c, E) ∈ P̃N , we have E{i,n} = α(ci + cn) and E{j,n} = α(cj + cn). Since
CEAj(c{j,n}, E{j,n}) = cj ≤ λ{j,n}, we have that cj ≤ α(cj+cn)2 and
α ≥ 2cj
cj + cn
and αcn ≥ (2− α)cj.
Since (2− α) > 0 and ci ≤ cj , this implies
αcn ≥ (2− α)ci
⇔ αcn + αci ≥ 2ci
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⇔ α(ci + cn)
2
≥ ci.
This implies CEAi(c{i,n}, E{i,n}) = ci and CEAn(c{i,n}, E{i,n}) = α(ci + cn) − ci




≥ αcn + (α− 1)cj = α(cj + cn)− cj = CEAn(c{j,n}, E{j,n}). Thus,
CEAn(c{i,n}, E{i,n}) ≥ CEAn(c{j,n}, E{j,n}).

Lemma 2.4.6 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 2.4.7. Let N ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ P̃N , and %((c,E),CEA) be the coalition formation
problem with agent set N induced by ((c, E), CEA). If α ≥ 2cn−1
cn−1+cn
≡ γ1, then for each
i ∈ N \ {1, n}, CEAn(c{1,n}, E{1,n}) ≥ CEAn(c{i,n}, E{i,n}).
Corollaries 2.4.5 and 2.4.7 now imply that agents 1 and n− 1 are potential “stable
partners” for agent n. When α is very low (α ≤ 2c1
c1+cn
≡ β1), then {n − 1, n} is a
stable pairwise coalition, and when α is very large (α > 2cn−1
cn−1+cn
≡ γ1), then {1, n} is
a stable pairwise coalition. Thus, we next need to determine a threshold value δ1 for
parameter α when β1 < α ≤ γ1 to see when agent n’s partner of choice is n − 1 (for
α ≤ δ1) and when it is 1 (for α > δ1).
We next show that δ1 ≡ 2c12c1−cn−1+cn , the value specified in Step 1 of the CEA
algorithm to trigger either Case (i) with stable coalition {n − 1, n} or Case (ii) with
stable coalition {1, n}.
Lemma 2.4.8. LetN ∈ N , (c, E) ∈ P̃N , and%((c,E),CEA) be the coalition formation problem
with agent set N induced by ((c, E), CEA). Assume that β1 ≤ α ≤ γ1. Then, for δ1 ≡
2c1
2c1−cn−1+cn we have
(i) If α ≤ δ1, then CEAn(c{n−1,n}, E{n−1,n}) ≥ CEAn(c{1,n}, E{1,n}).
(ii) If α ≥ δ1, then CEAn(c{1,n}, E{1,n}) ≥ CEAn(c{n−1,n}, E{n−1,n}).
Proof: Let N , (c, E), and %((c,E),CEA) as specified in the lemma. Given that (c, E) ∈
P̃N , we haveE{1,n} = α(c1+cn) andE{n−1,n} = α(cn−1+cn). Assume that β1 ≤ α ≤ γ1,
which implies
(2− α)c1 ≤ αcn ≤ (2− α)cn−1.




. Hence, CEAn(c{1,n}, E{1,n}) = α(c1 + cn)− c1
and CEAn(c{n−1,n}, E{n−1,n}) =
α(cn−1+cn)
2
. Now, we consider
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⇔ α(2c1 + 2cn − cn−1 − cn) ≷ 2c1
⇔ α ≷ 2c1
(2c1 − cn−1 + cn)
= δ1.
It now follows that
(i) If α ≤ δ1, then CEAn(c{n−1,n}, E{n−1,n}) ≥ CEAn(c{1,n}, E{1,n}).
(ii) If α ≥ δ1, then CEAn(c{1,n}, E{1,n}) ≥ CEAn(c{n−1,n}, E{n−1,n}).

Finally, we show that parameters β1, γ1, and δ1 as defined in Corollaries 2.4.5 and
2.4.7 and Lemma 2.4.8 satisfy















(2c1 − cn−1 + cn)
≤ 2cn−1
(cn−1 + cn)
⇔ 2c1(cn−1 + cn) ≤ 2cn−1(2c1 − cn−1 + cn)
⇔ c1cn−1 + c1cn ≤ 2c1cn−1 − cn−1cn−1 + cn−1cn
⇔ 0 ≤ c1cn−1 − c1cn − cn−1cn−1 + cn−1cn
⇔ 0 ≤ cn−1(cn − cn−1)− c1(cn − cn−1)
⇔ 0 ≤ (cn−1 − c1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
)(cn − cn−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.3.4.
Proof: Let N ∈ N and (c, E) ∈ P̃N . Consider the coalition formation problem with
agent set N induced by ((c, E), CEA).
If |N | ≤ 2, then π = {N} is stable and we have nothing further to prove. Hence,
assume that |N | > 2. We show that in each step of the CEA algorithm, a top coalition
is chosen. This implies that the resulting partition π is stable.
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Step 1. Recall that N1 := N , |N1| > 2, and according to Cases (i) or (ii) in Step 1 of
the CEA algorithm, , S1 ∈ {{n− 1, n}, {1, n}}. We show that in either case, S1 is a top
coalition.
Case (i). α ≤ δ1. Note that since (c, E) ∈ P̃N we have that for each i ∈ {n− 1, n},
{n− 1, n} %((c,E),CEA)i {i}.
Next, let i ∈ {n− 1, n} and j ∈ N \ {n− 1, n}. We prove {n− 1, n} %((c,E),CEA)i {i, j}
by showing that
CEAi(c{n−1,n}, E{n−1,n}) ≥ CEAi(c{i,j}, E{i,j}). (2.6)
For i = n − 1, inequality (2.6) follows with Lemma 2.4.3. For i = n, inequality
(2.6) follows with Corollary 2.4.5 and Lemma 2.4.8 (i).
Case (ii). α > δ1. Note that since (c, E) ∈ P̃N we have that for each i ∈ {1, n},
{1, n} %((c,E),CEA)i {i}.
Next, let i ∈ {1, n} and j ∈ N \ {1, n}. We prove {1, n} %((c,E),CEA)i {i, j} by showing
that
CEAi(c{1,n}, E{1,n}) ≥ CEAi(c{i,j}, E{i,j}). (2.7)
For i = 1, inequality (2.7) follows with Lemma 2.4.3. For i = n, inequality (2.6)
follows with Corollary 2.4.7 and Lemma 2.4.8 (ii).
We have shown that S1 is a top coalition of N .




and |Nk| > 2.




. Then, according to Cases (i) or (ii) in Step k of the CEA
algorithm, Sk ∈ {{n − 1, n}, {1, n}}. Hence, by a similar reasoning than in Step 1
(with agents 1′, (n − 1)′, and n′ in the roles of agents 1, n − 1, and n respectively) it
follows that in both cases Sk is a top coalition of Nk.
We have proven that the CEA algorithm in each step assigns a pairwise top coali-
tion. Therefore, by the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2.3.3, the resulting
partition π is stable. 
Proof of Theorem 2.3.6
Recall that N = {1, . . . n} and c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn. Furthermore, for each S ⊆ N ,
we denote the CEL parameter associated with (cS, ES) by λS , i.e., for each i ∈ S,
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CELi(cS, ES) = max{0, ci − λS}, where λS is chosen so that
∑
j∈S max{0, cj − λS} =
ES .
Proof: Let N ∈ N and (c, E) ∈ P̃N . Consider the coalition formation problem with
agent set N induced by ((c, E), CEL).
If |N | ≤ 2, then π = {N} is stable and we have nothing further to prove. Hence,
assume that |N | > 2. We show that in each step of the CEL algorithm, a top coalition
is chosen. This implies that the resulting partition π is stable.
Step 1. Recall that N1 := N , |N1| > 2, and S1 := {1, 2}. We show that S1 is a top
coalition. Note that since (c, E) ∈ P̃N we have that for each i ∈ {1, 2},
{1, 2} %((c,E),CEL)i {i}.
Next, let i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ N \ {1, 2}. We prove {1, 2} %((c,E),CEL)i {i, j} by showing
that
CELi(c{1,2}, E{1,2}) ≥ CELi(c{i,j}, E{i,j}) or, equivalently, λ{1,2} ≤ λ{i,j}. (2.8)
Note that i < j and hence c1 ≤ ci ≤ cj .
If CELi(c{i,j}, E{i,j}) = 0, then inequality (2.8) holds automatically. Hence, as-
sume that CELi(c{i,j}, E{i,j}) = ci − λ{i,j} > 0. Since ci ≤ cj , this implies CELj(c{i,j},
E{i,j}) = cj − λ{i,j} > 0 and E{i,j} = ci + cj − 2λ{i,j}. Given that (c, E) ∈ P̃N , we also
have E{i,j} = α(ci + cj) and a corresponding loss (1− α)(ci + cj). Thus,
λ{i,j} =
(1− α)(ci + cj)
2
< ci ≤ cj. (2.9)
Next, let {i, k} = {1, 2}. Note that ck ≤ cj , together with inequality (2.9), implies
(1− α)(c1 + c2)
2
=
(1− α)(ci + ck)
2
≤ λ{i,j} < ci.




≤ c1, then λ{1,2} = (1−α)(c1+c2)2 ≤ λ{i,j} and inequality (2.8) holds.
Hence, assume that (1−α)(c1+c2)
2
> c1. Then,CEL1(c{1,2}, E{1,2}) = 0 andCEL2(c{1,2},
E{1,2}) = c2 − λ{1,2} > 0. Hence, i = 2 and E{1,2} = c2 − λ{1,2}. Thus, λ{1,2} =
(1− α)c2 − αc1. Then, inequality (2.9) together with c2 ≤ cj , implies
λ{2,j} =




= (1− α)c2 > (1− α)c2 − αc1 = λ{1,2}
and inequality (2.8) holds.
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We have shown that S1 is a top coalition of N .




and |Nk| > 2. Set
Sk := {2k − 1, 2k}. Note that agents 2k − 1 and 2k are lowest claim agents in Nk.
Hence, by a similar reasoning than in Step 1 (with agents 2k − 1 and 2k in the roles
of agents 1 and 2 respectively) it follows that Sk is a top coalition of Nk.
We have proven that the CEL algorithm in each step assigns a pairwise top coali-
tion. Therefore, by the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2.3.3, the resulting
partition π is stable. 
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Chapter 3
Strategy-proofness on a mixed domain
of single-peaked and single-dipped
preferences
Abstract
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a mixed domain of single-
peaked and single-dipped preferences where the type of preference (single-peaked
or single-dipped) of each agent is known, but there is no information about the po-
sition of her peak or dip and the rest of the preference. In this framework, we char-
acterize all strategy-proof social choice rules and show that they all are also group
strategy-proof. We find that each of these rules can be decomposed into two steps:
in the first step, agents with single-peaked preferences are asked about their peaks
and then, at most two alternatives are preselected; in the second step, agents with
single-dipped preferences are asked about their dips to complete the decision be-
tween the preselected alternatives. We also study which strategy-proof rules satisfy
Pareto efficiency.
3.1 Introduction
Governments are continually improving their cities by constructing new public fa-
cilities such as schools, hospitals or parks. When deciding the location of these facil-
ities, public officials must consider technical constraints (e.g., not all locations may
be feasible) and monetary limitations (e.g., construction costs of facilities could dif-
fer from one location to another), but they may also be interested in considering the
preferences of the population affected by the decision. However, since preferences
are private information and agents are strategic, the rule applied may not always in-
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duce agents to reveal their preferences. This chapter seeks to construct social choice
rules that incentivize people always to reveal their preferences truthfully, a property
known as strategy-proofness.
The literature on strategy-proofness is based on Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s theorem
(Gibbard et al., 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975), which states that dictatorial rules are the
only strategy-proof rules on the universal preference domain with more than two
alternatives in their range. Therefore, to construct non-dictatorial social choice rules
that induce truth-telling, one has to restrict either the range of the rules to two alter-
natives or the domain of admissible preferences. Since rules with a range of two are
not Pareto efficient on the universal preference domain, the literature has focused
on restricting the domain of preferences, which makes a good fir for some real-life
situations such as the location of public facilities.
This chapter proposes a new preference domain for locating a public facility in
any countable subset of the real line. In this domain, the type of preference of each
agent (single-peaked or single-dipped) is known but the location of the peak or dip
and the rest of the preference are private information. In this setting, the set of ad-
missible preferences for an agent with single-peaked (single-dipped) preferences is
equal to the set of all single-peaked (single-dipped) preferences.
Our main result is a characterization of all strategy-proof rules on the aforemen-
tioned preference domain. In particular, we find that all strategy-proof rules can be
described in two steps. In the first step, each agent with single-peaked preferences is
asked about her best alternative in the range of the rule (her "peak") and, as a result,
one or two alternatives are preselected. If only one alternative is preselected, this
is the final outcome. Otherwise, we find that any pair of alternatives that arise as
the outcome of the first step is formed by contiguous alternatives in the range of the
rule. In the second step, each agent with single-dipped preferences is asked about
her worst alternative in the range of the rule (her "dip"). Finally, taking into account
the information about the "peaks" and "dips", one of the two preselected alternatives
is chosen. We also study which of the strategy-proof rules are Pareto efficient. We
find that any strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rule has either a range of two, coin-
ciding with the "extreme points" of the set of feasible alternatives, or a range equal
to the set of feasible alternatives.
Related literature
There is a considerable body of literature on strategy-proofness that studies domains
that escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility (see Barberà (2011) for a
survey). For the case of locating public facilities, the literature has analyzed in depth
the domain of single-peaked preferences and the domain of single-dipped prefer-
ences.
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When the facility is a public good, e.g., a school or a hospital, the domain of
single-peaked preferences is appealing. A preference is said to be single-peaked if
(a) there is a single most preferred alternative (the peak); and (b) for each alternative
x situated between the peak and another alternative y, the preference declares that
x is preferred to y. The single-peaked preference domain was first discussed by
Black (1948a,b), who shows that the median voter rule, which selects the median
of the declared peaks, is strategy-proof and selects the Condorcet winner. Later,
Moulin (1980) and Barberà and Jackson (1994) characterize all strategy-proof rules
on this domain: The generalized median voter rules. By contrast, if the facility to be
located is a prison or a cemetery, i.e., a facility that is considered a public bad, the
single-dipped preference domain emerges naturally. A preference is single-dipped
whenever (a) there is a single worst alternative (the dip); and (b) for each alternative
x located between another alternative y and the dip, the preference declares that y is
preferred to x. Barberà et al. (2012) and Manjunath (2014) show that for this domain
all strategy-proof rules have a range of two.
However, there are examples of public facilities which do not give rise to unani-
mous opinions for which preferences may be either single-peaked or single-dipped
in the society, e.g., dog parks, soccer stadiums or dance clubs. For example, dog
owners may have single-peaked preferences on the location of a dog park, but indi-
viduals who do not like dogs will probably have single-dipped preferences. Conse-
quently, a mixed domain that includes both single-peaked and single-dipped prefer-
ences is needed to deal with such situations. When the set of admissible preferences
of each agent coincides with the set of all single-peaked and all single-dipped pref-
erences, Berga and Serizawa (2000) and Achuthankutty and Roy (2018) show that
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility applies. Hence, the domain of preferences
needs to be constrained even further. Thomson (2008) studies a restricted domain
with two agents. In that domain, the social planner knows the type of preferences
of each agent: one agent has single-peaked preferences while the other has single-
dipped preferences. Moreover, the peak and the dip of these preferences are located
at the same point and this location is public information. The rest of the preference
of each agent in that domain is private information. Later, Feigenbaum and Sethu-
raman (2015) consider a restricted domain in which the type of the preference of
each agent (single-peaked or single-dipped) is known and preferences are cardinally
determined by the distance between each location and the peak/dip, which is the
only issue in the preference of each agent that is private information. More recently,
Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz (2018) analyze a model closer to the one presented in this
chapter. In their model, the peak or the dip of each agent, which corresponds to the
location of the individual in the real line, is public information but the social planner
is uncertain whether a particular agent has single-peaked or single-dipped prefer-
ences and what the rest of the preference of each agent is. Unlike them, we consider
a domain in which the type of preference of each agent (single-peaked or single-
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dipped) is public information, but the social planner has no information about the
location of the peak or the dip and the rest of the preference of each agent. Observe
that in this new domain, in contrast to the domain of Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz
(2018), agents could misrepresent their preferences by lying about the location of the
peak or dip, but not about the type of preference (i.e., an agent with single-peaked
preferences cannot declare that she has single-dipped preferences, and vice versa).
The strategy-proof rules on our domain are somewhat similar to the strategy-
proof rules on the single-peaked and single-dipped preference domains. Observe
that in the first step of our rules, only the agents with single-peaked preferences
are asked about their peaks. Note that the outcome of this first step may contain a
single alternative or a pair of contiguous alternatives. We show that if we define a set
formed by single alternatives and all pairs formed by contiguous alternatives under
a particular order, the procedure used in this first step to choose an element of that
set consists of applying a generalized median voter function on that set. Moreover, in
the second step of our rules, a binary decision problem is faced and we find that the
choice between the two locations is made in the same way as in the strategy-proof
rules of the single-dipped preference domain.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model.
Section 3.3 introduces the general structure that any strategy-proof rule must have.
Section 3.4 completes the characterization of all strategy-proof rules.Section 3.5 ana-
lyzes which strategy-proof rules also satisfy Pareto efficiency. Section 3.6 concludes.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
3.2 The model
Consider a social planner who wants to locate a public facility at a point in a count-
able set X ⊂ R of feasible locations. There is a finite group of agents N , divided into
two groups: A, with cardinality a, and D, with cardinality n− a. Let Ri be the weak
preference relation of agent i ∈ N on X . Formally, Ri is a complete, transitive,
and antisymmetric binary relation. Pi denotes the strict preference relation induced
by Ri. We assume that the agents of A (respectively, D) have single-peaked (respec-
tively, single-dipped) preferences on X . That is, if i ∈ A, Ri is a single-peaked pref-
erence with a peak p(Ri), which means that for all x, y ∈ X such that p(Ri) ≥ x > y
or p(Ri) ≤ x < y, it follows that xPi y. Similarly, if i ∈ D, Ri is a single-dipped pref-
erence with a dip d(Ri), which means that for all x, y ∈ X such that d(Ri) ≥ x > y
or d(Ri) ≤ x < y, it follows that y Pi x. We denote the preference domain of agent i by
Ri. If i ∈ A (i ∈ D), thenRi corresponds with the set of all single-peaked preferences
(the set of all single-dipped preferences).
A preference profile is a set of preferences R ≡ (Ri)i∈N such that Ri ∈ Ri for
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each i ∈ N . For each profile R and each set S ⊂ N , we denote by RS and R−S the
subprofiles ofR restricted to the set of agents S andN \S, respectively.1 In particular,
the preferences of the agents with single-peaked (single-dipped) preferences in R is
denoted by RA (RD). We also write for any S ⊆ N ,RS = ×i∈SRi and, for the sake of
simplicity,R = RN .
Given any R ∈ R, for any S ⊆ A, we denote the vector of peaks of the agents
of S by p(RS). Similarly, d(RS) denotes the vector of dips of the agents of S for any
S ⊆ D at profile R. With a slight abuse of notation, we write p(R) and d(R) instead
of p(RA) and d(RD), respectively.
The solution concept is a social choice rule f : R → X that selects for each
preference profile R ∈ R a feasible location f(R) ∈ X . We denote the range of f
by rf , i.e., rf = {x ∈ X : ∃R ∈ R such that f(R) = x}. Given any R ∈ R, we
define ω(p(R)) as the set of alternatives in the range of f that appear as the outcome
of f for the profiles with vector of peaks p(R), i.e., ω(p(R)) = {x ∈ rf : ∃R′ ∈
R such that p(R′) = p(R) and f(R′) = x}.
We focus on rules that incentivize the truthful representation of preferences. A
rule f is said to be manipulable by group S ⊆ N if there is a preference profile
R ∈ R in which each agent in S benefits from a simultaneous misrepresentation of
preferences. Formally, a social choice rule f is manipulable by group S ⊆ N if there
is a preference profile R ∈ R and a subprofile R′S ∈ RS such that f(R′S, R−S)Pi f(R)
for each i ∈ S. Thus, a rule f is group strategy-proof (GSP) if it is not manipulable by
any group S ⊆ N . Similarly, f is said to be strategy-proof (SP) if it is not manipulable
by any group S ⊆ N such that |S| = 1. A rule f is Pareto efficient (PE) if for each
R ∈ R, there is no x ∈ X such that xPi f(R) for each i ∈ N . Finally, a rule f with
|rf | ≥ 2 is dictatorial if there is an agent i ∈ N (the dictator) such that f(R)Ri x for
all R ∈ R and all x ∈ rf .
3.3 General structure of strategy-proof rules
This section derives the common structure that each SP rule will have. First, it is
important to note that all rules f with |rf | = 1 are SP. Therefore, we focus throughout
the chapter only on rules f with |rf | ≥ 2. The first result establishes an equivalence
between SP and GSP on our domain.
Proposition 3.3.1. The social choice rule f is SP if and only if it is GSP.
In the following proposition, we show that if the preference of any agent changes
but she continues to rank all alternatives in rf in the same way as before, then the
1With a slight abuse of notation, we write R−i instead of R−{i}.
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alternative chosen should be the same. That is, the rule f should be independent of
preferences over alternatives that are not in the range of f .
Proposition 3.3.2. Let f be SP. For each R,R′ ∈ R such that xPi y ⇔ xP ′i y for all
x, y ∈ rf and all i ∈ N , then f(R) = f(R′).
Given Proposition 3.3.2, it is useful to define for each i ∈ A and each Ri ∈ Ri the
peak over the alternatives in the range of f as pf (Ri) = {x ∈ rf : xPi y for all y ∈
rf \{x}}. Thus, pf (R) is an element of rAf . Similarly, for each i ∈ D and each Ri ∈ Ri,
we define the dip over the alternatives in the range of f as df (Ri) = {x ∈ rf :
y Pi x for all y ∈ rf \ {x}}.
We now discuss the implications that SP (and, thus, GSP) imposes on the rules.
The following result, which is essential to understand the structure of any SP rule,
establishes that if a vector of peaks pf (R) is set, there are at most two alternatives in
the range of f .
Proposition 3.3.3. Let f be SP. Then, for each R ∈ R, |ω(pf (R))| ≤ 2.
Proposition 3.3.3 implies that any SP rule can be decomposed in two steps. In
the first step, agents with single-peaked preferences have to declare only their peaks
and, depending on those peaks, a set of at most two alternatives is preselected. If one
alternative is preselected, that alternative is finally implemented. If two alternatives
are preselected, the alternative finally selected must be determined in the second
step of the procedure. This idea is summarized in the following proposition. We
first introduce some notation: for each R ∈ R, denote minω(pf (R)) by ω(pf (R)) and
maxω(pf (R)) by ω(pf (R)).
Proposition 3.3.4. If f is SP, there is a function ω : rAf → r2f and a set of binary decision
functions {g{x,y} : R → {l, r}}{x,y}∈r2f such that for each R ∈ R,
f(R) =
{
ω(pf (R)) if gω(pf (R))(R) = l,
ω(pf (R)) if gω(pf (R))(R) = r.
Proposition 3.3.4 explains the structure of any SP rule. Each SP rule f depends
on a set of functions. The first of them, ω, determines the set of alternatives that are
preselected when the agents of A have declared their peaks. That is, ω(pf (R)) gives
the alternatives that can be selected when the vector of peaks is pf (R). By Propo-
sition 3.3.3, we know that this set of preselected alternatives includes at most two
alternatives. If only one alternative x is preselected, we denote that the outcome of ω
is {x, x}. Thus, the outcome of ω is always in r2f . To choose between the preselected
alternatives, ω(pf (R)) and ω(pf (R)), the SP rules apply a binary decision function
gω(pf (R)) : R → {l, r} in such a way that if the outcome of gω(pf (R)) at profile R is l,
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then ω(pf (R)) is chosen by f . Otherwise, ω(pf (R)) is selected by f . For example, if
ω(pf (R)) = {x, y}, with x < y, and g{x,y}(R) = r, then f(R) = y. Note that, when
only one alternative x has been preselected in the first step, that is, ω(pf (R)) = {x, x},
it always holds that f(R) = x because ω(pf (R)) = ω(pf (R)) = x.
Observe that so far we have not imposed any conditions on ω and {g{x,y}}{x,y}∈r2f .
For that reason, although all SP rules can be decomposed in the way described be-
fore, there are rules that follow the structure of Proposition 3.3.4 that are not SP.
Therefore, there is a need to study how SP restricts each function.
3.4 Characterization of strategy-proof rules
In this section, we characterize all rules that are SP on our preference domain. We
start by providing the necessary conditions upon Proposition 3.3.4 that each of the
two steps has to satisfy.
3.4.1 Conditions on the first step
We study what additional conditions are required in the first step to guarantee SP,
i.e., what conditions have to be satisfied by the function ω. In particular, we analyze
the structure of the single alternatives and pairs of alternatives that can appear as
the outcome of the first step.
The first result states that if the outcome of ω for a vector of peaks contains two
alternatives, then there is no other alternative between them in the range of f . We
say for any ~pf ∈ rAf that |ω( ~pf )| = 1 when ω( ~pf ) = {x, x} for some x ∈ rf and that
|ω( ~pf )| = 2 when ω( ~pf ) = {x, y} for some x, y ∈ rf with x 6= y.
Proposition 3.4.1. Let f be SP. If |ω(~pf )| = 2 for some ~pf ∈ rAf , then rf ∩ (ω(~pf ), ω(~pf )) =
∅.
Given Proposition 3.4.1, it is useful to define Vf as the set that contains all ordered
pairs that can be formed with contiguous alternatives of rf , i.e., Vf = {(x, y) ∈ r2f :
x < y and (x, y) ∩ rf = ∅}. If the outcome of ω is a single alternative, then ω takes a
value in rf . Otherwise, if the outcome of ω is a pair of contiguous alternatives, then
ω takes a value in Vf . Therefore, the range of ω is a (not necessarily strict) subset of
Vf ∪rf .2 To simplify notation, from now on we write the outcome of ω( ~pf ) by xwhen
it is {x, x} and by (x, y) when it is {x, y}, with x < y.
2There is a slight abuse of notation in this sentence because the range of ω consists of non-ordered
pairs, while Vf is defined as ordered pairs. However, since any pair can be ordered, we use both
notations without distinction throughout the chapter.
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At this point, it must be remembered that rf is countable (becauseX is countable),
so there may be no min rf and max rf . However, all the following definitions and
results can be applied for any possible rf independently of whether or not the set
has a maximum and/or a minimum.3
The second result states that for each interior alternative in the range of f , there
is a vector of peaks such that the outcome of ω is uniquely that alternative.4
Proposition 3.4.2. Let f be SP. For each x ∈ rf \ {min rf ,max rf}, there is ~pf ∈ rAf such
that ω(~pf ) = x.
Observe that if min rf or max rf exists, Proposition 3.4.2 gives the flexibility to
include them or not in the range of ω. Therefore, the range of ω always includes
Vf ∪ rf \ {min rf ,max rf} and may or may not include the alternatives min rf and
max rf .
Observe that rf ⊆ X ⊆ R. Then, there is a natural order < over the set rf . This
order can be extended to Vf ∪ rf with an order <∗ in the following way:
(i) x <∗ y ⇔ x < y,
(ii) for each (x, y) ∈ Vf with x 6= y, x <∗ (x, y) <∗ y.
That is, <∗ ranks all single alternatives in the range in the same way as < and
inserts each pair of contiguous alternatives in the middle of them.5 Figure 3.1 illus-
trates how Vf and <∗ are constructed from rf .
1 (1,2) 2 (2,3) 3 (3,4) 4
Figure 3.1: Order <∗ over Vf ∪ rf with rf = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
We now analyze the structure of ω in order to ensure SP. Observe that in this
first step there is a set of agents with single-peaked preferences and a set Vf ∪ rf of
elements with an order <∗. It is well-known in the literature (see Barberà, 2011) that
the SP rules on a domain in which all agents have single-peaked preferences over an
ordered set are generalized median voter rules. However, the existing results cannot
3In those results in which the statement makes reference to the elements min rf and/or max rf , if
the particular rf under analysis does not have that element, then the reference to that element should
be taken as eliminated on reading the statement.
4With a slight abuse of notation, when ω(p(R)) = {x, x}, we write ω(p(R)) = {x} or simply
ω(p(R)) = x.
5Observe that an order >∗ can be defined in a similar way. We also make use of the weak orders
≤∗ and ≥∗ constructed from <∗ and >∗ in the standard way, respectively.
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be applied directly because even though the preferences of the agents ofA are single-
peaked over X , they may not be single-peaked over Vf ∪ rf . To see why, consider
an agent whose peak is at x ∈ X . Thus, it seems that this agent will strictly prefer
(x, y) over y as the outcome of the function ω. However, this is not always the case
because the final decision will depend on the entire profile of preferences: if, given
the preferences of the other agents, y is going to be selected in the second step in
both cases, then the agent is indifferent between (x, y) and y. Nevertheless, it turns
out that the unique ω functions compatible with an SP rule on our domain are also
generalized median voter functions.
The first important issue that deserves to be mentioned about the class we are
going to define is that it is defined not necessarily on Vf ∪rf , but on a set Tf such that
[Vf ∪ (rf \ {min rf ,max rf})] ⊆ Tf ⊆ Vf ∪ rf . To clarify this point, consider the rules
f with rf = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Then, since alternatives 1 = min rf and 4 = max rf may or
may not belong to Tf , there are four possible sets Tf for these rules: (i) Tf = Vf ∪ rf ,
that is, Tf = {1, (1, 2), 2, (2, 3), 3, (3, 4), 4}; (ii) Tf = Vf ∪ (rf \ {1}), that is, Tf =
{(1, 2), 2, (2, 3), 3, (3, 4), 4}; (iii) Tf = Vf ∪ (rf \ {4}), that is, Tf = {1, (1, 2), 2, (2, 3), 3,
(3, 4)}; and (iv) Tf = Vf ∪ (rf \ {1, 4}), that is, Tf = {(1, 2), 2, (2, 3), 3, (3, 4)}.
The second main point in defining a generalized median voter function on a set
(in this case, on Tf ) is the concept of a left coalition system. We first introduce the
formal definition of it.
Definition 3.4.3. Consider a set Tf such that [Vf ∪ (rf \ {min rf}, {max rf})] ⊆ Tf ⊆
Vf ∪ rf . A left coalition system on Tf is a correspondence L : Tf → 2A assigning to each
α ∈ Tf a collection of coalitions L(α) such that:
(i) if C ∈ L(α) and C ⊂ C ′, then C ′ ∈ L(α),
(ii) if α <∗ β and C ∈ L(α), then C ∈ L(β), and
(iii) if rf has a maximum and max rf /∈ Tf , then ∅ ∈ L(maxTf ) \ L(α) for each α ∈
Tf \ {maxTf}.
(iv) if rf does not have a maximum, then ∅ /∈ L(α) for each α ∈ Tf .
A left coalition system on Tf includes a set of coalitions L(α) for each element
α ∈ Tf . The coalitions in L(α) can be interpreted as the “support" or “winning
coalitions" needed to implement an alternative to the left of or equal (with the order
≤∗) to α. Condition (i) implies that if a coalition is winning at α, all its supercoalitions
are also winning at α. Condition (ii) implies that if a coalition is winning at α, it is
also winning at any β >∗ α. Finally, conditions (iii) and (iv) guarantee, as shown
below, that any alternative in the range of f appears as the outcome of f .
A generalized median voter function can thus be defined using the notion of a
left coalition system.
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Definition 3.4.4. Given a left coalition system L on Tf , its associated generalized me-
dian voter function ω is defined so that for each ~pf ∈ rAf and each R ∈ R such that
pf (R) = ~pf ,
ω(~pf ) = α⇔ {i ∈ A : pf (Ri) ≤∗ α} ∈ L(α) and
{i ∈ A : pf (Ri) ≤∗ β} /∈ L(β) for all β ∈ Tf such that β <∗ α.
Once a set Tf and a left coalition system L on Tf are obtained, the associated
generalized median voter function ω chooses the first element α ∈ Tf , starting from
the left, such that the set of agents whose peaks are to the left of or equal to α belongs
to L(α) under the order ≤∗.
We are now ready to explain the relevance of conditions (iii) and (iv) in Defi-
nition 3.4.3. Note first that once the empty set belongs to L(α) for some α ∈ Tf ,
no alternative to the right of α appears as the outcome of ω for any profile. To see
why, observe that if ∅ ∈ L(α) for some α ∈ Tf , then L(α) = 2A by condition (i)
in Definition 3.4.3. Therefore, for any R ∈ R, {i ∈ A : pf (Ri) ≤∗ α} ∈ L(α) and
thus, ω(pf (R)) ≤∗ α. So if the empty set belongs to an element of Tf , then Tf has
a maximum, which requires that rf should have a maximum too. Thus, condition
(iv) in Definition 3.4.3 means that when rf does not have a maximum, the empty
set does not belong to L(α) for any α ∈ Tf . To understand condition (iii), consider,
for instance, a rule f with rf = {1, 2, 3, 4} and Tf = Vf ∪ (rf \ {4}). We first show
that the empty set must belong to L(α) for some α ∈ Tf . To see this, consider a pro-
file R ∈ R such that pf (Ri) = 4 for each i ∈ A. If ∅ /∈ L(α) for each α ∈ Tf , then
ω(pf (R)) >
∗ (3, 4) = maxTf , which is not possible. Second, we show that the empty
set belongs only to L(maxTf ) = L(3, 4). To see this, assume that for some α 6= (3, 4),
∅ ∈ L(α). Then, L(α) = 2A by condition (i) in Definition 3.4.3. Therefore, for any
R ∈ R, ω(pf (R)) ≤∗ α and (3, 4) will never appear as the outcome of ω. Hence,
alternative 4 will never be the outcome of f , which is not possible given that 4 ∈ rf .
Finally, observe that Proposition 3.4.2 states that all interior alternatives of rf
must be in the range of ω but there is no obligation to include either the single al-
ternatives min rf and max rf or each of the pairs of Vf . All this flexibility is included
in Definition 3.4.4. On the one hand, as shown, the set Tf may or may not include
min rf and max rf . On the other hand, even though all pairs (x, y) ∈ Vf also belong to
Tf , some of them may not belong to the range of ω. In particular, this happens when
L(x) = L(x, y). To see why, consider, for instance, that L(2) = L(2, 3). Thus, for any
R ∈ R, {i ∈ A : pf (Ri) ≤∗ 2} = {i ∈ A : pf (Ri) ≤∗ (2, 3)} given that pf (Ri) ∈ rf .
Therefore, if {i ∈ A : pf (Ri) ≤∗ (2, 3)} ∈ L(2, 3), then {i ∈ A : pf (Ri) ≤∗ 2)} ∈ L(2)
and then, ω(pf (R)) 6= (2, 3). Thus, the pair (2, 3) will never appear as the outcome of
ω.
The result below shows that the function ω has to be a generalized median voter
function to guarantee SP.
3.4. CHARACTERIZATION OF STRATEGY-PROOF RULES 71
Proposition 3.4.5. Let f be SP. The function ω is a generalized median voter function on a
set Tf , with [Vf ∪ (rf \ {min rf ,max rf})] ⊆ Tf ⊆ Vf ∪ rf .
3.4.2 Conditions on the second step
We now introduce the additional conditions that SP imposes on the second step; i.e.,
the conditions on the functions {g{x,y} : R → {l, r}}{x,y}∈r2f . Note first that, given
the analysis of the previous subsection, only the pairs of Tf may appear as the out-
come of ω. Additionally, observe that if the outcome of ω is a singleton, then the
definition of the second step is irrelevant. Therefore, the only functions that need
to be analyzed are {g(x,y)}(x,y)∈Vf . We introduce the following notation: for each
(x, y) ∈ Vf and each R ∈ R, denote the set of agents that prefer x to y at R by
L(x,y)(R) = {i ∈ N : xPi y}.
We define a particular class of binary decision functions called voting by collec-
tions of left-decisive sets. Any of these functions g(x,y) can be defined by specifying
a set of coalitions W (g(x,y)) ⊆ 2N (called left-decisive sets) such that g(x,y) chooses l
if the set of agents that prefer x to y, L(x,y)(R), is a superset of any coalition that be-
longs to W (g(x,y)), and r otherwise. Before the formal definition is introduced, some
concepts need to be defined. A coalition S ⊆ N is minimal in a set of coalitions
V ⊆ 2N if S ∈ V and for each S ′ ⊂ S, S ′ /∈ V . Then, we say that a set of coalitions
V ⊆ 2N is minimal if all its coalitions are minimal in that set.
Definition 3.4.6. Given a generalized median voter function ω defined on a set Tf , with
[Vf ∪ (rf \ {min rf ,max rf})] ⊆ Tf ⊆ Vf ∪ rf , and any (x, y) ∈ Vf , the binary decision
function g(x,y) is called a voting by collections of left-decisive sets if there is a minimal
set of coalitions W (g(x,y)) ⊆ 2N such that for each R ∈ R, with ω(pf (R)) = (x, y),
g(x,y)(R) =
{
l if C ⊆ L(x,y)(R) for some C ∈ W (g(x,y))
r otherwise,
and the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) For each C ∈ W (g(x,y)), C ∩D 6= ∅.
(ii) For each minimal coalition B of L(x, y) \ L(x), there is C ∈ W (g(x,y)) such that
C ∩ A = B.
Observe that two additional conditions are required in order to complete the de-
scription of the minimal set of coalitions W (g(x,y)). These conditions guarantee that,
given any ~pf ∈ rAf such that ω(~pf ) = (x, y), both alternatives x and y appear as the
outcome of f for some profiles with a vector of peaks ~pf . To see why, observe that if
for some ~pf ∈ rAf we have ω(~pf ) = (x, y), then the set of agents of A that prefer x to
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y, say B, is in L(x, y) \ L(x). Thus, condition (ii) requires there to be a coalition of
W (g(x,y)) such that its agents with single-peaked preferences are exactly those agents
of B. Additionally, note that given any ~pf ∈ rAf such ω(~pf ) = (x, y), the preference
between x and y of all agents of A is known because there is no alternative in the
range between x and y: if for some agent i ∈ A, (~pf )i ≤ x, then agent i prefers x to
y. Otherwise, if (~pf )i ≥ y, then agent i prefers y to x. Thus, if the preferences of the
agents with single-dipped preferences are not considered, the outcome of f will be
either always x or always y for all profiles with a vector of peaks ~pf , which is not
possible because ω(~pf ) = (x, y). Therefore, condition (i) requires there to be at least
one agent with single-dipped preferences in each coalition of W (g(x,y)).
Proposition 3.4.7. Let f be SP and ω be its associated generalized median voter function
on a set Tf , with [Vf ∪ (rf \ {min rf ,max rf})] ⊆ Tf ⊆ Vf ∪ rf . Then, the family of binary
decision functions {g(x,y) : R → {l, r}}(x,y)∈Vf is such that for each (x, y) ∈ Vf , g(x,y) is a
voting by collections of left-decisive sets.
Observe that no conditions are imposed on the relationship between functions
g(x,y) and g(z,w), so it is possible to use different votings by collections of left-decisive
sets for each pair of Vf .
3.4.3 The characterization
Some necessary conditions have been defined on the two steps into which a social
choice rule can be decomposed to guarantee SP. The main theorem states that all
these conditions are also sufficient to obtain SP (and, by Proposition 3.3.1, GSP).
Theorem 3.4.8. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) f is SP.
(ii) f is GSP.
(iii) There is a generalized median voter function ω on a set Tf , with [Vf ∪ (rf \ {min rf ,
max rf})] ⊆ Tf ⊆ Vf ∪ rf , and a set of voting by collections of left-decisive sets
{g(x,y) : R → {l, r}}(x,y)∈Vf such that for each R ∈ R,
f(R) =

ω(pf (R)) if ω(pf (R)) ∈ rf ,
ω(pf (R)) if ω(pf (R)) ∈ Vf and gω(pf (R))(R) = l,
ω(pf (R)) if ω(pf (R)) ∈ Vf and gω(pf (R))(R) = r.
A relevant characteristic of the rules characterized in Theorem 3.4.8 is how little
information is required about agents’ preferences: any of these rules only need to
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know the peak of the preference of each agent i ∈ A among the alternatives in the
range of the rule, pf (Ri), and the dip of the preference of each agent j ∈ D among the
alternatives in the range of the rule, df (Rj). To see why, observe on the one hand that
the function ω only requires information about the location of all peaks, pf (R). On
the other hand, the functions g(x,y) only need information about agents’ preferences
between alternatives x and y. Since there is no alternative of rf between x and y, the
whole vector of peaks and dips among the alternatives of rf provide the required
information: if for an agent k ∈ N , pf (Rk) ≤ x or df (Rk) ≥ y, agent k prefers x to y,
while in the remaining cases agent k prefers y to x.
It is also important to mention that the social planner can design any of the rules
characterized in Theorem 3.4.8 as follows. First, the social planner decides a range
rf ⊆ X . Once rf is known, Vf is straightforwardly defined. Second, the social plan-
ner define a set Tf by deciding whether min rf and/or max rf belong to Tf or not.
Once Tf is defined, the social planner decides on a left coalition system L on Tf
that meets the conditions in Definition 3.4.3. Thus, the function ω associated with
L is known to be a generalized median voter function. Since the outcome of ω may
belong to Vf , the social planner finally has to specify for each (x, y) ∈ Vf , a set of
minimal left-decisive sets W (g(x,y)) satisfying the conditions in Definition 3.4.6.
The following examples clarify how some of the rules in the family characterized
in Theorem 3.4.8 are described with the four components explained in the previous
paragraph: rf , Tf , L(α) for each α ∈ Tf , and W (g(x,y)) for each (x, y) ∈ Vf . The first
two examples correspond to cases D = ∅ and A = ∅ respectively.
Example 3.4.9. It has been established by Moulin (1980) and Barberà and Jackson
(1994) that generalized median voter rules on a set S ⊆ X are the only SP rules on
the single-peaked preference domain. Thus, to describe those rules in terms of the
family characterized in Theorem 3.4.8, the outcome of ω must take a value of rf for
each profile. These rules correspond to rf = S, Tf = Vf ∪ rf , a left coalition system L
such that L(x, y) = L(x) for each (x, y) ∈ Vf , and any sets {W (g(x,y))}(x,y)∈Vf because
the second step is never required. 
Example 3.4.10. Manjunath (2014) shows that if all agents have single-dipped pref-
erences, the only SP rules on that domain have range two and that the choice be-
tween the two alternatives is made with a voting by collections of left-decisive sets.
These rules can be expressed in terms of the family characterized in Theorem 3.4.8
by making the outcome of the first step always the same pair of alternatives. These
rules correspond to any range rf such that |rf | = 2, Tf = {(min rf ,max rf )}, a set
W (g(min rf ,max rf )) such that C ⊆ D for each C ∈ W (g(min rf ,max rf )), and any left coali-
tion system L because since Tf only includes the element (min rf ,max rf ), the first
step is irrelevant. Since the outcome of ω is (min rf ,max rf ) for any vector of peaks,
the choice will be always made in the second step of the procedure according to a
voting by collection of left-decisive sets, g(min rf ,max rf ). 
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Dictatorial rules are SP on the universal preference domain, so they are also SP
on all restricted preference domains such as the domain studied in this chapter. The
following two examples show how they can be described in terms of the family
characterized in Theorem 3.4.8.6
Example 3.4.11. Consider the dictatorial rule over a set S ⊆ X in which the dictator
is an agent with single-peaked preferences, i ∈ A. This rule corresponds to rf = S,
Tf = Vf ∪ rf , a left coalition system L such that for each α ∈ Tf , [C ∈ L(α)⇔ i ∈ C],
and any sets {W (gx,y))}(x,y)∈Vf . Since for each (x, y) ∈ Vf , L(x, y) = L(x), the outcome
of ω will be always an alternative of rf . Moreover, given that a coalition is decisive
in ω if and only if i belongs to it, the outcome of ω for any profile R will be pf (Ri),
the best alternative in the range according to i’s preference. Observe that the second
step is irrelevant, so {W (gx,y))}(x,y)∈Vf does not need to be specified. 
Example 3.4.12. Consider the dictatorial rule in which the dictator is an agent with
single-dipped preferences, i ∈ D. This rule corresponds to any range rf such that
|rf | = 2, Tf = {(min rf ,max rf )}, W (g(min rf ,max rf )) = {{i}}, and any left coali-
tion system L. Since W (g(min rf ,max rf )) only contains coalition {i}, the outcome of
g(min rf ,max rf ) for any profile R will depend only on df (Ri). That is, f selects min rf if
and only if agent i prefers min rf to max rf . Hence, agent i always prefer the alterna-
tive selected by the rule to the other alternative in the range. 
Apart from the rules set out above, there are many other SP rules on our domain
that take into account the preferences of all agents. We describe one of them in the
following example.
Example 3.4.13. Suppose that X = R, A = {i1, i2, i3} and D = {j1, j2, j3}. Consider
any rule with rf = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Then, Vf = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4)}, so {(1, 2), 2, (2, 3), 3, (3,
4)} ⊆ Tf ⊆ {1, (1, 2), 2, (2, 3), 3, (3, 4), 4}. Consider in particular the rule f such that:
• Tf = Vf ∪ rf .
• L(1) = L(1, 2) = L(2) = {S ⊆ A : |S| ≥ 2} and L(2, 3) = L(3) = L(3, 4) =
L(4) = {S ⊆ A : |S| ≥ 1}.
• W (g(1,2)) = {S ⊆ N : |S| = 3 and |S ∩ A| = 2} and W (g(2,3)) = W (g(3,4)) =
{S ⊆ N : |S| = 3 and |S ∩ A| = 1}.
This rule is SP because it belongs to the family characterized in Theorem 3.4.8. The
outcome of this function in some profiles can be seen below:
6Observe that the families of rules defined in Examples 3.4.9 and 3.4.10 already include the dicta-
torial rules where the dictator is a single-peaked or a single-dipped agent, respectively.
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• Consider a profile R ∈ R such that pf (R) = pf (Ri1 , Ri2 , Ri3) = (1, 2, 4) and
df (R) = df (Rj1 , Rj2 , Rj3) = (1, 3, 3). Thus, ω(pf (R)) = 2 because {i ∈ A :
pf (Ri) ≤∗ 2} = {i1, i2} ∈ L(2) and {i ∈ A : pf (Ri) ≤∗ (1, 2)} = {i1} 6∈ L(1, 2).
Since 2 ∈ rf , then f(R) = 2.
• Consider a profile R′ ∈ R such that pf (R′) = (1, 3, 4) and df (R′) = (1, 3, 3).
Thus, ω(pf (R′)) = (2, 3) because {i ∈ A : pf (R′i) ≤∗ (2, 3)} = {i1} ∈ L(2, 3)
and {i ∈ A : pf (R′i) ≤∗ 2} = {i1} 6∈ L(2). Since (2, 3) ∈ Vf , it is necessary to
analyze g(2,3). Observe that L(2,3)(R′) = {i1, j2, j3}. Given that |{i1, j2, j3}| = 3
and |{i1, j2, j3} ∩ A| = 1, it follows that {i1, j2, j3} ∈ W (g(2,3)). Thus, f(R′) = 2.
• Consider a profile R′′ ∈ R such that pf (R′′) = (1, 3, 4) and df (R′′) = (1, 2, 3).
Thus, ω(pf (R′′)) = (2, 3) because {i ∈ A : pf (R′′i ) ≤∗ (2, 3)} = {i1} ∈ L(2, 3)
and {i ∈ A : pf (R′′i ) ≤∗ 2} = {i1} /∈ L(2). Observe that L(2,3)(R′′) = {i1, j3}.
Given that |L(2,3)(R′′)| = 2, there is no C ∈ W (g(2,3)) such that C ⊆ L(2,3)(R′′).
Thus, f(R′′) = 3.
Observe that this rule corresponds to the following procedure: First, the function ω is
the median of the peaks of the three agents in A and four phantom voters situated at
−∞, 1, (2, 3) and +∞. Second, if a pair of alternatives is preselected by ω, a majority
rule is applied (selecting the left element of the pair if there is a tie). 
Finally, observe that the family characterized in Theorem 3.4.8 has similarities
with the results provided in the literature for the domains of only single-peaked
preferences or only single-dipped preferences. On the one hand, in the first step
of the rules characterized in Theorem 3.4.8, a generalized median voter function is
applied as in the single-peaked preference domain. However, on the single-peaked
preference domain the generalized median voter function is defined on rf , while
here it is defined on a set Tf . On the other hand, the second step of the rules charac-
terized in Theorem 3.4.8 faces a binary decision problem as it occurs with the SP rules
on the single-dipped preference domain and in both cases a voting by collections of
left-decisive sets has to be applied.
3.5 Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rules
The family characterized in Theorem 3.4.8 is quite large, so it may be useful to reduce
it by imposing additional axioms. In this section, we analyze the consequences of
adding PE. The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5.1. The following statements hold:
(i) All SP rules f such that rf = X are PE.
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(ii) All SP rules f such that rf 6∈ {X, {minX,maxX}} are not PE.
(iii) A SP rule f such that rf = {minX,maxX} 6= X is PE if and only if A = ∅ or
Tf = {(minX,maxX)}.
It can be seen that PE imposes a strong restriction on the range of f . All of those
SP rules whose range is equal to the set of feasible alternatives but only some of the
SP rules whose range is equal to the minimum and maximum points of the set of
feasible alternatives are PE. Let us explain the intuition behind this result. Note first
that if a SP rule f has a range equal to X but is not PE, then there is an alternative
in X that is unanimously preferred to the one chosen by f . Since that alternative is
in the range of f , the rule is not GSP and, by Proposition 3.3.1, nor is SP. Observe
that this argument only explains part (i) in Proposition 3.5.1. Now we focus on the
remaining cases.
First, it is easy to check that minX and maxX must be in the range of f to guar-
antee PE. To see why, assume, for instance, that minX is not in the range of f and
consider a preference profile in which all the peaks over X are in minX and all the
dips overX are in maxX . Then, minX Pareto dominates any alternative in the range
of f , so f is not PE.
Second, if minX and maxX are not the only elements in the range of f , then
there is an interior alternative in rf . Moreover, since the range of f does not coincide
with X , there is another interior alternative in X \ rf . Let x ∈ X \ rf and y ∈ rf ,
with y being the closest alternative to x. Consider a preference profile where all the
peaks over X are located in x and all the peaks and dips over rf are in y. It can
be checked that any SP rule chooses y in that profile by Theorem 3.4.8. However, x
Pareto dominates y, which contradicts PE. Therefore, if a SP rule f , with rf 6= X , is
PE, then rf = {minX,maxX}.
Finally, if the range of f is equal to {minX,maxX}, then more restrictions are
needed to guarantee PE. These restrictions are provided in part (iii) of Proposition
3.5.1. Observe that these conditions require the set D to be non-empty. Moreover,
by the role of the agents of D in W (g(minX,maxX)), Tf = {(minX,maxX)} implies
that if f chooses minX (respectively, maxX) it is because there is an agent of D such
that minX (respectively, maxX) is preferred to any other alternative of X , which
guarantees PE.
3.6 Concluding remarks
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility that generates different opinions
among agents: Some agents consider it as a good while others consider it as a bad.
It has already been shown in the literature that it is not possible to escape from the
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Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility in a domain where the set of admissible prefer-
ences of each agent includes all single-peaked and all single-dipped preferences, so
the domain needs to be restricted further. We analyze a new domain in which the
social planner has information about the kind of preference of each agent (single-
peaked or single-dipped) but is uncertain as to where each agent’s peak or dip is
located and how each agent ranks the rest of the alternatives. This domain fits well
with situations in which even though the social planner knows a location for each
agent, that location may not necessarily coincide with her peak or dip. Consider
for instance that the facility to be built is a nursery. Parents with children may con-
sider this facility desirable, but it might be undesirable for others without children
or for those who prefer to live in a quiet neighborhood. The location of the house of
each agent may be known, but taking into account the high number of hours peo-
ple spend at work, parents may prefer to have a nursery close to their workplace
rather than to their house. Note that such situations cannot be accommodated in
the domain of Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz (2018), where the peak or the dip of the
preference of each agent corresponds to the unique location of the agent, which is
known by the social planner. In contrast, to allow each agent total flexibility as to
the location of her peak or dip, the social planner needs to have full information as
to the type of preference of each agent, while in the domain of Alcalde-Unzu and
Vorsatz (2018) that information is private. We characterize all strategy-proof rules
on this new domain and show that they are all also group strategy-proof. Finally,
we restrict the family characterized by imposing Pareto efficiency and show that this
property implies a strong restriction on the range of strategy-proof rules.
The family of strategy-proof rules characterized here shows some similarities
with and differences from the family of strategy-proof rules characterized in Alcalde-
Unzu and Vorsatz (2018). All strategy-proof rules on the domain of Alcalde-Unzu
and Vorsatz (2018) also follow a two-step procedure. In their domain, the location
of the peak or dip of each agent is known, so the first step of their rules asks which
agents have single-peaked preferences. As a result of the first step, both the type of
preference of each agent and the location of the peaks and dips are known. In the
domain analyzed here, the type of preference of each agent is public information and
in the first step we ask agents with single-peaked preferences about their peaks. As
a result, the type of preference of each agent and the location of all peaks are known.
Note that even though the social planner in our domain has less information after
the first step, at most two alternatives are preselected in both settings. If two al-
ternatives are preselected, the second step of Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz (2018) asks
all agents their ordinal preference between the two alternatives to make the final
decision. Unlike them, we only need to ask agents with single-dipped preferences
about their dips to choose the final location. Thus, less information is required for
the strategy-proof rules on our domain to be implemented than the strategy-proof
rules on the domain of Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz (2018): we only need to know the
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location of the peaks and dips, while they need to know the type of preferences of
each agent and the ordinal preference between any pair of preselected alternatives
that may appear as the outcome of the first step. Moreover, we provide a closed-
form characterization of the strategy-proof rules on our domain while Alcalde-Unzu
and Vorsatz (2018) do not. We therefore consider that our family of rules is easier to
implement in real-life situations than the family of strategy-proof rules on that other
domain.
Considerations for further research may include constraining the family charac-
terized by imposing other axioms such as anonymity or extending the model by
allowing for indifferences. Note that it is not possible to apply the classical defini-
tion of anonymity because the set of admissible preferences differs from one agent
to another. However, we can define a new property, “type-anonymity", which al-
lows for permutations only between agents with the same set of admissible prefer-
ences (i.e., an agent with single-peaked preferences can only permute with another
agent with single-peaked preferences and an agent with single-dipped preferences
can only permute with another agent with single-dipped preferences). Moreover,
note that we assume throughout the chapter that preferences are linear orders. Al-
lowing for indifferences would necessitate extending the results to the domains of
single-plateau (Berga, 1998; Moulin, 1984) and single-basined (Bossert and Peters,
2014) preferences.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1
We first need to introduce some notation and definitions. For any x ∈ X and any
Ri ∈ Ri, we define the lower contour set of Ri at x as L(Ri, x) = {y ∈ X : xRi y}
and the strict lower contour set of Ri at x as L̄(Ri, x) = {y ∈ X : xPi y}. We also
define, for each y, z ∈ X and each profile R ∈ R, the set S(R; y, z) = {i ∈ N :
y Pi z}. A binary relation %(R;y,z) on S(R; y, z) is defined in the following way: for
each i, j ∈ S(R; y, z), i %(R;y,z) j if L(Ri, z) ⊂ L̄(Rj, y). We can define the strict and
indifference binary relations associated to%(R;y,z). Formally, for each i, j ∈ S(R; y, z),
we say that i ∼(R;y,z) j if [L(Ri, z) ⊂ L̄(Rj, y) and L(Rj, z) ⊂ L̄(Ri, y)], and we say
that i (R;y,z) j if [L(Ri, z) ⊂ L̄(Rj, y) and L(Rj, z) 6⊂ L̄(Ri, y)]. Finally, we say that a
profile R′ is a strict monotonic transformation of R at an alternative z ∈ X whenever
for each i ∈ N such that R′i 6= Ri and each x ∈ X \ {z} such that z Ri x, then z P ′i x.
After introducing all these concepts, we are now ready to prove the proposition.
The proof is based on the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.6.1. For each R ∈ R and each y, z ∈ X , there exists a strict monotonic transfor-
mation of R at z, R′ ∈ R (possibly R′ = R), such that y P ′i z for each i ∈ S(R; y, z) and
%(R′;y,z) is complete and acyclic.
Proof: Consider any profile R ∈ R and any pair of alternatives y, z ∈ X . Without
loss of generality, assume that y < z.
If D = ∅ (respectively, A = ∅), then R is the domain in which all agents have
single-peaked (respectively, single-dipped) preferences. Consider R′ = R. Since, by
Barberà et al. (2010), %(R;y,z) is complete and acyclic, then %(R′;y,z) is complete and
acyclic.
Suppose from now on that A 6= ∅ 6= D and consider R′ = (R′A, RD) ∈ R such that,
for each i ∈ A, p(R′i) = y and z P ′i w for each w < y. By construction, S(R; y, z) ⊆
S(R′; y, z), and then, y P ′i z for each i ∈ S(R; y, z). Moreover, it is easy to see that for
each x ∈ X \ {z} such that z Ri x, it is satisfied that z P ′i x. Therefore, R′ is a strict
monotonic transformation of R at z such that y P ′i z for each i ∈ S(R; y, z).
We prove now that %(R′;y,z) is complete and acyclic. To show that %(R′;y,z) is com-
plete we divide the proof in three parts.
(i) We show that i ∼(R′;y,z) j for each i, j ∈ A ∩ S(R′; y, z).
Since p(R′k) = y for each k ∈ {i, j}, we have that L̄(R′k, y) = X \ {y}. Moreover,
given that, for each k ∈ {i, j}, k ∈ S(R′; y, z), then y /∈ L(R′k, z). Therefore,
L(R′i, z) ⊂ L̄(R′j, y) and L(R′j, z) ⊂ L̄(R′i, y), and, thus, i ∼(R′;y,z) j.
(ii) We show that i ∼(R′;y,z) j for each i, j ∈ D ∩ S(R′; y, z).
Observe that, for each k ∈ {i, j}, since k ∈ D ∩ S(R′; y, z), then d(R′k) > y. We
define first L(R′k, z) and L̄(R
′
k, y) for each k ∈ {i, j} depending on the location
of d(R′k):
(ii.1) Suppose that y < d(R′k) ≤ z. Then, L(R′k, z) = [v, z] ∩ X with y < v ≤ z.
Similarly, we have that [L̄(R′k, y) = (y, w] ∩ X with w > z if w < +∞] or
[L̄(R′k, y) = (y, w) ∩X if w = +∞].
(ii.2) Suppose that d(R′k) > z. Then, [L(R
′
k, z) = [z, v]∩X with v > z if v < +∞]
or [L(R′k, z) = [z, v) ∩ X if v = +∞]. Similarly, we have that [L̄(R′k, y) =
(y, w] ∩X with w > v if w < +∞] or [L̄(R′k, y) = (y, w) ∩X if w = +∞].
It can be checked that for any i, j ∈ D ∩ S(R′; y, z), L(R′i, z) ⊂ L̄(R′j, y) and
L(R′j, z) ⊂ L̄(R′i, y) by (ii.1) and (ii.2). Therefore, i ∼(R′;y,z) j.
(iii) We show that j %(R′;y,z) i for each i ∈ A ∩ S(R′; y, z) and each j ∈ D ∩ S(R′; y, z).
Since p(R′i) = y, L̄(R′i, y) = X \{y}. Given that j ∈ S(R′; y, z), then y /∈ L(R′j, z).
Therefore, L(R′j, z) ⊂ L̄(R′i, y) and we conclude that j %(R′;y,z) i.
80 CHAPTER 3. STRATEGY-PROOFNESS ON A MIXED DOMAIN
Hence, the binary relation %(R′;y,z) is complete.
Finally, we show that %(R′;y,z) is acyclic. Since, by (i), we have that for any two
agents in A ∩ S(R; y, z), they are indifferent by %(R;y,z), then no cycle can be formed
between agents of A ∩ S(R; y, z). A similar argument can be applied to the agents
of D ∩ S(R; y, z) by (ii). In (iii), we have shown that any agent of D ∩ S(R′; y, z)
is ranked by %(R′;y,z) above any agent of A ∩ S(R′; y, z). Therefore, no cycle can be
formed between agents of A ∩ S(R′; y, z) and D ∩ S(R′; y, z). Thus, %(R′;y,z) is acyclic
and the proof is finished. 
The implication of the lemma is exactly one of the conditions that Barberà et al.
(2010) provide to guarantee the equivalence between SP and GSP: indirect sequential
inclusion. Then, Proposition 3.3.1 is proved.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.2
Let R,R′ ∈ R be such that, for each i ∈ N and each x, y ∈ rf , xPi y ⇔ xP ′i y.
Suppose by contradiction that f(R) 6= f(R′). Starting at R, construct a sequence
of profiles in which the preferences of all agents i ∈ N are changed one-by-one
from Ri to R′i such that the sequence ends at R′. Since f(R) 6= f(R′), the out-
come of the function must change along this sequence. Let S ⊂ N be the set of
agents that have changed preferences in the sequence the last time the rule selects
f(R). That is, f(R′S, R−S) = f(R). Let i ∈ N \ S be the next agent changing pref-
erences in the sequence. Then, by construction, f(R′S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) 6= f(R′S, R−S).
If f(R′S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i}))Pi f(R
′
S, R−S), then agent i manipulates f at (R
′
S, R−S) via R
′
i.
If, however, f(R′S, R−S)Pi f(R
′







R−(S∪{i})) (because these two alternatives belong to rf ) and agent i manipulates f at
(R′S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) via Ri.
A remark
Proposition 3.3.2 implies that the outcome of f only depends on the preferences over
the alternatives in the range of f . Therefore, from now on, it would be sufficient to
consider only the preferences over the alternatives of rf . However, some proofs refer
to the preferences over X . Then, sometimes we will make still use of the notation
p(Ri) and d(Ri) instead of pf (Ri) and df (Ri), respectively.
For the remaining proofs, we denote the vector of peaks and dips of the agents
of S over the entire set of alternatives X at profile R by o(RS). We define, for each
R ∈ R, ω∗(o(R)) = {x ∈ rf : ∃R′ ∈ R such that o(R′) = o(R) and f(R′) = x}. That is,
ω ∗ (o(R)) gives the set of alternatives in the range of f that appear as the outcome
of f for the profiles with vector of peaks and dips equal to o(R). Observe that, by
definition, ω∗(o(R)) ⊇ ω(p(R)) for all R ∈ R.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3.3
Consider any R ∈ R. The proof is divided in six steps.
Step 1: We prove that |ω∗(o(R))| ≤ 2.
Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz (2018) analyzes the SP rules in a model in which the
location of each agent is public information and it is assumed that the peak or dip
of her preference is in her location, but the social planner does not know if each
agent has single-peaked or single-dipped preferences. Proposition 1 of that paper
analyzes the subdomain in which all agents have declared their type of preference
(single-peaked or single-dipped) and, then, the social planner already knows the
type of preference of each agent and the location of all peaks and dips. That result
shows that, after knowing this information, the range is reduced to at most two
alternatives. In our model, the social planner already knows the type of preference
(single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Observe that, then, the subdomain
that arises after knowing the information about the location of the peaks and dips
(i.e., o(R)) in our model is exactly the same as the one analyzed in Proposition 1 of
Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz (2018). Then, we can apply that result and we obtain that
|ω∗(o(R))| ≤ 2. From now on, we denote, for each R ∈ R, minω(pf (R)) by ω(pf (R))
and maxω(pf (R)) by ω(pf (R)).
Step 2: We prove that if |ω∗(o(R))| = 2, then ω∗(o(R′i, R−i)) = ω∗(o(R)) for each i ∈ D
and each R′i ∈ Ri.
We start introducing some notation. We denote, for any R ∈ R, N(R) ≡ {i ∈
N : o(Ri) ∈ (ω∗(o(R)), ω∗(o(R)))}. The following lemma shows that, fixing a profile
of peaks and dips o(R), only the preferences of the agents in N(R) can affect the
outcome of f .
Lemma 3.6.2. Let f be SP. For each R,R′ ∈ R such that o(R) = o(R′), if RN(R) = R′N(R),
then f(R) = f(R′).
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that there are two profiles R,R′ ∈ R such that
o(R) = o(R′) and RN(R) = R′N(R), but f(R) 6= f(R′). Assume without loss of general-
ity that f(R) < f(R′). Observe that, since o(R) = o(R′), ω∗(o(R)) = ω∗(o(R′)). Given
that f(R) 6= f(R′), we have that |ω∗(o(R))| 6= 1. Therefore, by Step 1, |ω∗(o(R))| = 2.
Then, f(R) = ω∗(o(R)) and f(R′) = ω∗(o(R)). Starting at R, construct the sequence
of profiles in which the preferences of all agents i ∈ N are changed one-by-one from
Ri to R′i so that the sequence ends at R′. Observe that in all profiles of the sequence,
the vector of peaks and dips of the agents is the same. Therefore, for each profile of
the sequence, the outcome of f is either ω∗(o(R))) or ω∗(o(R)). Since f(R) 6= f(R′),
the outcome must have changed along the sequence. So, let S ⊂ N be the set of
agents that have changed preferences in the sequence the last time the rule selects
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f(R), and let i ∈ N be the next agent changing preferences in the sequence. Then,
f(R) = f(R′S, R−S) = ω
∗(o(R)) 6= ω∗(o(R)) = f(R′S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) = f(R′). Since
RN(R) = R
′
N(R), we have that i /∈ N(R). If [i ∈ A and p(Ri) ≤ ω∗(o(R))] or [i ∈ D and
d(Ri) ≥ ω∗(o(R))], then ω∗(o(R))P ′i ω∗(o(R)) and, therefore, agent i manipulates f at
(R′S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) via Ri. Otherwise, if [i ∈ A and p(Ri) ≥ ω∗(o(R))] or [i ∈ D and
d(Ri) ≤ ω∗(o(R))], then ω∗(o(R))Pi ω∗(o(R)) and, therefore, agent i manipulates f at
(R′S, R−S) via R
′
i. 
Lemma 3.6.2 implies that if the outcome of ω∗ in some profile contains two alter-
natives, then at least one agent should have her peak or dip in that profile strictly
between the two preselected alternatives. Therefore, we deduce that there is at least
one alternative of X between the two alternatives of ω∗ in that profile. This fact is
summed up in the following corollary:
Corollary 3.6.3. Let f be SP. For each R ∈ R such that |ω∗(o(R))| = 2, then (ω∗(o(R)),
ω∗(o(R))) ∩X 6= ∅.
We now introduce another lemma that shows some restrictions on ω∗(o(R′i, R−i))
in relation with ω∗(o(R)) for each R ∈ R, each i ∈ D, and each R′i ∈ Ri. We will use
in the lemma and in the proof of Proposition 3.3.3 the following notation: ω∗(o(R))
and ω∗(o(R)) will be denoted by l and r, respectively. Similarly, ω∗(o(R′i, R−i)) and
ω∗(o(R′i, R−i)) will be denoted by l′ and r′, respectively.
Lemma 3.6.4. Let f be SP and consider any R ∈ R, i ∈ D and R′i ∈ Ri.
(i) If d(Ri) ≤ l, then l′ ∈ [d(Ri), l] and r′ ≤ r.
(ii) If d(Ri) ≥ r, then r′ ∈ [r, d(Ri)] and l′ ≥ l.
(iii) If i ∈ N(R), then {l′, r′} ⊆ [l, r].
Proof: We start proving part (i). Assume that d(Ri) ≤ l. Suppose first by contradic-
tion that r′ > r. Consider a preference profile R′′ ∈ R such that o(R′′) = o(R′i, R−i)
and f(R′′) = r′.7 Since o(Ri, R′′−i) = o(R), f(Ri, R′′−i) ∈ {l, r} and agent i manipulates
f at this profile via R′′i to obtain r′. Then, r′ ≤ r. Suppose now by contradiction that
l′ 6∈ [d(Ri), l]. If l′ > l, consider R̂ ∈ R such that o(R̂) = o(R) and f(R̂) = l. Observe
that o(R′i, R̂−i) = o(R′i, R−i) and, therefore, f(R′i, R̂−i) ∈ {l′, r′}. Agent i manipulates
f at R̂ via R′i. Finally, if l′ < d(Ri), consider R̃′ ∈ R such that o(R̃′) = o(R′i, R−i)
and f(R̃′) = l′. Consider also a preference R̃i ∈ Ri with d(R̃i) = d(Ri) and l′ P̃i r.
Observe that o(R̃i, R̃′−i) = o(R) and, therefore, f(R̃i, R̃′−i) ∈ {l, r}. Therefore, agent i
manipulates f at this profile via R̃′i to obtain l′.
7It can be checked that all preference profiles and preference rankings introduced in the proofs
exist. We omit these parts of the proofs, but they can be provided upon request.
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The proof of part (ii) is similar and thus omitted. We prove now part (iii). As-
sume that i ∈ N(R) and suppose by contradiction that {l′, r′} 6⊆ [l, r]. Assume with-
out loss of generality that l′ 6∈ [l, r]. Consider R̄′ ∈ R such that o(R̄′) = o(R′i, R−i)
and f(R̄′) = l′. Consider also R̄i ∈ Ri such that d(R̄i) = d(Ri) and l′ P̄iw for each
w ∈ {l, r}. Since o(R̄i, R̄′−i) = o(R), we have that f(R̄i, R̄′−i) ∈ {l, r} and agent i
manipulates f at this profile via R̄′i to obtain l′. 
We are now ready to prove Step 2. Consider any R ∈ R such that |ω∗(o(R))| = 2.
We show that for each i ∈ D and each R′i ∈ Ri, {l′, r′} = {l, r}. We divide the proof
into five cases.
Case 1: [d(Ri) ≤ l and d(R′i) ≤ l] or [d(Ri) ≥ r and d(R′i) ≥ r].
We only prove the case in which d(Ri) ≤ l and d(R′i) ≤ l because the other is
similar and thus omitted. Assume without loss of generality that d(R′i) < d(Ri).
Given that d(Ri) ≤ l, we can deduce by part (i) of Lemma 3.6.4 that l′ ∈ [d(Ri), l] and
r′ ≤ r. Since d(R′i) < d(Ri) and we have already deduced that d(Ri) ≤ l′, we have
that d(R′i) < l′. Then, we can apply part (i) of Lemma 3.6.4 (with (R′i, R−i) and Ri
playing the roles of R and R′i, respectively) to obtain that l ∈ [d(R′i), l′] and r ≤ r′.
Therefore, l = l′ and r = r′.
Case 2: d(Ri) ∈ (l, r) and d(R′i) ∈ (l, r).
Given that i ∈ N(R), we can deduce by part (iii) of Lemma 3.6.4 that {l′, r′} ⊆
[l, r]. If d(R′i) ≤ l′, then by part (i) of Lemma 3.6.4 (with (R′i, R−i) and Ri playing the
roles of R and R′i, respectively) we deduce that l ∈ [d(R′i), l′]. Since d(R′i) ∈ (l, r), a
contradiction is reached. If d(R′i) ≥ r′, we obtain a similar contradiction applying
part (ii) of Lemma 3.6.4. Finally, if i ∈ N(R′), we can apply part (iii) of Lemma
3.6.4 (with (R′i, R−i) and Ri playing the roles of R and R′i, respectively) to obtain that
{l, r} ⊆ [l′, r′]. Therefore, l = l′ and r = r′.
Case 3: d(Ri) 6∈ (l, r) and d(R′i) ∈ (l, r).
Assume without loss of generality that d(Ri) ≤ l. By part (i) of Lemma 3.6.4 to
obtain that l′ ∈ [d(Ri), l] and r′ ≤ r. If r′ ≤ d(R′i), we have by part (ii) of Lemma 3.6.4
(with (R′i, R−i) and Ri playing the roles of R and R′i, respectively) that r ∈ [r′, d(R′i)],
but this contradicts that d(R′i) ∈ (l, r). Then, we have that r′ > d(R′i) and, therefore,
i ∈ N(R′). We can now apply part (iii) of Lemma 3.6.4 (with (R′i, R−i) andRi playing
the roles of R and R′i, respectively) to obtain that {l, r} ⊆ [l′, r′]. Then, we have that
l′ = l and r′ = r.
Case 4: d(Ri) ∈ (l, r) and d(R′i) 6∈ (l, r).
Assume without loss of generality that d(R′i) ≤ l. Since i ∈ N(R), we can apply
part (iii) of Lemma 3.6.4 to obtain that {l′, r′} ⊆ [l, r]. Given that d(R′i) ≤ l and
we have already deduced that l ≤ l′, then d(R′i) ≤ l′. Then, by part (i) of Lemma
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3.6.4 (with (R′i, R−i) and Ri playing the roles of R and R′i, respectively) we obtain
that r ≤ r′ and, thus, r′ = r. If l′ ∈ [l, d(Ri)), then we have the situation of Case 3
(with (R′i, R−i) and Ri playing the roles of R and R′i, respectively) and, thus, l′ = l
and r′ = r. Otherwise, if l′ ∈ [d(Ri), r], then we have the situation of Case 1 (with
(R′i, R−i) and Ri playing the roles of R and R′i, respectively) and, thus, l′ = l and
r′ = r.
Case 5: [d(Ri) ≤ l and d(R′i) ≥ r] or [d(Ri) ≥ r and d(R′i) ≤ l].
We only prove the case in which d(Ri) ≤ l and d(R′i) ≥ r because the other is
similar and thus omitted. Since |ω∗(o(R))| = 2, we have that, by Corollary 3.6.3,
(l, r) ∩X 6= ∅. Consider then R̄i ∈ Ri such that d(R̄i) ∈ (l, r). Then, by Case 3 (with
R̄i playing the role of R′i) we obtain that ω∗(o(R̄i, R−i)) = {l, r}. Then, applying Case
4 (with (R̄i, R−i) playing the role of R), we obtain that l′ = l and r′ = r.
Step 3: We prove that if |ω∗(o(R))| = 1, then |ω∗(o(R′i, R−i))| = 1.
Suppose by contradiction that |ω∗(o(R))| = 1 and |ω∗(o(R′i, R−i))| 6= 1. Then, by
Step 1, |ω∗(o(R′i, R−i))| = 2. Therefore, by Step 2 (with (R′i, R−i) and Ri playing the
roles of R and R′i, respectively) we deduce that ω∗(o(R)) = ω∗(o(R′i, R−i)), which
contradicts |ω∗(o(R))| = 1.
Step 4: We prove that if |ω∗(o(R))| = 1, then there is x ∈ rf \ {ω∗(o(R))} such that
ω∗(o(R′S, R−S)) = ω
∗(o(R)) or ω∗(o(R′S, R−S)) = x for each S ⊆ D and each R′S ∈ RS .
Consider any S ⊆ D and any R′S ∈ RS . Starting at R, construct the sequence of
profiles in which the preferences of all agents i ∈ S are changed one-by-one from
Ri to R′i so that the sequence ends at (R′S, R−S). Then, since |ω∗(o(R))| = 1, we can
apply successive times Step 3 to conclude that the outcome of ω∗ in all profiles of the
sequence is a singleton. Therefore, |ω∗(o(R′S, R−S))| = 1.
Consider now the mapping hf : RD → rf such that for each RD ∈ RD, hf (RD) =
ω∗(o(RD, RA)) = f(RD, RA). Observe that hf is well-defined because |ω∗(o(RD, RA))| =
1 for each RD ∈ RD by the previous paragraph. Given that f is SP, we have that hf
is SP too. Note that the domain of hf is the set of all profiles of single-dipped prefer-
ences. Then, we can apply the result in Barberà et al. (2012) to obtain that the range
of hf cannot contain more than two alternatives. Since ω∗(o(R)) is already in the
range of hf , we have that there exists x ∈ rf \ ω∗(o(R)) such that for each RD ∈ RD,
hf (RD) = ω
∗(o(R)) or hf (RD) = x. Then, we deduce that there exists x ∈ rf \ω∗(o(R))
such that ω∗(o(R′S, R−S)) = ω
∗(o(R)) or ω∗(o(R′S, R−S)) = x for each S ⊆ D and each
R′S ∈ RS .
Step 5: We prove that |ω(p(R))| ≤ 2.
We have, by Step 1, that |ω∗(o(R))| ≤ 2. Suppose first that |ω∗(o(R))| = 2. For this
case, we define ω(p(R)) = ω∗(o(R)). To prove that |ω(p(R))| ≤ 2, we need to prove
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that ω∗(o(R)) = ω∗(o(R′)) for each R′ ∈ R such that p(R′) = p(R). Consider then any
profile R′ ∈ R such that p(R′) = p(R). Starting at with R, construct the sequence of
profiles in which the preferences of the agents i ∈ D are changed one-by-one from
Ri to R′i so that the sequence ends at (R′D, RA). Then, by successive applications of
Step 2, we obtain that the outcome of ω∗ in all profiles of the sequence is equal to
ω∗(o(R)). Therefore, ω∗(o(R′D, RA)) = ω
∗(o(R)). Since p(R′) = p(R), we have that
o(R′) = o(R′D, RA) and, therefore, ω
∗(o(R′)) = ω∗(o(R′D, RA)). Thus, ω
∗(o(R′)) =
ω∗(o(R)).
Suppose now that |ω∗(o(R))| = 1. To prove that |ω(p(R))| ≤ 2, we need to prove
that there exists x ∈ rf \ ω∗(o(R)) such that [ω∗(o(R′)) = ω∗(o(R)) or ω∗(o(R′)) = x]
for each R′ ∈ R such that p(R′) = p(R). Consider then any profile R′ ∈ R such
that p(R′) = p(R). Starting at R, construct the sequence of profiles in which the
preferences of the agents i ∈ D are changed one-by-one from Ri to R′i so that the
sequence ends at (R′D, RA). Then, by successive applications of Step 4, we obtain that
there exists x ∈ rf\ω∗(o(R)) such that the outcome of ω∗ in all profiles of the sequence
is equal to ω∗(o(R)) or x. Therefore, ω∗(o(R′D, RA)) = ω
∗(o(R)) or ω∗(o(R′D, RA)) = x.
Since p(R′) = p(R), we have that o(R′) = o(R′D, RA) and, therefore, ω
∗(o(R′)) =
ω∗(o(R′D, RA)). Thus, ω
∗(o(R′)) = ω∗(o(R)) or ω∗(o(R′)) = x. If ω∗(o(R′)) = x for
some R′ ∈ R with p(R′) = p(R), then we define ω(p(R)) = {ω∗(o(R)), x}. Otherwise,
we define ω(p(R)) = ω∗(o(R)).
Step 6: We prove that |ω(pf (R))| ≤ 2.
We have, by Step 5, that |ω(p(R))| ≤ 2. Then, applying Proposition 2 we obtain
that |ω(pf (R))| ≤ 2.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.4
Let f be SP. We define a function ω on rAf such that for each (α1, . . . , αa) ∈ rAf ,
ω(α1, . . . , αa) = {x ∈ rf : ∃R ∈ R such that p(R) = (α1, . . . , αa) and f(R) = x}.
By Proposition 3.3.3, we have that for each (α1, . . . , αa) ∈ rAf , ω(α1, . . . , αa) ∈ r2f . We
now define for each {x, y} ∈ r2f , a binary decision function g{x,y} : R → {l, r} such
that for each R ∈ R,
g{x,y}(R) = l if ω(pf (R)) 6= {x, y},
g{x,y}(R) = l if ω(pf (R)) = {x, y} and x = y, and
g{x,y}(R) =
{
l if ω(pf (R)) = {x, y}, x 6= y, and f(R) = ω(pf (R))
r if ω(pf (R)) = {x, y}, x 6= y, and f(R) = ω(pf (R)).
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Then, these structures of functions ω and {g{x,y}}{x,y}∈r2f allow us to define rule f
as follows:
For each R ∈ R,
f(R) =
{
ω(pf (R)) if gω(pf (R))(R) = l,
ω(pf (R)) if gω(pf (R))(R) = r.
Necessary results for the remaining proofs
Proposition 3.3.3 allows us to deduce that any SP rule can be decomposed in two
steps. In the first step, each agent of A declares her peak and, depending on them,
at most two alternatives are preselected. If one alternative is preselected, this is the
final outcome of the rule. Otherwise, in the second step, the rule selects between
the two preselected alternatives one of them as the final winner. This fact can be
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.6.5. If f is SP, there is a function ω : rAf → r2f and a set of functions
{g~pf : R → {l, r}}~pf∈rAf such that for each R ∈ R,
f(R) =
{
ω(pf (R)) if gpf (R)(R) = l
ω(pf (R)) if gpf (R)(R) = r.
Proof: Let f be SP. We define a function ω on rAf such that for each (α1, . . . , αa) ∈ rAf ,
ω(α1, . . . , αa) = {x ∈ rf : ∃R ∈ R such that p(R) = (α1, . . . , αa) and f(R) = x}. By
Proposition 3.3.3, we have that for each (α1, . . . , αa) ∈ rAf , ω(α1, . . . , αa) ∈ r2f . We now
define for each (α1, . . . , αa) ∈ rAf , a binary decision function g(α1,...,αa) : R → {l, r}
such that for each R ∈ R,
g(α1,...,αa)(R) = l if pf (R) 6= (α1, . . . , αa),
g(α1,...,αa)(R) = l if pf (R) = (α1, . . . , αa) and ω(pf (R)) = ω(pf (R)) and,
g(α1,...,αa)(R) =
{
l if pf (R) = (α1, . . . , αa), ω(pf (R)) 6= ω(pf (R)), and f(R) = ω(pf (R))
r if pf (R) = (α1, . . . , αa), ω(pf (R)) 6= ω(pf (R)), and f(R) = ω(pf (R)).
Then, these structures of functions ω and {g(α1,...,αa)}(α1,...,αa)∈rAf allow us to define
rule f as follows:
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For each R ∈ R,
f(R) =
{
ω(pf (R)) if gpf (R)(R) = l
ω(pf (R)) if gpf (R)(R) = r.

Proposition 3.6.5 explains the structure of any SP rule in a slight different way
than Proposition 3.3.4 in the main text. While in the main text a function g is defined
for each (x, y) ∈ r2f , here we define a function g for each possible vector of peaks ~pf ∈
rAf . This new definition is less simple but more helpful for the proof of Proposition
3.4.1. The idea is that each SP rule f depends on a set of functions. The first of them,
ω, determines the set of alternatives that are preselected when the agents of A have
declared their peaks. That is, ω(pf (R)) gives the alternatives that can be selected by
f when the vector of peaks is equal to pf (R). We know, by Proposition 3.3.3, that
this set of preselected alternatives includes at most two alternatives. To choose the
final winner, a binary decision function gpf (R) : R → {l, r} is applied. If the outcome
of gpf (R) at R is l, then ω(pf (R)) is chosen by the rule and, otherwise, ω(pf (R)) is
selected.
To prove Propositions 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, we need to introduce a lemma that imposes
some restrictions on the functions g~pf . We first define, for each R ∈ R, L(R) =
{i ∈ (N(R) ∩ A) ∪D : ω(pf (R))Pi ω(pf (R))}. The lemma will show that any binary
decision function, associated with a vector of peaks ~pf ∈ rAf , g~pf , can be defined
by specifying a set of coalitions W (g~pf ) ⊆ 2N , called left-decisive sets, such that
g~pf chooses l in a profile R ∈ R with pf (R) = ~pf if L(R) belongs to W (g~pf ), and r
otherwise. We introduce a formal definition of these binary decision functions.
Definition 3.6.6. Given ~pf ∈ rAf , the binary decision function g~pf is called a voting by
collections of left-decisive sets if there is a set of coalitions W (g~pf ) ⊆ 2N such that for each
R ∈ R with pf (R) = ~pf ,
g~pf (R) =
{
l if L(R) ∈ W (g~pf )
r otherwise,
and the following conditions are satisfied:
• W (gpf (R)) ⊆ 2(N(R)∩A)∪D.
• If B ∈ W (gpf (R)) and B ⊂ C ⊆ [(N(R) ∩ A) ∪D], then C ∈ W (gpf (R)).
• If |ω(~pf )| = 2, then ∅ 6∈ W (g~pf ) 6= ∅.
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Observe that Definition 3.6.6 imposes some conditions on the left-decisive sets.
The first condition requires that the left-decisive sets of a binary decision function
gpf (R) have to be subsets of (N(R) ∩ A) ∪ D. This condition implies that the de-
cision between ω(pf (R)) and ω(pf (R)) should depend only on the opinion of the
agents with single-dipped preferences and those agents with single-peaked prefer-
ences whose peaks at R are located between the two preselected alternatives. Ob-
serve that Lemma 3.6.2 already established that, after knowing the location of the
peaks and dips of all agents, the final decision does not depend on those agents with
peak or dip outside the interval between the preselected alternatives. Given that we
only know the location of all peaks, then, according to Lemma 3.6.2, we also need
to know the location of all dips to choose the final alternative. The second condi-
tion, a monotonicity property, says that all supersets of a left-decisive set are also
left-decisive sets. Finally, the non-emptiness condition guarantees that both l and r
appears as the outcome of g~pf at some profiles.
Lemma 3.6.7. If f is SP, there is a function ω : rAf → r2f and a set of voting by collections of
left-decisive sets {g~pf : R → {l, r}}~pf∈rAf such that for each R ∈ R,
f(R) =
{
ω(pf (R)) if gpf (R)(R) = l
ω(pf (R)) if gpf (R)(R) = r.
Proof: By Proposition 3.6.5, it only remains to be shown that g~pf can be defined as a
voting by collections of left-decisive sets. This is equivalent to show that there is a
set of coalitions W (g~pf ) ⊆ 2N that satisfies the conditions in Definition 3.6.6. Given
~pf , we define, for each g~pf , a set W (g~pf ) ⊆ 2N in the following way: B ∈ W (g~pf ) if
there is R ∈ R such that pf (R) = ~pf , L(R) = B, and g~pf (R) = l. Observe that, by
definition, W (gpf (R)) ⊆ 2(N(R)∩A)∪D for each R ∈ R.
Step 1: We show that if B ∈ W (g~pf ) for some ~pf ∈ rAf , then for each R′ ∈ R such that
pf (R
′) = ~pf and L(R′) = B, we can assume that g~pf (R
′) = l.
Consider any ~pf ∈ rAf and any B ∈ W (g~pf ). Then, there is R ∈ R such that
pf (R) = ~pf , L(R) = B, and g~pf (R) = l.
If |ω(pf (R))| = 1, then consider any R′ ∈ R such that pf (R′) = ~pf and L(R′) = B.
Since in this case the outcome of f does not depend on the outcome of g~pf , we can
assume that g~pf (R
′) = l. Then, assume from now on that |ω(pf (R))| = 2. Suppose by
contradiction that there exists R̄ ∈ R such that pf (R̄) = ~pf , L(R̄) = B, but g~pf (R̄) = r.
Starting atR, construct the sequence of profiles in which the preferences of all agents
i ∈ [(N(R) ∩ A) ∪ D] are changed one-by-one from Ri to R̄i so that the sequence
ends at (R̄(N(R)∩A)∪D, R−((N(R)∩A)∪D)). Since g~pf (R) 6= g~pf (R̄), the outcome must have
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changed along the sequence. So, let S ⊂ [(N(R)∩A)∪D] be the set of agents that have
changed preferences in the sequence the last time g~pf selects l, and let i ∈ [(N(R) ∩
A) ∪ D] be the next agent changing preferences in the sequence. Then, g~pf (R) =
g~pf (R̄S, R−S) = l 6= r = g~pf (R̄S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) = g~pf (R̄(N(R)∩A)∪D, R−((N(R)∩A)∪D)).
Therefore, f(R) = f(R̄S, R−S) = ω(pf (R)) 6= ω(pf (R)) = f(R̄S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) =
f(R̄(N(R)∩A)∪D, R−((N(R)∩A)∪D)). If i ∈ B, ω(pf (R)) P̄i ω(pf (R)) and agent i manipu-
lates f at (R̄S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) via Ri. Otherwise, if i /∈ B, ω(pf (R))Pi ω(pf (R)) and
agent i manipulates f at (R̄S, R−S) via R̄i.
Step 2: We show that if B ∈ W (gpf (R)) and B ⊂ C ⊆ [(N(R) ∩ A) ∪D] for some R ∈ R,
then we can assume that C ∈ W (gpf (R)).
Consider any R ∈ R, any B ∈ W (gpf (R)), and any C ⊆ [(N(R)∩A)∪D] such that
B ⊂ C.
If |ω(pf (R))| = 1, then we have that in all profiles R̄ ∈ R such that pf (R̄) = pf (R),
the outcome of f does not depend on the outcome of gpf (R) and, thus, we can as-
sume that gpf (R)(R̄) = l for each R̄ ∈ R such that pf (R̄) = pf (R). Then, there is
R̄′ ∈ R such that pf (R̄′) = pf (R), L(R̄′) = C and gpf (R)(R̄′) = l. By definition of
W (gpf (R)), we obtain that C ∈ W (gpf (R)). Assume from now on that |ω(pf (R))| = 2
and suppose by contradiction that C /∈ W (gpf (R)). Consider R′ ∈ R such that
pf (R
′) = pf (R) and L(R′) = B. Note that since B ∈ W (gpf (R)) = W (gpf (R′)),
then, by Step 1, gpf (R)(R
′) = l and, therefore, f(R′) = ω(pf (R)). Consider now
R′′C\B ∈ RC\B such that pf (R′′C\B) = pf (RC\B) and ω(pf (R))P ′′j ω(pf (R)) for each
j ∈ C \B. Observe that pf (R′′C\B, R′−(C\B)) = pf (R) and, then ω(pf ((R′′C\B, R′−(C\B)) =
ω(pf (R)). Since L(R′′C\B, R
′









−(C\B)) = ω(pf (R)). However,
the agent set C \B manipulates f at this profile via R′C\B to obtain ω(pf (R)) and f is
not GSP. By Proposition 3.3.1, f is not SP and this is a contradiction.
Step 3: We show that if |ω(~pf )| = 2 for some ~pf ∈ rAf , then ∅ /∈ W (g~pf ) 6= ∅.
Consider any ~pf ∈ rAf such that |ω(~pf )| = 2. We only prove that W (g~pf ) 6= ∅ be-
cause the other part is similar and thus omitted. To do it, we are going to show that,
given R ∈ R such that pf (R) = ~pf , and L(R) = [(N(R) ∩ A) ∪ D], then g~pf (R) = l
and, therefore, [(N(R) ∩ A) ∪D] ∈ W (g~pf ). Suppose otherwise that g~pf (R) = r and,
therefore, f(R) = ω(pf (R)). Since ω(pf (R)) ∈ ω(pf (R)), there is R′ ∈ R such that
pf (R
′) = ~pf and f(R′) = ω(pf (R)). Then, starting at R, consider the sequence of
profiles in which the preferences of all agents i ∈ N are changed one-by-one from Ri
to R′i so that the sequence ends at R′. Observe that all profiles of the sequence have
the same vector of peaks than R and, therefore, f chooses in all of them ω(pf (R))
or ω(pf (R)). Since f(R) 6= f(R′), the outcome must have changed along the se-
quence. So, let S ⊂ N be the set of agents that have changed preferences in the
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sequence the last time the rule selects f(R), and let i ∈ N be the next agent changing
preferences in the sequence. Then, f(R) = f(R′S, R−S) = ω(pf (R)) 6= ω(pf (R)) =
f(R′S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) = f(R
′). If i ∈ L(R), then ω(pf (R))Pi ω(pf (R)) and agent i ma-
nipulates f at (R′S, R−S) via R
′
i. Otherwise, if i /∈ L(R), then i ∈ A \ (N(R) ∩ A). If
p(Ri) ≤ ω(pf (R)), then agent imanipulates f at (R′S, R−S) viaR′i. If p(Ri) ≥ ω(pf (R)),
then p(R′i) ≥ ω(pf (R)) and agent i manipulates f at (R′S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) via Ri. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1
Consider any R ∈ R such that |ω(pf (R))| = 2. To prove the proposition, we need
a set of lemmas. For all of them, consider any i ∈ A and any R′i ∈ Ri. We denote
ω(pf (R)) and ω(pf (R)) by l and r, respectively. Similarly, we denote ω(pf (R′i, R−i))
and ω(pf (R′i, R−i)) by l′ and r′, respectively. Observe that, since |ω(pf (R))| = 2, l 6= r.
The objective of this set of lemmas is to show, in Lemma 3.6.11, that if pf (R′i) ∈ (l, r),
then {l′, r′} = {l, r}.
Lemma 3.6.8. Let f be SP. If pf (Ri) ∈ (l, r), then {l′, r′} ∩ (l, r) = ∅.
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that i ∈ N(R) but l′ ∈ (l, r) (if r′ ∈ (l, r), the proof
is similar and thus omitted). Consider R̄′ ∈ R such that pf (R̄′) = pf (R′i, R−i) and
f(R̄′) = l′. Consider now R̄i ∈ Ri such that pf (R̄i) = pf (Ri) and l′ P̄i v for each
v ∈ {l, r}. Note that pf (R̄i, R̄′−i) = pf (R) and, then, ω(pf (R̄i, R̄′−i)) = {l, r}. Therefore,
f(R̄i, R̄
′
−i) ∈ {l, r} and agent i manipulates f at this profile via R̄′i to obtain l′. 
Lemma 3.6.9. Let f be SP. If [pf (Ri) ≤ l, pf (R′i) ∈ (l, r) and r′ = r] or [pf (Ri) ≥ r,
pf (R
′
i) ∈ (l, r) and l′ = l], then {l′, r′} = {l, r}.
Proof: We only show the case in which pf (Ri) ≤ l, pf (R′i) ∈ (l, r) and r′ = r because
the other is similar and thus omitted. Suppose by contradiction that l′ 6= l.
Step 1: We show that l′ ∈ (l, pf (R′i)].
Suppose by contradiction that l′ 6∈ (l, pf (R′i)]. If l′ < l, we can apply Lemma
3.6.8 (with R′i playing the role of Ri and vice versa) to obtain that l 6∈ (l′, r′), which
is a contradiction. If l′ > pf (R′i), consider R̄ ∈ R such that pf (R̄) = pf (R) and
f(R̄) = l. Consider also R̄′i ∈ Ri such that pf (R̄′i) = pf (R′i) and l P̄ ′i l′. Observe that
pf (R̄
′
i, R̄−i) = pf (R
′
i, R−i) and then, f(R̄′i, R̄−i) ∈ {l′, r′}. Therefore, agent i manipu-
lates f at this profile via R̄i to obtain l.
Step 2: We show that for each C ∈ W (gpf (R′i,R−i)), C ∩D ∈ W (gpf (R)).
Suppose by contradiction that there is some C ∈ W (gpf (R′i,R−i)), but C ∩ D /∈
W (gpf (R)). Consider a profile R̂ ∈ R such that:
(i) pf (R̂) = pf (R′i, R−i),
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(ii) for all j ∈ [(N(R̂) ∩ A) ∪D], l′ P̂j r ⇔ j ∈ C, and
(iii) for all k ∈ [N(R) ∩ A] ∪ [D \ (C ∩D)], r P̂k l.
It can be checked that L(R̂) = C. Observe that for each j ∈ D such that l′ P̂j r,
we also have that l P̂j r. Then, we can deduce that L(Ri, R̂−i) = C ∩D. Observe that
pf (Ri, R̂−i) = pf (R) and then, ω(pf (Ri, R̂−i)) = {l, r}. Since C ∈ W (gpf (R′i,R−i)) =
W (gpf (R̂)) and C ∩ D /∈ W (gpf (R)) = W (gpf (Ri,R̂−i)), we have that f(R̂) = l
′ and
f(Ri, R̂−i) = r. Then, since pf (Ri) < l′ < r, we have that l′ Pi r and agent i manipu-
lates f at (Ri, R̂−i) via R̂i.
Step 3: We show that there exists B ∈ W (gpf (R′i,R−i)) such that B ∩D = ∅.
We know, by Step 1, that l′ ∈ (l, pf (Ri)]. The proof is divided into two cases
depending on l′.
• Suppose that l′ = pf (R′i). We know, by Lemma 3.6.7 (exactly by the third point
in Definition 3.6.6), thatW (gpf (R)) 6= ∅. Consider then a coalitionC ∈ W (gpf (R)).
Observe that [C∩N(R′i, R−i)∩A]∩D = ∅. If we prove that [C∩N(R′i, R−i)∩A] ∈
W (gpf (R′i,R−i)), then Step 3 will be proved by setting B = [C ∩ N(R
′
i, R−i) ∩ A].
Suppose by contradiction that [C ∩ N(R′i, R−i) ∩ A] /∈ W (gpf (R′i,R−i)). Consider
now a profile R̃ ∈ R such that
(i) pf (R̃) = pf (R),
(ii) for all j ∈ (N(R̃) ∩ A), l P̃j r ⇔ j ∈ C,
(iii) for all k ∈ D, d(R̃k) = l′ and l P̃k r ⇔ k ∈ C, and
(iv) for all m ∈ [N(R′i, R̃−i) ∩ (A \ (C ∩ A))], r P̃m l′.
Consider also R̃′i ∈ Ri such that pf (R̃′i) = pf (R′i) and l P̃ ′i r′. Observe that
pf (R̃
′
i, R̃−i) = pf (R
′
i, R−i) and, then ω(pf (R̃′i, R̃−i)) = {l′, r′}. It can be checked
that L(R̃) = C. Observe that for each j ∈ N(R′i, R−i)∩A such that l P̃j r, we also
have that l′ P̃j r′. Then, we can deduce that L(R̃′i, R̃−i) = C ∩ N(R′i, R−i) ∩ A.
Since C ∈ W (gpf (R)) = W (gpf (R̃)), but C ∩ N(R
′
i, R−i) ∩ A /∈ W (gpf (R′i,R−i)) =
W (gpf (R̃′i,R̃−i)), we have that f(R̃) = l and f(R̃
′
i, R̃−i) = r
′. Therefore, agent i
manipulates f at (R̃′i, R̃−i) via R̃i.
• Suppose that l′ ∈ (l, pf (R′i)). Given that {i} ∩ D = ∅, if we show that {i} ∈
W (gpf (R′i,R−i)), then Step 3 will be proved by setting B = {i}. Suppose then by
contradiction that {i} /∈ W (gpf (R′i,R−i)). Consider a profile R
′′ ∈ R such that
(i) pf (R′′) = pf (R′i, R−i),
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(ii) l′ P ′′i l P ′′i r,
(iii) for all j ∈ D, l P ′′j r P ′′j l′,
(iv) for all k ∈ [(N(R′i, R−i) ∩ A) \ {i}], r P ′′k l′, and
(v) for all m ∈ [(N(R) \N(R′i, R−i)) ∩ A], l P ′′m r.
Observe that pf (Ri, R′′−i) = pf (R) and then, ω(pf (Ri, R′′−i)) = {l, r}. It can be
checked that L(R′′) = {i} and L(Ri, R′′−i) = [(N(R) \ N(R′i, R−i)) ∩ A] ∪ D.
Since {i} /∈ W (gpf (R′i,R−i)) = W (gpf (R′′)), we have that f(R
′′) = r′. We know, by
Lemma 3.6.7 (exactly by the second and third points in Definition 3.6.6), that
[(N(R′i, R−i) ∩ A) ∪D] ∈ W (gpf (R′′)) = W (gpf (R′i,R−i)). By Step 2, [(N(R
′
i, R−i)∩
A) ∪ D] ∩ D = D ∈ W (gpf (R)) = W (gpf (Ri,R′′−i)). Given that D ⊆ [(N(R) \
N(R′i, R−i)) ∩ A] ∪ D, we have, by Lemma 3.6.7 (exactly by the second point
in Definition 3.6.6), that [(N(R) \ N(R′i, R−i)) ∩ A] ∪ D ∈ W (gpf (Ri,R′′−i)). Then,
f(Ri, R
′′
−i) = l. Therefore, agent i manipulates f at R′′ via Ri.
Step 4: We find a contradiction.
By Step 3, there exists B ∈ W (gpf (R′i,R−i)) such that B ∩ D = ∅. Then, by Step 2
(with B ∩D playing the role of C), we have that (B ∩D)∩D ∈ W (gpf (R)). Therefore,
∅ ∈ W (gpf (R)). Since |ω(pf (R))| = 2, this contradicts Lemma 3.6.7 (exactly the third
point in Definition 3.6.6). 
Lemma 3.6.10. Let f be SP.
(i) If pf (Ri) ≤ l, then l′ ≥ l and r′ ≥ r.
(ii) If pf (Ri) ≥ r, then l′ ≤ l and r′ ≤ r.
Proof: We only prove part (i) because the other is similar and thus omitted. Suppose
then that pf (Ri) ≤ l. We divide the proof into two steps.
Step 1: We show that if l ≤ l′, then r′ ≥ r.
Suppose by contradiction that pf (Ri) ≤ l ≤ l′ and r′ < r. Consider R̄ ∈ R
such that pf (R̄) = pf (R) and f(R̄) = r. Observe that pf (R′i, R̄−i) = pf (R′i, R−i) and,
therefore, f(R′i, R̄−i) ∈ {l′, r′}. Since pf (R̄i) ≤ l′ ≤ r′ < r, w P̄i r for all w ∈ {l′, r′},
and, therefore, agent i manipulates f at R̄ via R′i.
Step 2: We show that l ≤ l′.
Suppose by contradiction that l′ < l. First, if pf (Ri) < l, then consider R̄′ ∈ R such
that pf (R̄′) = pf (R′i, R−i) and f(R̄′) = l′. Consider also R̄i ∈ Ri such that pf (R̄i) =
pf (Ri) and l′ P̄i l. Observe that pf (R̄i, R̄′−i) = pf (R) and, then, ω(pf (R̄i, R̄′−i)) = {l, r}.
Therefore, f(R̄i, R̄′−i) ∈ {l, r} and agent imanipulates f at this profile via R̄′i to obtain
l′. Then, assume from now on that pf (Ri) = l.
If r′ < r, then consider R̂ ∈ R such that
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(i) pf (R̂) = pf (R),
(ii) l′ P̂i r,
(iii) For all j ∈ [(N(R) ∩ A) ∪D], r P̂j l.
It can be checked that L(R̂) = ∅ and, then, by Lemma 3.6.7 (exactly by the third
point in Definition 3.6.6), f(R̂) = r. Observe that pf (R′i, R̂−i) = pf (R′i, R−i) and
then, ω(pf (R′i, R̂−i)) = {l′, r′}. Therefore, f(R′i, R̂−i) ∈ {l′, r′}. Since w P̂i r for all
w ∈ {l′, r′}, agent i manipulates f at R̂ via R′i. Then, we have deduced that r′ ≥ r.
Observe that, if pf (R′i) ∈ (l′, r′), we can deduce by Lemma 3.6.8 (with R′i playing
the role of Ri and vice versa) that {l, r} ∩ (l′, r′) = ∅. However, this contradicts that
l ∈ (l′, r′). Then, pf (R′i) 6∈ (l′, r′).
If pf (R′i) ≥ r′, then consider R̂′ ∈ R such that pf (R̂′) = pf (R′i, R−i) and f(R̂′) =
l′. Observe that pf (Ri, R̂′−i) = pf (R) and then, ω(pf (Ri, R̂′−i)) = {l, r}. Therefore,
f(Ri, R̂
′
−i) ∈ {l, r}. Since v P̂ ′i l′ for each v ∈ {l, r}, agent i manipulates f at R̂′ via Ri.
Finally, if pf (R′i) ≤ l′, we have that pf (R′i) ≤ l′ < l. Then, by Step 1 (with R′i
playing the role of Ri and vice versa), we have that r ≥ r′. Thus, r′ = r. Observe that
we have pf (R′i) ≤ l′, pf (Ri) ∈ (l′, r′) and r = r′. Then, applying Lemma 3.6.9 (with R′i
playing the role of Ri and vice versa), we have that {l, r} = {l′, r′}, which contradicts
that l′ < l. 
Lemma 3.6.11. Let f be SP. If pf (R′i) ∈ (l, r), then {l′, r′} = {l, r}.
Proof: First, if r′ ≤ l, we can apply Lemma 3.6.10 (exactly part (ii) withR′i playing the
role of Ri and vice versa) to obtain that l ≤ l′ and r ≤ r′. However, this contradicts
that r′ < r. If l′ ≥ r, a similar contradiction is reached applying part (i) of Lemma
3.6.10. Then, we can assume from now on that l′ < r and r′ > l.
If i ∈ N(R), by Lemma 3.6.8, we have that {l′, r′} ∩ (l, r) = ∅ and, thus, l′ ≤ l
and r′ ≥ r. Observe then that i ∈ N(R′i, R−i) and we can apply Lemma 3.6.8 (with
R′i playing the role of Ri and vice versa) to obtain {l, r} ∩ (l′, r′) = ∅. Therefore,
{l′, r′} = {l, r}.
If i 6∈ N(R), we can assume without loss of generality that pf (Ri) ≤ l. By Lemma
3.6.10 (exactly part (i)), l′ ≥ l and r′ ≥ r. Therefore, l′ ∈ [l, r) and r′ ≥ r. We
distinguish two cases. If l′ ≥ pf (R′i), we can apply Lemma 3.6.10 (exactly part (i) with
R′i playing the role of Ri and vice versa) to obtain that l ≥ l′ and r ≥ r′. However,
this contradicts that l < pf (R′i) ≤ l′. Then, we can assume from now on that l′ ∈
[l, pf (R
′
i)). Observe then that i ∈ N(R′i, R−i). By Lemma 3.6.8 (with R′i playing the
role of Ri and vice versa), {l, r} ∩ (l′, r′) = ∅. Since we already know that r′ ≥ r,
we conclude that r′ = r. Observe that pf (Ri) ≤ l, pf (R′i) ∈ (l, r) and r′ = r. Then,
applying Lemma 3.6.9, we obtain that {l′, r′} = {l, r}. 
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We are now ready to prove Proposition 4. Remember that |ω(pf (R))| = 2. Sup-
pose by contradiction that there exists x ∈ rf ∩ (l, r). Then, there exists a profile
R̄ ∈ R such that x ∈ ω(pf (R̄)). By Proposition 3.3.3, |ω(pf (R̄))| ≤ 2. Denote
ω(pf (R̄)) = {x, y}, with x ≤ y without loss of generality.
Consider a subprofile R̂A ∈ RA such that pf (R̂i) = x for all i ∈ A. Starting at
R, construct the sequence of profiles in which the preferences of all agents i ∈ A are
changed one-by-one from Ri to R̂i so that the sequence ends at (R̂A, RD). By succes-
sive applications of Lemma 3.6.11 we obtain that ω(pf (R̂A, RD)) = {l, r}. Consider
now a profile R̃ ∈ R such that pf (R̃) = pf (R̄) and f(R̃) = x. Since pf (R̂A, R̃D) =
pf (R̂A, RD), we have that ω(pf (R̂A, R̃D)) = {l, r} and, then f(R̂A, R̃D) ∈ {l, r}. There-
fore, the agent set A manipulates f at this profile via R̃A to obtain x. Then f is not
GSP and, by Proposition 3.3.1, f is not SP, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.2
Consider any x ∈ rf \{min rf ,max rf} and suppose by contradiction that ω(pf (R)) 6=
x for each R ∈ R. Since x ∈ rf , there exists R′ ∈ R such that ω(pf (R′)) = {x, y} for
some y ∈ rf \ {x}. Assume w.l.o.g. that x < y ≤ max rf , that is, ω(pf (R′)) = (x, y).
By Proposition 3.4.1, (x, y) ∩ rf = ∅. Since x > min rf and rf is countable (because X
is countable), there is z ∈ rf such that min rf ≤ z < x and (z, x) ∩ rf = ∅. Then, there
exists R̄ ∈ R such that z ∈ ω(pf (R̄)).
Consider also R̃ ∈ R such that
(i) for all i ∈ A, pf (R̃i) = x and w P̃i y for each w ≤ x, and
(ii) for all j ∈ D, df (R̃j) = y.
We first show that x ∈ ω(pf (R̃)). Suppose by contradiction that x /∈ ω(pf (R̃)) and,
therefore, f(R̃) 6= x. Consider profile (R′A, R̃D) ∈ R. Since pf (R′A, R̃D) = pf (R′), we
have that ω(pf (R′A, R̃D)) = (x, y). Given that, by Proposition 3.4.1, N(R
′
A, R̃D) ∩ A =
∅, then, by construction, L(R′A, R̃D) = D and, by Lemma 3.6.7 (exactly by a combina-
tion of the second and third points in Definition 3.6.6), we have that f(R′A, R̃D) = x.
Then, the agent set A manipulates f at R̃ via R′A to obtain x and f is not GSP. By
Proposition 3.3.1, f is not SP, which is a contradiction. Then, we have deduced that
x ∈ ω(pf (R̃)).
Since ω(pf (R̃)) 6= x by assumption, we have, by Proposition 3.4.1, that ω(pf (R̃)) ∈
{(z, x), (x, y)}. If ω(pf (R̃)) = (z, x) and, given that, by Proposition 3.4.1, N(R̃) ∩
A = ∅, then, by construction, we have that L(R̃) = D. Therefore, by Lemma 3.6.7
(exactly by a combination of the second and third points in Definition 3.6.6), that
f(R̃) = z. Consider now profile (R′A, R̃D) ∈ R. Since pf (R′A, R̃D) = pf (R′), we have
that ω(pf (R′A, R̃D)) = (x, y). By Proposition 3.4.1, N(R
′
A, R̃D) ∩ A = ∅ and, then,
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by construction, we have that L(R′A, R̃D) = D. Therefore, by Lemma 3.6.7 (exactly
by a combination of the second and third points in Definition 3.6.6), we have that
f(R′A, R̃D) = x. Since x P̃i z for each i ∈ A, then the agent set A manipulates f at
R̃ via R′A to obtain x and f is not GSP. By Proposition 3.3.1, f is not SP, which is a
contradiction.
Finally, suppose that ω(p(R̃)) = (x, y). Consider a profile R̃′ ∈ R such that
(i) pf (R̃′) = pf (R̃), and
(ii) for all j ∈ D, df (R̃′j) = x.
Since, by Proposition 3.4.1, N(R̃′)∩A = ∅, we have that, by construction, L(R̃′) =
∅. Therefore, by Lemma 3.6.7 (exactly by the third point in Definition 3.6.6), f(R̃′) =
y. Consider now (R̄A, R̃′D) ∈ R. Since pf (R̄A, R̃′D) = pf (R̄), then ω(pf (R̄A, R̃′D)) =
ω(pf (R̄)). Given that z ∈ ω(pf (R̄)), we have that ω(pf (R̄A, R̃′D)) ∈ {z, (u, z), (z, x)}
with u < z. If ω(pf (R̄A, R̃′D)) = z, we have that |ω(pf (R̄A, R̃′D)) = z. If ω(pf (R̄)) =
(u, z) with u < z, observe that, by construction, L(R̄A, R̃′D) = D and, then, by
Lemma 3.6.7 (exactly the third point in Definition 3.6.6), f(R̄A, R̃′D) = u. Finally,
if ω(pf (R̄A, R̃′D)) = (z, x) and, since, by Proposition 3.4.1, N(R̄A, R̃
′
D) ∩ A = ∅, then,
by construction, L(R̄A, R̃′D) = D. Therefore, by Lemma 3.6.7 (exactly by a combina-
tion of the second and third points in Definition 3.6.6), we have that f(R̄A, R̃′D) = z.
Since for each i ∈ A, w P̃ ′i y for each w ≤ x, the agent set A manipulates f at R̃′ via
R̄A to obtain u or z and f is not GSP. By Proposition 3.3.1, f is not SP, which is a
contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.5
Given a SP rule f , we include min rf in Tf if for all R ∈ R such that pf (Ri) = min rf
for all i ∈ A, f(R) = min rf . Similarly, we include max rf in Tf if for all R ∈ R
such that pf (Ri) = max rf for all i ∈ A, f(R) = max rf . Once we have Tf defined,
we define a correspondence L : Tf → 2A such that for each α ∈ Tf , C ∈ L(α)
if [C ∈ L(β) for some β <∗ α] or [there is R ∈ R such that ω(pf (R)) = α and
(pf (Ri) ≤∗ α⇔ i ∈ C)].
We now prove a lemma.
Lemma 3.6.12. Let f be SP and consider any α ∈ Tf and any C ∈ L(α) \ L(β) for each
β <∗ α. Then:
(i) for each R′ ∈ R such that [if i ∈ C, then pf (R′i) ≤∗ α], we have that ω(pf (R′)) ≤∗ α.
(ii) for each R′ ∈ R such that [if pf (R′i) ≤∗ α, then i ∈ C], we have that ω(pf (R′)) ≥∗ α
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Proof: We only prove (i) because (ii) is similar and thus omitted. Let α ∈ Tf and
C ∈ L(α)\L(β) for each β <∗ α. Then, there isR ∈ R such that [pf (Ri) ≤∗ α⇔ i ∈ C]
and ω(pf (R)) = α. Consider R′ ∈ R such that [if i ∈ C, then pf (R′i) ≤∗ α] and
suppose by contradiction that ω(pf (R′)) >∗ α. Let C ′ ≡ {i ∈ A : pf (R′i) ≤∗ α}. Note
that C ⊆ C ′. Consider now R̄, R̄′, R̂′ ∈ R such that
(i) pf (R̄) = pf (R) and pf (R̄′) = pf (R̂′) = pf (R′),
(ii) f(R̄) = ω(pf (R)) and f(R̂′) = ω(pf (R′)),
(iii) for each j ∈ A and each v, w ∈ rf with v ≤∗ α <∗ w, [v P̄j w ⇔ j ∈ C], and
(iv) for each j ∈ A and each v, w ∈ rf with v ≤∗ α <∗ w, [v P̄ ′j w ⇔ v P̂ ′j w ⇔ j ∈ C ′].
We first show that f(R̄′A, R̄D) ≤∗ ω(pf (R)). Suppose by contradiction that f(R̄′A,
R̄D) >
∗ ω(pf (R)). Starting at R̄, construct a sequence of profiles in which the prefer-
ences of all agents i ∈ A are changed one-by-one from R̄i to R̄′i such that the sequence
ends at (R̄′A, R̄D). Since f(R̄) = ω(pf (R)) <
∗ f(R̄′A, R̄D), the outcome of the function
must change from ω(pf (R)) or an alternative to the left of ω(pf (R)) to an alterna-
tive to the right of ω(pf (R)) along this sequence. Let S ⊂ A be the set of agents
that have changed preferences in the sequence the last time f selects an alternative
to the left or equal to ω(pf (R)). That is, f(R̄′S, R̄−S) ≤∗ ω(pf (R)). Let i ∈ A \ S
be the next agent changing preferences in the sequence. Then, by construction,
f(R̄′S∪{i}, R̄−(S∪{i})) >
∗ ω(pf (R)). If i ∈ C ′, then f(R̄′S, R̄−S) P̄ ′i f(R̄′S∪{i}, R̄−(S∪{i}))
given that, by construction, [v P̄ ′i w ⇔ i ∈ C ′] for each v, w ∈ rf with v ≤∗ α <∗ w.
Therefore, agent i manipulates f at (R̄′S∪{i}, R̄−(S∪{i})) via R̄i. Otherwise, if i ∈ A \C ′,
then f(R̄′S∪{i}, R̄−(S∪{i})) P̄i f(R̄
′
S, R̄−S) given that [v P̄iw ⇔ i ∈ C] for each v, w ∈ rf
with v ≤∗ α <∗ w and C ⊆ C ′. Therefore, agent i manipulates f at (R̄′S, R̄−S) via R̄′i.
Hence, f(R̄′A, R̄D) ≤∗ ω(pf (R)).
Since ω(pf (R′)) >∗ α and pf (R̄′A, R̄D) = pf (R
′), then we have ω(pf (R̄′A, R̄D)) >
∗
α. If [|ω(pf (R))| = 2] or [|ω(pf (R))| = 1 and ω(pf (R)) /∈ ω(pf (R̄′A, R̄D))], then
f(R̄′A, R̄D) >
∗ ω(pf (R)) and this is a contradiction. Suppose then from now on that
|ω(pf (R))| = 1 and ω(pf (R)) ∈ ω(pf (R̄′A, R̄D)). Then we have that ω(pf (R)) = α and
ω(pf (R̄
′
A, R̄D)) = (α, γ), with γ > α. Since f(R̂
′) = ω(pf (R
′)) and pf (R̂′) = pf (R′) =
pf (R̄
′
A, R̄D), then f(R̂
′) = γ.
We now show that f(R̄A, R̂′D) ≥∗ γ. Suppose by contradiction that f(R̄A, R̂′D) <∗
γ. Starting at R̂′, construct a sequence of profiles in which the preferences of all
agents i ∈ A are changed one-by-one from R̂′i to R̄i such that the sequence ends
at (R̄A, R̂′D). Since f(R̂
′) = γ >∗ f(R̄A, R̂
′
D), the outcome of the function must
change from γ or an alternative to the right of γ to an alternative to the left of γ
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along this sequence. Let S ⊂ A be the set of agents that have changed prefer-
ences in the sequence the last time f selects an alternative to the right or equal to
γ. That is, f(R̄S, R̂′−S) ≥∗ γ. Let i ∈ A \ S be the next agent changing preferences
in the sequence. Then, by construction, f(R̄S∪{i}, R̂′−(S∪{i})) <







−S) given that, by construction, [v P̂
′
i w ⇔ i ∈ C ′] for
each v, w ∈ rf with v ≤∗ α <∗ w. Therefore, agent i manipulates f at (R̄S, R̂′−S)
via R̄i. Otherwise, if i ∈ A \ C ′, then f(R̄S, R̂′−S) P̄i f(R̄S∪{i}, R̂′−(S∪{i})) given that
[v P̄iw ⇔ i ∈ C] for each v, w ∈ rf with v ≤∗ α <∗ w and C ⊆ C ′. Therefore, agent
i manipulates f at (R̄S∪{i}, R̂′−(S∪{i})) via R̂
′





Finally, since ω(pf (R)) = α and pf (R̄A, R̂′D) = pf (R), we have that f(R̄A, R̂
′
D) = α,
which is a contradiction. 
We now show that Definition 3.4.4 is satisfied.
⇐) Observe that the union of conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3.6.12 implies that, for
each R ∈ R and each α ∈ Tf , if {i ∈ A : pf (Ri) ≤∗ α} ∈ L(α) \ L(β) for all β <∗ α,
then ω(pf (R)) = α.
⇒) Consider now any α ∈ Tf , any ~pf ∈ rAf such that ω(~pf ) = α and any R ∈ R with
pf (R) = ~pf . We have to show that {i ∈ A : pf (Ri) ≤∗ α} ∈ L(α) and {i ∈ A :
pf (Ri) ≤∗ β} 6∈ L(β) for all β <∗ α. The facts that ω(~pf ) = α and pf (R) = ~pf imply
that ω(pf (R)) = α. Then, by definition of L, we have that {i ∈ A : pf (Ri) ≤∗ α} ∈
L(α). Suppose now by contradiction that {i ∈ A : pf (Ri) ≤∗ β} ∈ L(β) for some
β <∗ α. Then, ω(pf (R)) ≤∗ β and this is a contradiction.
Finally, we show that L satisfies the conditions in Definition 3.4.3 and then, it is a
left coalition system.
Observe first that condition (i) of Lemma 3.6.12 implies that if C ∈ L(α) for some
α ∈ Tf , then C ′ ∈ L(α) for each C ′ ⊇ C. Then, condition (i) in Definition 3.4.3 is
satisfied. Moreover, by definition of L, if C ∈ L(α) for some α ∈ Tf , then C ∈ L(β)
for all β >∗ α. Therefore, condition (ii) in Definition 3.4.3 is also satisfied.
Suppose now that rf has a maximum and max rf /∈ Tf and we show that ∅ ∈
L(maxTf ) \ L(α) for each α ∈ Tf \ {maxTf}. We first show that ∅ ∈ L(α) for some
α ∈ Tf . Suppose by contradiction that ∅ /∈ L(α) for any α ∈ Tf . Consider R ∈
R such that pf (Ri) = max rf for each i ∈ A. Then, {i ∈ A : pf (Ri) ≤∗ α} = ∅
for each α ∈ Tf . Since ∅ /∈ L(α) for any α ∈ Tf , we have that ω(pf (R)) /∈ Tf ,
which is a contradiction. Hence, ∅ ∈ L(α) for some α ∈ Tf . Second, we show that
∅ /∈ L(α) for each α ∈ Tf \ {maxTf}. Suppose by contradiction that ∅ ∈ L(α) for
some α ∈ Tf \ {maxTf}. Then, by condition (i) in Definition 3.4.3, we have that
L(α) = 2A. Then, ω(pf (R)) ≤∗ α for each R ∈ R. Since max rf /∈ Tf , we have
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maxTf = (y,max rf ) with y < max rf . Given that α ∈ Tf \ {maxTf}, we have that
α ≤∗ y. Therefore, ω(pf (R)) ≤∗ y for each R ∈ R, which contradicts that max rf
belongs to rf . Hence, condition (iii) in Definition 3.4.3 is also satisfied.
If, in contrast, rf does not have a maximum, then we show that ∅ /∈ L(α) for each
α ∈ Tf . Suppose by contradiction that ∅ ∈ L(α) for some α ∈ Tf . Then, by condition
(i) in Definition 3.4.3, we have that L(α) = 2A. Then, we have that ω(pf (R)) ≤∗ α
for each R ∈ R. Note that, since we also know that X is countable, we can deduce
that Tf has a maximum. Therefore, rf also has a maximum, which is a contradiction.
Then, condition (iv) in Definition 3.4.3 is also satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.7
Given a generalized median voter function ω on a set Tf , with [Vf ∪ (rf \ {min rf ,
max rf})] ⊆ Tf ⊆ Vf ∪ rf , we have to prove that g(x,y) is a voting by collections of left-
decisive sets for each (x, y) ∈ Vf . This is equivalent to show that for each (x, y) ∈ Vf ,
there is a minimal set of coalitions W (g(x,y)) ∈ 2N that satisfies the conditions in
Definition 3.4.6. We define first a set W ∗(g(x,y)) ⊆ 2N in the following way: C ∈
W ∗(g(x,y)) if there isR ∈ R such that ω(pf (R)) = (x, y), L(x,y)(R) = C and g(x,y)(R) = l
(and thus f(R) = x). Observe that, by definition, for each C ∈ W ∗(g(x,y)), C ∩
A ∈ L(x, y) \ L(x). Now, we define W (g(x,y)) as the set of the minimal coalitions of
W ∗(g(x,y)). Then, we have that W (g(x,y)) is a minimal set of coalitions and that for
each C ∈ W (g(x,y)), C ∩ A ∈ L(x, y) \ L(x).
Step 1: We show that if C ∈ W (g(x,y)), then for each R′ ∈ R such that ω(pf (R′)) = (x, y)
and C ⊆ L(x,y)(R′), we have that g(x,y)(R′) = l.
Suppose by contradiction thatC ∈ W (g(x,y)) but there is R̄ ∈ R such that ω(pf (R̄))
= (x, y), C ⊆ L(x,y)(R̄) and g(x,y)(R̄) = r (and thus f(R̄) = y). Since C ∈ W (g(x,y)),
there is R ∈ R such that ω(pf (R)) = (x, y), L(x,y)(R) = C and g(x,y)(R) = l (and thus
f(R) = x). Suppose first that L(x,y)(R̄) = C and consider (R̄C , R−C) ∈ R. Note that
{i ∈ A : pf ((R̄C , R−C)i) ≤∗ (x, y)} = {i ∈ A : pf (Ri) ≤∗ (x, y)} ∈ L(x, y) \ L(x).
Then, we have by Proposition 3.4.5 that ω(pf (R̄C , R−C)) = (x, y). If g(x,y)(R̄C , R−C) =
l, then f(R̄C , R−C) = x and the agent set N \ C manipulates f at this profile via
R̄−C . Otherwise, if g(x,y)(R̄C , R−C) = r, then f(R̄C , R−C) = y and the agent set C
manipulates f at this profile via RC . In both cases, f is not GSP and, by Proposition
3.3.1, f is not SP, which is a contradiction. Hence, observe that we have deduced
until now that for each R′ ∈ R such that ω(pf (R′)) = (x, y) and L(x,y)(R′) = C, we
have that g(x,y)(R′) = l (and thus f(R′) = x).
Suppose now that L(x,y)(R̄) 6= C, that is, C ⊂ L(x,y)(R̄). Denote B = L(x,y)(R̄) and
observe that C ⊂ B. Consider (R̄C , R−C) ∈ R. Note that {i ∈ A : pf ((R̄C , R−C)i) ≤∗
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(x, y)} = {i ∈ A : pf (Ri) ≤∗ (x, y)} ∈ L(x, y) \ L(x). Then, we have by Proposi-
tion 3.4.5 that ω(pf (R̄C , R−C)) = (x, y). Given that L(x,y)(R̄C , R−C) = C, we have,
by the previous paragraph, that g(x,y)(R̄C , R−C) = l and thus, f(R̄C , R−C) = x. Con-
sider now (R̄B, R−B) ∈ R. Note that {i ∈ A : pf ((R̄B, R−B)i) ≤∗ (x, y)} = {i ∈
A : pf (R̄i) ≤∗ (x, y)} ∈ L(x, y) \ L(x). Then, we have by Proposition 3.4.5 that
ω(pf (R̄B, R−B)) = (x, y). If g(x,y)(R̄B, R−B) = l, then f(R̄B, R−B) = x and the agent
set N \ B manipulates f at this profile via R̄N\B. Otherwise, if g(x,y)(R̄B, R−B) = r,
then f(R̄B, R−B) = y and the agent set B \ C manipulates f at this profile via RB\C .
In both cases, f is not GSP and, by Proposition 3.3.1, f is not SP, which is a contra-
diction.
Step 2: We show that for each C ∈ W (g(x,y)), C ∩D 6= ∅.
Suppose by contradiction that there is C ∈ W (g(x,y)) such that C ∩D = ∅. Then,
by definition, C ∩ A = C ∈ L(x, y) \ L(x). Consider any ~pf ∈ rAf such that for each
i ∈ A, (~pf )i ≤∗ (x, y) ⇔ i ∈ C. Since C ∈ L(x, y) \ L(x), there is R ∈ R such that
pf (R) = ~pf and f(R) = y. However, observe that C ⊆ L(x,y)(R) and then, by Step 2,
we have that g(x,y)(R) = l and thus, f(R) = x, which is a contradiction.
Step 3: We show that for each minimal coalition B of L(x, y) \ L(x), there is C ∈ W (g(x,y))
such that C ∩ A = B.
Suppose by contradiction that for some minimal coalition B of L(x, y) \ L(x),
there is no C ∈ W (g(x,y)) such that C ∩ A = B. Consider any ~pf ∈ rAf such that
for each i ∈ A, (~pf )i ≤∗ (x, y) ⇔ i ∈ B. Since B ∈ L(x, y) \ L(x), there is R ∈ R
such that pf (R) = ~pf and f(R) = x. Observe that L(x,y)(R) ∩ A = B. Since for
each C ∈ W (g(x,y)), C ∩ A 6= B, we have that there is no C ∈ W (g(x,y)) such that
C ⊆ L(x,y)(R). Therefore, g(x,y)(R) = r and thus, f(R) = y, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.8
First, note that the equivalence between (i) and (ii) is provided in Proposition 3.3.1.
Then, it only remains to be shown the equivalence between (i) and (iii).
If (i) is satisfied, then the structure of the rule f is as described in (iii) given
the results of Sections 3.3 and 3.4. To prove that (iii) implies (i), consider any rule
f such that it can be decomposed as described in (iii) with a generalized median
voter function ω on a set Tf , with [Vf ∪ (rf \ {min rf ,max rf})] ⊆ Tf ⊆ Vf ∪ rf ,
and a set of voting by collections of left-decisive sets {g(x,y) : R → {l, r}}(x,y)∈Vf .
Suppose by contradiction that there is a profile R ∈ R and an agent i ∈ N with the
alternative preference R′i ∈ Ri such that f(R′i, R−i)Pi f(R). We assume without loss
of generality that f(R) < f(R′i, R−i).
Suppose first that ω(pf (R)) = ω(pf (R′i, R−i)). If |ω(pf (R))| = 1, then f(R) =
f(R′i, R−i), which contradicts f(R′i, R−i)Pi f(R). Otherwise, if |ω(pf (R))| = 2, then
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f(R) = ω(pf (R)) and f(R′i, R−i) = ω(pf (R)). Given that f(R) = ω(pf (R)), we
know by definition that gω(pf (R))(R) = l and therefore, C ⊆ Lω(pf (R))(R) for some
C ∈ W (gω(pf (R))).8 Since f(R′i, R−i)Pi f(R), i /∈ Lω(pf (R))(R). Observe then that
Lω(pf (R))(R) ⊆ Lω(pf (R))(R′i, R−i) and thus, C ⊂ Lω(pf (R))(R′i, R−i). Therefore, gω(pf (R))
(R′i, R−i) = l and consequently, f(R′i, R−i) = ω(pf (R)), which is a contradiction.
Suppose now that ω(pf (R)) 6= ω(pf (R′i, R−i)). Then, i ∈ A and given that f(R) <
f(R′i, R−i), we have that ω(pf (R)) <∗ ω(pf (R′i, R−i)). Since f(R′i, R−i)Pi f(R), we
have that if |ω(pf (R))| = 1, then pf (Ri) > ω(pf (R)) and if |ω(pf (R))| = 2, then
pf (Ri) ≥ ω(pf (R)). Thus, in any case pf (Ri) >∗ ω(pf (R)) and then, i /∈ {j ∈ A :
pf (Rj) ≤∗ ω(pf (R))}. Observe then that {j ∈ A : pf (Rj) ≤∗ ω(pf (R))} ⊆ {j ∈ A :
pf ((R
′
i, R−i)j) ≤∗ ω(pf ((R′i, R−i))}. Therefore, by Proposition 3.4.5, ω(pf (R′i, R−i)) ≤∗
ω(pf (R)), which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.1
We first prove (i). Take any SP rule f such that rf = X . Suppose by contradiction
that f is not PE. Then, there is x ∈ X and R ∈ R such that xPi f(R) for each i ∈ N .
Since rf = X , x ∈ rf and then there is a profileR′ ∈ R such that f(R′) = x. Therefore,
the agent set N manipulates f at R via R′ and f is not GSP. By Proposition 3.3.1, f is
not SP, which is a contradiction.
Second, we show (ii). Take any SP rule f such that rf /∈ {X, {minX,maxX}}.
Therefore,X\rf 6= ∅. Suppose by contradiction that f is PE. First, we prove the result
when {minX,maxX} 6⊂ rf . Suppose without loss of generality that minX /∈ rf .
Consider R ∈ R such that for each i ∈ A, p(Ri) = minX and for each i ∈ D,
d(Ri) = maxX . Observe that, by construction, minX Pi x for each x ∈ rf and each
i ∈ N . Then, minX Pareto dominates f(R) because f(R) ∈ rf . Now, we prove the
case in which {minX,maxX} ⊂ rf . Let x ∈ X \ rf and let y ∈ rf \ {min rf ,max rf}
be the closest alternative to x in rf \ {min rf ,max rf}. Observe that x and y always
exist because rf /∈ {X, {minX,maxX}}. Consider a profile R′ ∈ R such that for
each i ∈ A, [p(R′i) = x and pf (R′i) = y], and for each i ∈ D, df (R′i) = y. Then,
{j ∈ A : pf (R′j) ≤∗ y} = A and for each α <∗ y, {j ∈ A : pf (R′j) ≤∗ α} = ∅. Therefore,
by Theorem 3.4.8, ω(pf (R′)) = y, and f(R′) = y. However, xP ′i y for each i ∈ N and
a contradiction is reached.
Finally, we prove (iii). Consider any SP rule f such that rf = {minX,maxX} 6=
X . We divide the proof into three steps:
Step 1: We show that if A = ∅, then f is PE.
8With a slight abuse of notation, we write for each R ∈ R, Lω(pf (R))(R) to refer to
L(ω(pf (R)),ω(pf (R)))(R).
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Since A = ∅, N = D 6= ∅. Observe then that for any agent, either minX or maxX
is the most preferred alternative of X . Consider first any profile R ∈ R such that
all agents have the same most preferred alternative of X . Assume, without loss of
generality, that this most preferred alternative is minX . Then, L(minX,maxX)(R) = N
and, by Theorem 3.4.8, g(minX,maxX)(R) = l and f(R) = minX . Consider now any
profile R′ ∈ R such that not all agents have the same most preferred alternative.
Then, there are some agents, say S ⊂ D, whose most preferred alternative is minX ,
while for the remaining agents, N \S, maxX is the most preferred alternative. Since
rf = {minX,maxX}, we have f(R′) ∈ {minX,maxX}. If, on the one hand, f(R′) =
minX , then f(R′)P ′i x for each i ∈ S and each x ∈ X \{minX}. If, on the other hand,
f(R′) = maxX , then f(R′)P ′i x for each i ∈ N \ S and each x ∈ X \ {maxX}. Hence,
f is PE.
Step 2: We show that if A 6= ∅ and Tf = {(minX,maxX)}, then f is PE.
Since we know, by Theorem 3.4.8 (exactly by point (i) in Definition 3.4.6), that for
each C ∈ W (g(minX,maxX)), C ∩D 6= ∅, we have that D 6= ∅. Additionally, since rf has
a maximum at maxX and maxX /∈ Tf , we know, by Theorem 3.4.8 (exactly by point
(iii) in Definition 3.4.3) that ∅ ∈ L(minX,maxX). Then, ∅ is a minimal coalition
of L(minX,maxX) and by Theorem 3.4.8 (exactly by point (ii) in Definition 3.4.6),
there is C ∈ W (g(minX,maxX)) such that C ⊆ D. Observe that for any agent of D,
either minX or maxX is the most preferred alternative of X . Observe also that
since Tf = {(minX,maxX)}, then for each R ∈ R, ω(pf (R)) = (minX,maxX).
Consider first any profile R′ ∈ R such that C ⊆ L(minX,maxX)(R′). Then, by Theorem
3.4.8, g(minX,maxX)(R′) = l and f(R′) = minX . Since C ⊆ L(minX,maxX)(R′) and C ⊆
D, we have that minX P ′i x for each i ∈ C and each x ∈ X \ {minX}. Consider
now any profile R′′ ∈ R such that C 6⊆ L(minX,maxX)(R′′). Then, by Theorem 3.4.8,
g(minX,maxX)(R
′′) = r and f(R′′) = maxX . Since C 6⊆ L(minX,maxX)(R′′) and C ⊆ D,
we have that maxX P ′′i x for some i ∈ C and each x ∈ X \ {maxX}. Hence, f is PE.
Step 3: We show that if A 6= ∅ and Tf 6= {(minX,maxX)}, then f is not PE.
Since rf = {minX,maxX} and Tf 6= {(minX,maxX)}, we have that minX ∈
Tf and/or maxX ∈ Tf . Suppose without loss of generality that minX ∈ Tf . Let
x ∈ X \ rf and consider a profile R ∈ R such that for each i ∈ A, [p(Ri) = x
and pf (Ri) = minX], and for each i ∈ D, df (Ri) = minX . Since minX ∈ Tf and
{j ∈ A : pf (Rj) ≤∗ minX} = A then, by Theorem 3.4.8, we have ω(pf (R)) = minX
and f(R) = minX . However, xPi minX for each i ∈ N and thus, f is not PE.
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Conclusions and further research
This thesis focuses on analyzing some aspects of two fields of economics, Coopera-
tive Game Theory and Social Choice Theory, where agents’ preferences or opinions
play a crucial role in the final outcome. Regarding Cooperative Game Theory, we
analyze how agents’ preferences over the coalitions in which they may take part
lead to stable partitions (Chapter 1). We also study the specific structure of those
stable partitions (Chapter 2). Regarding Social Choice Theory, we analyze a location
problem in which agents’ preferences over alternatives give rise to a final collective
decision that cannot be manipulated by any agent (Chapter 3). Our main findings
are summed up below, and some questions and extensions, which have arisen in the
course of our work, are pointed out.
Chapter 1, written in collaboration with Elena Iñarra of the University of the
Basque Country, introduces a generalized claims problem to deal with coalition for-
mation in a bankruptcy situation, bringing together two branches of the literature
that have been analyzed separately until now: Claims problems and coalition for-
mation problems. In this new setting, we analyze the core stability of the coalition
formation problems that emerge from bankruptcy situations. The main result, The-
orem 2, characterizes all rules that guarantee the non-emptiness of the core. The
properties required for such a characterization are continuity, resource monotonic-
ity, and consistency. We show, for instance, that the Random Arrival rule (Shapley,
1953), which fails to satisfy consistency, may induce coalition formation problems
with an empty core. By contrast, we analyze a well-known class of rules, parametric
rules (Young, 1987), which satisfy the required properties so that the existence of sta-
ble partitions is guaranteed. Chapter 1 also contributes to the literature of coalition
formation problems by introducing a new class of games, called “regular coalition
formation problems", which guarantee the existence of stability. These problems sat-
isfy the properties of weak pairwise alignment and lack of rings. This new class
includes the coalition formation problems that satisfy the common ranking property
(Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988) and is contained in the class of stable coalition forma-
tion problems that satisfy the top coalition property (Banerjee et al., 2001).
Several questions emerge from this new model. An initial extension in the short
run is the application of other concepts of stability in addition to core stability. For
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there to be core stability there must be no coalition such that all agents strictly pre-
fer that coalition to the one in which they are taking part in the current partition.
However, we could require there to be no coalition such that only one agent strictly
prefers that coalition to her coalition in the current partition while the others are not
worse off. The strong core notion Roth and Postlewaite (1977) can then be applied.
Further, if the idea is to focus on the analysis of partitions in which no agent can
benefit from moving from her current coalition to another existing coalition, Nash
stability Bogomolnaia et al. (2002) should be applied. Bogomolnaia et al. (2002) also
define other stability concepts related to individual deviations such as individual sta-
bility and contractual individual stability. Recently, Karakaya (2011) has proposed a
new stability notion based on the so-called “free exit-free entry membership rights",
referring to it as strong Nash stability.
Looking again at the input of a generalized claims problem (a vector of claims
and a set of endowments), two natural extensions emerge. With respect to claims,
observe that we have assumed that they are the same across coalitions, which re-
flects a kind of objectivity. However, claims may be subjective and may depend,
for instance, on the identities of the members of the coalitions. The introduction of
subjective claims may make the analysis cumbersome and it is thus left for future
research. Endowments might depend on how the remaining agents are organized,
which may lead to externalities across coalitions and may call for the analysis of a
game in partition function.
Pycia (2012) proves that the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution Kalai and
Smorodinsky (1975) does not always induce stability. Similarly, we prove in Chapter
1 that the random arrival rule does not always induce coalition formation problems
with stable partitions. Therefore, the study of the domains of coalition formation
problems in which these and other well-known rules induce stability is another pos-
sibly extension that merits further analysis.
Another issue that arises naturally from the results provided in Chapter 1 is the
analysis of the structure of the stable partitions. This question is addressed in Chap-
ter 2, written in collaboration with Bettina Klaus of the University of Lausanne. Once
the non-emptiness of the core is guaranteed, the study of how agents sort themselves
into coalitions to form stable partitions becomes a relevant issue. Note that pay-
offs may differ considerably depending on the rule used to divide the endowments,
which induces different agents’ preferences so different stable partitions may emerge
under different rules. We analyze a particular generalized claims problem where the
endowment of each group is a fixed proportion of the sum of its members’ claims
and singleton coalitions receive zero endowment. Proportional cuts are frequently
applied in many real-life situations, so they seem to be a very natural constraint to
consider. We show that when any continuous, strict resource monotonic, and con-
sistent rule is applied, each stable partition contains at most one singleton and for
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any coalition with a size larger than two, each agent receives a proportional payoff.
For the weak notion of resource monotonicity, we do not characterize all stable par-
titions but we still guarantee the existence of a pairwise stable partition with at most
one singleton coalition if the set of agents is odd. We also provide two algorithms for
constructing pairwise stable partitions for the CEA and CEL rules, respectively. For
CEA, a pairwise stable partition is obtained by assortatively pairing off either the
two highest claim agents (assortative coalition) or the highest and the lowest claim
agent (extremal coalition). For CEL, an assortative stable partition is obtained by
sequentially pairing off the two lowest claim agents.
One possible extension of Chapter 2 is briefly explained in its last section, which
outlines how the model can be generalized to more real-life situations. Recall the
example of the call for funding research teams in which the government has a budget
to invest in projects. Those projects can be carried out by research groups which must
be formed by researchers with the aim of obtaining a joint profit to divide among
them. When the budget cannot be directly assigned to agents, a two-step procedure
is needed. The process can thus be sketched as follows: First, the budget is divided
among the groups and, second, the amount for each group is divided among its
members. In this case, the formation of groups will depend on both the rule that
divides the budget among the different groups and the rule that is used to distribute
the endowment of each group among its members. This two-step model would
enable the stable partitions which emerge from different combinations of rules to
be analyzed.
Finally, Chapter 3, written in collaboration with Jorge Alcalde-Unzu of the Uni-
versidad Pública de Navarra and Marc Vorsatz of the Universidad Nacional de Edu-
cación a Distancia (UNED), analyzes the problem of locating a public facility taking
into account agents’ preferences over the possible locations. In particular, we con-
sider the location of a facility that is considered a good by part of society and a bad by
the rest. Even though this context has been already analyzed, we propose a new do-
main in which the kind of preferences of each agent (single-peaked or single-dipped
preferences) is known by the social planner but there is no public information about
the location of the peak or dip and the rest of the preference of each agent. This
model allows each agent to have her peak or dip at any point such as her house, her
workplace or her children’s school. In this setting, we look for social choice rules
that induce agents to reveal their preferences truthfully. The main result character-
izes all strategy-proof rules on this domain and shows that they are all also group
strategy-proof. We also analyze which of these rules are Pareto efficient.
A primary extension of the results of this chapter is the study of which strategy-
proof rules satisfy the axiom of anonymity. It must be taken into account that it is
not possible to apply the classical definition of anonymity because the set of admis-
sible preferences differs from one agent to another. We therefore opt to the prop-
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erty of type-anonymity, which allows for permutations only between those agents
with the same set of admissible preferences (i.e., an agent with single-peaked pref-
erences can only swap with another agent with single-peaked preferences, and an
agent with single-dipped preferences can only swap with another agent with single-
dipped preferences). This extension is already in progress.
Another straightforward question concerns indifferences. The model in Chapter
3 only considers preferences that are linear orders. If indifferences are allowed for,
then the domains need to be extended to single-plateau Berga (1998); Moulin (1984)
and single-basined Bossert and Peters (2014) preferences, respectively.
A natural question that comes to mind is how the results can be extended for the
case of k units of the same facility. This extension needs to take into account several
technical issues that complicate it. A particular agent could, for instance, have single-
peaked preferences over the location of each unit of the facility, but there are many
possible ways of extending those preferences to vectors of locations of the k units
of the facility (see, for instance, Heo (2013) and Lahiri and Pramanik (2019) for the
location of two public goods and several public bads, respectively, on an interval).
One last possible extension for the results of Chapter 3 could be the analysis of
the case in which the possible locations are described by a k-dimensional vector (see
Barberà et al. (1993) for a similar analysis of the case of only single-peaked prefer-
ences).
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